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This thesis makes a contribution to that part of the economics literature that explores 
how behavioural economics can inform environmental economics. Theoretically, the 
thesis develops the concept of environmental morale. Empirically, the study 
investigates the role of environmental morale on individuals’ behaviour within two 
different contexts: recycling participation and intertemporal choices over different 
goods (i.e., money, environment, and health) and outcomes (i.e., gains and losses). 
Major objectives of this analysis are: to shed light on how environmental morale 
interplays with individuals’ behaviour under different recycling policy schemes, and 
to examine whether temporal discounting is domain specific and depends on 
environmental morale heterogeneity. Original survey investigations are employed to 
analyse these issues. 
 
Results highlight the relevance of environmental morale both in motivating 
individuals’ contribution to recycling and intertemporal choices towards 
environmental outcomes. Regarding the interaction between environmental morale, 
recycling participation and government interventions, results from this analysis 
suggest that a facilitating nudge policy seems to be relatively more powerful in 
increasing individuals’ contribution and motivation towards recycling. Considering 
intertemporal choices, a paradox of hyperopia seems to be located in data provided 
in this analysis. 
 
Some of the original contributions of the thesis are, first the broader 
reconceptualization of the definition of environmental morale and its 
operationalization in analyses of questionnaire preferences. Secondly, in line with 
other areas of research (i.e., tax compliance literature); this study pursues an 
investigation of individual and cultural differences with respect to recycling policies, 
an area which has been neglected in the environmental economics literature. In this 
regard, the analysis considers a comparison between psychology and economics 
students in Italy and the UK. Thirdly, conditioning discounting on environmental 
morale offers a unique opportunity to analyse how ethical considerations influence 
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1.1 INTRODUCTION AND RATIONALE OF STUDY 
 
This thesis makes a contribution to that part of the literature that explores how 
behavioural economics can advance the science of environmental economics. 
Environmental economics has traditionally been focused on developing solutions to 
market failures. Market failures are typically associated with externalities, public 
goods, and asymmetric information. Economists refer to these sources of economic 
inefficiency to design and evaluate public policies for environmental sustainability, 
which include command and control regulation (i.e., emission standards) as well as 
price-based instruments (i.e., Pigovian taxes, tradable permits, fines and subsidies). 
The idea that economic theory can prevent market failures is based on the 
assumption of rational behaviour – i.e., consistent behaviour. Rational choice theory 
is a key concept for neoclassical welfare economics, which suggests the adoption of 
a prescriptive approach to guide environmental policy. Indeed, if people make 
consistent and systematic choices, predictions can be made when homo economicus1 
faces new constraints.   
 
Despite the attractiveness of this approach, over the past four decades, numerous 
empirical studies in different areas of research have pointed out the limits of human 
behaviour providing evidence for systematic deviations from rational choice theory 
(see e.g. Tversky and Kahneman, 2000). Behavioural economics commonly 
analyses, describes and catalogues such deviations in three general categories: 
bounded rationality, bounded self-interest, and bounded willpower (see Shogren and 
Taylor, 2008). Bounded rationality (also known in the literature as ‘individual 
failure’ – see Cullis and Jones, 2009) refers to the idea that even under perfect 
information individuals might not be able to make rational choices. Rather, they may 
use rules of thumb and shortcuts to make decisions, which produce behavioural 
                                                 
1 This term is also referred in the literature as Rational Economic Man (REM). 
2 
 
biases. Bounded self-interest is related to individuals’ concern for others’ well-being. 
Many studies in the literature provide, in fact, evidence for emotive or ‘other-
regarding’ preferences (i.e., reciprocity, altruism, and inequity aversion). Bounded 
willpower relates to lack of self-control. Examples are procrastination, instinctive 
decisions and saving too little.  
 
Departures from rational behaviour lead to behavioural ‘failures’, where 
behavioural failure here indicates a person who fails to behave as predicted by 
rational choice theory. The literature accounts for a significant body of evidence of 
behavioural failures, commonly referred to as an anomaly, paradox, heuristic bias, 
and fallacy. This suggests that, in some circumstances, rational choice theory might 
be a poor guide for economics in general, and for environmental economics in 
particular (see Shogren and Taylor, 2008). According to Crocker et al. (1998, p. 
159), “because the most visible and well-understood exchange institution, the 
competitive market, has relatively little role in arbitraging environmental assets…a 
public policy focus for environmental assets upon the findings of benefit–cost 
analysis narrowly interpreted in terms of the real individual’s hypothetical, 
impeccable utility maximization is highly problematic and plausibly self-defeating”. 
Specifically, the absence of an active market arbitrage to encourage consistent 
choices among individuals can generate anomalous behaviours; undermining rational 
expectations underpinning environmental policy (see Shogren and Taylor, 2008). 
 
This has recently motivated some scholars to argue that government interventions 
can be justified to correct both market and behavioural failures. Such a new form of 
intervention envisages a more paternalistic role of the government not only to 
guarantee environmental sustainability but also to deal with what is known in the 
literature as homo realitus2. Indeed, if in the presence of market failures (such as 
with public goods) there is an undeniable need for government intervention, when 
these failures are exacerbated by the arrival of homo realitus, in some circumstances, 
the size of the public sector might be even greater. Some researchers call this 
libertarian paternalism (see Thaler and Sunstein, 2008), where governments are 
legitimated to influence individuals’ behaviour (albeit people are free to choose) to 
                                                 
2 An individual that is “reliant on bounded rationality, concerned with more than pure self-interest, 
and responsive to signals that affect preferences” (see Cullis and Jones, 2009, p. 487). 
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protect citizens from their own self-destructive anomalous behaviour and lack of 
self-control. If this new form of paternalism has credit, environmental policy makers 
should consider the taxonomy of possible behavioural failures undermining 
efficiency-promoting environmental regulations, thus taking into consideration their 
interaction with market failures to promote effective policy designs.   
 
1.2 BACKGROUND LITERATURE  
 
As compared to other areas of research, the literature lacks empirical investigations 
of relevant environmental behavioural failures. To the extent that this might be 
crucial not only to identify relative solutions to environmental problems, but also to 
partially explain why in modern economies people seems to be hesitant to adopt 
more sustainable behaviour, this is a quite surprising fact. More than a decade ago, 
Knetsch (1997, p. 209) suggested in fact that “in view of the evidence, the seemingly 
quite deliberate avoidance of any accounting of these [behavioural] findings in the 
design of environmental policy or in debates over environmental values, does not 
appear to be the most productive means to improvement”. The present research seeks 
to contribute towards answering two open questions in the environmental economics 
literature. First, how can behavioural failures inform environmental policy? Second, 
when are behavioural failures relevant to the science of environmental policy?  
 
As suggested by Shogren and Taylor (2008), behavioural economics has had the 
biggest impact on environmental economics through the study of nonmarket 
valuation of environmental goods. Indeed, a well-documented behavioural anomaly 
in the literature is the discrepancy between the willingness to pay (WTP) and 
willingness to accept (WTA) monetary compensation for a commodity3, with the 
former being generally greater than the latter. Although the willingness to pay/accept 
asymmetry can be partially attributable (see e.g. Shogren et al., 1994) to lack of 
substitutability between tangible (e.g., money) and intangible (e.g., environment) 
goods, there is a general consensus over the hypothesis that the endowment effect – 
i.e., the tendency to value goods that are owned by individuals more than those not 
                                                 
3 With small income effects and many substitutes, the willingness to pay e.g. for a public good change 
and the willingness to accept compensation to postpone the same change should coincide. However, 
empirical evidence suggests that this is wrong (see e.g. Kahneman et al., 1990). 
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held in their endowment – plays a major role here. Without wishing to carry this 
discussion any further in this work, it is interesting to note that over the past decades, 
the incorporation of the endowment effect into welfare theoretical models and the 
role of government intervention in the presence of this behavioural anomaly have 
triggered many responses among scholars, albeit leaving unresolved questions.   
 
Besides the willingness to pay/accept asymmetry, there might be many other 
situations where behavioural failures may affect the way researchers and policy 
makers think about environmental policy designs. Shogren and Taylor (2008) 
identify choices under risk, environmental conflicts and cooperation, and the use of 
mechanism design to control for market failure as possible sources of behavioural 
failure. However, scarce empirical evidence (if any) exists in the literature 
documenting the presence and implications of behavioural anomalies within these 
contexts.  
 
1.3 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY  
 
This study aims to analyse the impact of environmental morale on individuals’ 
behaviour. In recent years, scholars have widely recognized the importance of morale 
considerations (or social norms) on individuals’ behaviour (see Halla and Schneider, 
2013). The failure of the neo-classical model of tax evasion to predict real-world 
compliance for example has lent credence to the hypotheses that benefit and tax 
morale – i.e., ‘the morale motivation to abstain from cheating on the state via benefit 
and tax evasion, respectively (see Halla and Schneider, 2013, p. 3) – play a major 
role in determining compliance behaviour. Despite an increasing number of papers 
acknowledging the role of environmental morale as a driving force for pro-
environmental behaviours (see e.g., Frey, 1997, and Frey and Stutzer, 2006), to date 
empirical evidence on the casual link between environmental morale and pro-
environmental behaviour is largely missing (Torgler et al., 2009, and Feldman and 
Perez, forthcoming, are exemptions). A possible explanation for the relative neglect 
of empirical analyses of these issues can be related to problems in disentangling 
behaviour arising from intrinsic (i.e., inherent to the individuals’ self) and extrinsic 
(i.e., outside the individuals’ self) motivation using secondary (rather than primary) 
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data. This can be even more problematic when terminology in the literature is 
confusing and there is overlap between the definitions of different concepts. This 
confusion is particularly apparent in the case of environmental morale.  
 
Environmental morale is generally referred to as the result of the aggregation of 
internalized norms and intrinsic motivation (Frey, 1997, Frey and Stutzer, 2006). 
Internalized norms can be considered as moral obligations that come from a 
cognitive process – i.e., an external regulation that becomes an autonomous 
regulation (see also Coleman, 1994). Intrinsic motivation represents instead “the 
doing of an activity for its inherent satisfaction rather than for some separable 
outcomes” (Ryan and Deci, 2000a, p.56) – i.e. extrinsic motivation. However, the 
distinction between the two terms becomes subtle, especially when norms have been 
internalized (see Frey and Stutzer, 2006). If a non-intrinsically motivated behaviour 
(i.e. obeying a social norm) becomes an internalized value, individuals feel a sense of 
obligation to that norm, and acting against this moral responsibility results in 
negative feelings (i.e. feelings of guilt and frustration, reduced self-esteem, and other 
negative self-evaluation).  
 
In order to address these aspects, the present study employs original survey 
questionnaire analyses and proposes a broader and novel definition of environmental 
morale which comprises attitudes and beliefs towards the environment driven by 
ethical considerations (e.g., it is wrong not to behave according to eco-conscious 
considerations). As an analogy with the tax evasion literature (Torgler, 2005, p. 526), 
environmental morale will be defined as the intrinsic motivation (or behavioural 
motive) to contribute to a better environment. That is, environmental morale 
represents individuals’ willingness or moral obligation to behave in an 
environmentally conscious way, or their belief in contributing to society by 
displaying pro-environmental behaviours. Likewise, tax morale includes feelings of 
moral regret or guilt over cheating on taxes, so environmental morale might involve 
individuals’ oppressiveness (i.e. negative feelings) as a deterrent to free riding. The 
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greater such oppressiveness, the more individuals will be driven towards more 
sustainable behaviours4.  
 
A common practice in the literature on tax compliance and benefit fraud is to 
employ large micro data sets from the European and World Value Survey (E/WVS) 
to investigate the role of morale on individuals’ behaviour. Morale is generally 
inferred from specific questions of the E/WVS justifiability section. The E/WVS 
single-items used to assess respectively the level of tax and benefit morale are 
framed as follows: ‘Please tell me for each of the following statements, whether you 
think it is never justified, always justified or somewhere in between: …cheating on 
taxes if you have the chance…claiming state benefits which you are not entitled’, 
where a ten-point Likert scale (1 = never justified, 10 = always justified) serves to 
assess different levels of morale. A similar approach has been recently used by 
Torgler et al. (2009) to analyse the relationship between environmental morale and 
pro-environmental behaviour. Within the justifiability section of the WVS, the 
authors assess the level of environmental morale according to answers provided to 
the option ‘throwing away litter in a public place’. However, there are some 
limitations to this approach. Given the peculiarity of the questions related to tax and 
benefit fraud, a single-item approach seems to be feasible to capture tax and benefit 
morale. Considering environmental morale, the available question in the WVS tends 
to capture only a single aspect of environmentally-friendly behaviours. Therefore, a 
multi-item index might be more appropriate to provide a comprehensive measure of 
individuals’ morale (see also Torgler et al., ibid)5. For this reason, in the current 
research environmental morale will be inferred using different sets of questions 
(index-items) regarding environmentally-friendly attitudes towards the environment 
(i.e., willingness to buy a ‘green’ product rather than a conventional identical good, 
and individuals’ attitudes towards energy and water saving, recycling and use of 
public transit). Compared to other approaches, survey analyses/experiments in 
general and primary data in particular have the advantage of controlling for specific 
                                                 
4 Despite these similarities, perhaps the most relevant difference between the two concepts lies on the 
consequences on wealth and resource redistribution. Indeed, while tax compliance is generally 
associated with income redistribution within a country, environmental morale is commonly related to 
the allocation, distribution and use of environmental resources. Thus, it can be argued that, differently 
from tax compliance, failing to contribute to a better environment now might have a major impact on 
future generations.  
5 Pros and cons of using a multi-item index will be discussed in detail in the following chapters. 
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factors explaining individuals’ behaviours, thus providing a unique opportunity to 
examine peculiar aspects of a particular phenomenon.  
 
Based on this definition, the main contributions of this work are to examine 
whether or not environmental morale plays a major role in determining individuals’ 
behaviour towards the environment, and to analyse how this can inform policy 
makers to design effective policy measures. The linkage between environmental 
morale and individuals’ behaviour will be investigated in two different contexts: 
recycling participation and intertemporal choices. First, the analysis seeks to shed 
light on how different policy designs (i.e., voluntary scheme, facilitating nudge 
scheme, and mandatory scheme) interplay with individuals’ willingness to participate 
in recycling activities via a crowding-out/in effect of environmental morale. In 
contrast with the orthodox literature, which suggests that the success of the economic 
approach to human behaviour is due to the relative price effect, many contributions 
in different fields of study show that price-based instruments (e.g. rewards, fines, and 
taxes) undermine moral motivation6. However, to date there seems to be only one 
study (see Feldman and Perez, forthcoming) that analyses the relationship between 
external incentives and individuals’ underlying motivation7. Likewise other non-
monetary motivations (e.g., altruism), environmental morale can be relevant for 
policy implications because it can render certain policies less effective (crowding-
out) and others more effective (crowding-in). Thus, understanding the interaction 
between environmental morale and policy regulation is critical to successful policy 
implementation, as in one set of circumstances they can reinforce each other, 
whereas in another set of circumstances they can be offsetting. 
 
 Second, given the relevance that ethical considerations have received in the 
theoretical literature of discounting, the present analysis seeks to further explore 
whether temporal discounting is domain specific and depends on environmental 
morale heterogeneity. There are only a few studies in the literature that analyse the 
differences in discounting between environmental and other domains (e.g. Guyse et 
al., 2002, Böhm and Pfister, 2005, and Hardisty and Weber, 2009), and the available 
                                                 
6 For a review of the literature see e.g. Frey and Jegen (2001). 
7 However, as it will be further discussed in the following chapters, Feldman and Perez (forthcoming) 
consider different external incentives than those considered in this analysis. 
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studies provide controversial results. Some support the adoption of different discount 
rates for different commodities (see e.g. Böhm and Pfister, 2005, and Gattig and 
Hendrickx, 2007) – i.e., discounting is domain specific. These studies in general find 
a lower discount rate for environmental goods, which seems to be justified by the 
presumption of ethical concerns about future generations. Alternatively, other 
contributions to the literature suggest using a single discount rate for all goods (see 
e.g. Hardisty and Weber, 2009) as differences in discounting are context (or valence) 
and not domain dependent. This is an unexpected result, which however represents 
good news for researchers and politicians who generally attempt to set a unique 
official discount rate for judging long-term projects and investments (see Hardisty 
and Weber, ibid). Although these studies provide possible explanations for discount 
rate differences, to the best of the author’s knowledge, there are no empirical 
analyses in the literature that attempt to explain the connection between 
environmental morale and discounting environmental outcomes. To the extent that 
people form expectations on future outcomes by means of two different neural 
systems (see Loewenstein and O’ Donoghue, 2007) – i.e., deliberative (or cognitive) 
system vs. affective (or emotional) system – it is interesting to investigate how 
environmental morale interplays with the two systems and how this influences 
discounting. Understanding the factors that affect discounting is of crucial 
importance for analysis of decisions that imply a trade-off between current and future 
benefits and costs.  
 
1.4 OUTLINE OF THE THESIS 
 
Given that environmental morale is a key concept in this thesis, chapter 2 provides a 
comprehensive description of the interaction between intrinsic motivation and 
extrinsic motivation based on a psychological and an economic perspective. 
Alongside the theory, a simple model of motivational crowding-out/in effect is also 
outlined to vividly describe how individuals’ environmental morale interacts with 
monetary incentives. This is followed by a critical literature review of the definition 
of environmental morale, which provides some insights into the linkage between 
environmental morale and other-regarding theories (i.e., social norms, altruism, and 
reciprocity). The chapter concludes with an overview of the existing contributions 
9 
 
describing how efficiency-promoting environmental instruments may crowd-out/in 
intrinsic motivation.  
 
Chapter 2 provides the foundation and rationale for the survey questionnaire 
described in chapter 3. One of the major objectives of this survey is to investigate 
whether monetary incentives can be counterproductive, thus undermining 
individuals’ intrinsic motivation to contribute to a better environment. The ‘low cost 
argument’ suggests that feasible areas of intervention can be found only in the 
private sector.8 Therefore, the study focuses on individuals’ attitudes towards 
recycling activities. Furthermore, given that in other areas of research (e.g., 
individuals’ cooperation and tax compliance) the nature of homo economicus has 
been investigated both at the individual level and at the cultural level, the present 
analysis pursues a similar evaluation within the context of recycling behaviour. At 
the individual level, the analysis provides a comparison between psychology and 
economics students. At the cultural level, the study offers a cross-country 
comparison between Italy and the UK. The survey considers three different policy 
designs: a voluntary scheme, a facilitating nudge policy and a mandatory scheme. 
The aim of the questionnaire is to analyse how individuals’ provision of efforts 
towards recycling changes with the policy schemes. Therefore, respondents’ attitudes 
towards the facilitating nudge policy and the mandatory scheme are conditioned on 
the voluntary scheme (i.e., the benchmark situation). Follow up questions, socio-
demographic/economic and attitudinal questions will contribute to understanding 
respondents’ choices in the empirical analysis. This is presented in chapter 4 along 
with a discussion of policy implications.  
 
The increasing attention that ethical concerns have received in the literature on 
discounting, their implications for intergenerational equity and environmental 
sustainability are highlighted in chapter 5. The scarce empirical evidence on how 
individuals’ form expectations over tradable (i.e., money) versus non tradable (i.e., 
environment and health) future outcomes, and the lack of contributions on the 
linkage between environmental morale and discounting, legitimate the survey 
investigation described in chapter 6. The survey involves a titration procedure and a 
                                                 
8 The ‘low cost’ argument predicts that the more environmental morale costs to individuals, the less 
they tend to apply ethics in real-life situations. 
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match task where participants tradeoff a specific amount of money, trees and lives 
between the present and the (near and far distant) future. In addition, the 
questionnaire includes general questions about respondents (i.e., gender, and year of 
degree programme) as well as the same set of questions used in the survey described 
in chapter 3 to infer their level of environmental morale. The single indifference 
points obtained using the titration procedure and the allocation of goods derived by 
the match task allow us to investigate how individuals discount different goods by 
linking this with their level of environmental morale. Finally, after having presented 
comprehensive empirical analysis on two different contexts where environmental 
morale can be a key variable to explain individuals’ behaviour, each explored using a 
large sample of respondents, the study concludes in chapter 7 with further discussion 
of pertinent findings.  
 
1.5 CONTRIBUTION TO LITERATURE 
 
In part this thesis adds to the existing literature on intrinsic motivation in general and 
on environmental morale in particular by filling some of its gaps. The novel 
definition of environmental morale and its linkage with other-regarding theories may 
offer a better understanding of the notion of environmental intrinsic motivation and 
of the extent to which intrinsic motivation can be influenced by extrinsic motivation. 
Some of the unique aspects of this thesis are: (i) use of primary data; (ii) definition of 
environmental morale by means of a multi-items index; (iii) analysis of the linkage 
between government signals (via policy designs) and individuals’ behaviour towards 
recycling activities based on their underlying intrinsic motivation, and within the 
same context; (iv) analysis of the nature of homo economicus at the individual (i.e., 
psychologists versus economists) and cultural (i.e., Italians versus British) level; (v) 
analysis of how individuals form expectations about tangible and intangible (near 
and far distant) future outcomes, conditioned on their level of environmental morale. 
 
One of the major contributions of this study is that it provides empirical evidence 
over the causal link between environmental morale and pro-environmental behaviors. 
Results highlight the relevance of environmental morale both in motivating 
individuals’ contribution to recycling and explaining differences in discounting of 
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(and intergenerational preferences for) monetary, environmental and health 
outcomes. In general, results suggest that people exhibit different sensitiveness 
towards the environment depending on sex, degree choice and cultural differences. 
Within the context of recycling activities, the differences between the levels and the 
reasons for respondents’ reactions to policy signals suggest that recycling can be 
better fostered with facilitating nudge policy measures than with mandatory schemes. 
Concerning discounting, a paradox of hyperopia seems to be located in data provided 
by this analysis – i.e., people that have a long-sighted view discount more 
environmental gains and are less willing to postpone losses. 
 


































The success of the economic approach to human behaviour has generally been linked 
to the relative price effect, (Fehr and Falk, 2002). This predicts that homo 
economicus increases their effort supply as monetary incentives are contingent on 
performance. Building upon neoclassical theory insights, economists have 
traditionally suggested market-based instruments for environmental policy (e.g. 
green taxes, subsidies, tradable emission permits, etc.) as their efficiency was 
assumed to be superior to other instruments such as command and control regulation. 
Not surprisingly, compared to the 1990s (see for example Frey, 1992), the number of 
countries using monetary incentives (e.g. taxes, subsidies, rewards and fines) to 
reduce and control pollution emissions has massively increased (OECD, 2011). 
 
After years of hesitation and based on the contribution of the psychological 
literature9, nowadays economists acknowledge the relevance of personal motivations 
other than homo economicus as a way to model ‘real life’ situations and actual 
human behaviour. As noted by James (2006, p. 598) “Factors such as social norms, 
morals, perception of justice, various attitudes, and particular beliefs can influence 
the way people behave, even sometimes if their own behaviour is not in their own 
immediate self-interest”. As such, environmental morale is commonly referred to in 
the literature as a way of reaching ‘desirable’ goals in environmental contexts (e.g. 
Frey, 1997; Frey and Stutzer, 2006; Nyborg, 2008).  
 
Environmental morale might be particularly relevant when regulation is difficult 
to implement. However, it is much less clear whether relying on environmental 
morale is desirable when regulations are feasible and practical. Indeed, a large 
number of studies in different areas of research (i.e., labour supply, constitutional 
                                                 
9 To give an example, the opposing view of economists (who support market-based instruments) and 
psychologists (who support environmental ethics) is described by Frey (1999) as a debate between 
Rationalists and Moralists. 
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design, tax evasion, public good provision and common pool resources)10 show that 
monetary incentives may undermine – crowd-out – moral or intrinsic motivation and 
therefore they can be counterproductive11. More importantly, in certain 
circumstances this may reverse the most fundamental economic ‘principle’ that states 
that monetary incentives boost supply. This not only suggests that homo economicus 
is only a single explanation of how human beings act and what they value (see also 
Eriksson and Anderson, 2010), but implies also that understanding the relationship 
between extrinsic and intrinsic motivation is crucial for the effectiveness of 
economic instruments.  
 
The present analysis seeks to make a contribution to this area of research and to 
shed light on how people react to different government signals (via policy designs) 
according to their level of environmental morale12. Any study is incomplete without 
a discussion of the relevant background literature supporting the empirical analysis. 
Section 2.2 briefly defines the concepts of intrinsic motivation and crowding-out/in 
effects from a psychological and an economic perspective. This gives insights into 
the importance of environmental morale and motivation. Section 2.3 provides a 
definition of environmental morale along with a discussion about the potential 
influence of ‘other-regarding’ theories on individuals’ intrinsic motivation to 
contribute to a better environment. It is followed by a review of the literature 
discussing the direction of the interaction between environmental morale and policy 
measures. Overall remarks are reported in section 2.5. 
 
2.2 INTRINSIC AND EXTRINSIC MOTIVATION 
 
Deci and Ryan (1985) define intrinsic motivation as an energy source that is of 
fundamental importance in the nature of organisms. Its recognition strengthens the 
                                                 
10 See, for example, Marwell and Ames (1979), Gneezy and Rustichini (2000a), Gneezy and 
Rustichini (2000b), Frey and Oberholzer-Gee (1997), and Frey and Meier (2004). 
11 Previous studies on the effect of monetary incentives to intrinsic motivation considered the 
consequences of introducing rewards to motivate individuals to desirable behaviours. Therefore, the 
effect is termed in the literature in many other ways, such as ‘The hidden cost of rewards’ (Lepper and 
Greene, 1978), ‘Overjustification Hypothesis’ (Lepper et al., 1973), or ‘Corruption Effect’ (Deci, 
1975).  
12 To the best of the author’s knowledge there seems to be only one study that examines the 
relationship between economic incentives and individuals’ underlying motivation (see Feldman and 
Perez, forthcoming). However, differently from this study, Feldman and Perez (ibid) consider deposit, 
mandatory scheme and voluntary contribution as external incentives.  
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idea that all behaviours are not drive-based13 and they are not merely a function of 
external controls. In contrast, there are actions that humans undertake only for the 
inherent gratification received internally from the activity itself (see Deci, 1971, 
Fischhoff, 1982, and Ryan and Deci, 2000a, 2000b).  
 
The effects of circumstances that determine or regulate behaviour with respect to 
motivational processes are explained by Cognitive Evaluation Theory (CET). The 
theory, first introduced by Deci (1975)14 has been changed in several ways since its 
initial formulation and now is considered a subtheory of the Self-Determination 
Theory (SDT)15 that particularly analyses the relationship between self-determination 
and the perceived concept of competence. Specifically, as suggested by Ryan and 
Deci (2000a) all events (e.g. rewards, feedback, and communication) that produce 
feelings of competence enhance intrinsic motivation because “they allow satisfaction 
of the basic psychological need for competence”  (ibid, p. 58). However, in order to 
be effective, feelings of competence need to be accompanied by a sense of 
autonomy, or alternatively, by a sense of internal perceived locus of causality. In 
other words, a high level of intrinsic motivation can be sustained if and only if 
people experience satisfaction of the needs of competence and autonomy16. It is 
important to underline that intrinsic motivation plays a role only when the activities 
“have the appeal of novelty, challenge or aesthetic value” for the individual (ibid, p. 
60). According to Ryan and Deci (2000a), a common example is represented by the 
behaviour of little children. They pick up things, throw them away and ask questions 
about them because they are perhaps intrinsically motivated to learn or to undertake 
challenges. However, for all of these actions they do not receive any rewards, which 
are instead inherent in the activities themselves. The primary motivation is therefore 
the curiosity and the internal experience that guides the behaviour.  
 
                                                 
13 Drive-based behaviours are generally induced by external interventions. 
14 CET was initially introduced to illustrate the effect of external intervention on individuals’ 
motivation. Later it has been elaborated and refined by Deci and Ryan (1980) and Ryan (1982) who 
integrated a detailed description of how internal processes regulate social events. 
15 Self-determination theory investigates the psychological needs for understanding people’s self-
motivation and personal integration, i.e. needs for competence, relatedness and autonomy (Ryan and 
Deci, 2000a, 2000b). 
16 The relevance of these feelings to maintain intrinsic motivation has been showed by many studies in 
the psychological literature. On the issue of competence see for example Deci (1971) and Deci and 
Cascio (1972). On the issue of autonomy see Zuckerman et al. (1978). 
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Intrinsic motivation is not the only behavioural motive that guides human beings. 
Indeed, it can be argued that most of the actions people undertake, especially when 
childhood is ended, depends on other forces, e.g. social pressure and other 
responsibilities in the society (see Ryan and Deci, 2000a), namely extrinsic 
motivations. Extrinsic motivation links individuals’ performance to separable 
outcomes rather than those embodied in the action itself. Real life accounts for many 
circumstances where individuals are motivated by the expectation of separable 
outcomes (e.g., in most of the environmental contexts, in voting situations, and in 
general in all situations where subjects act instrumentally rather than enjoying the 
activity they undertook). To give an example, a person who stops driving under the 
influence of alcohol might be extrinsically motivated by his/her fear of receiving a 
fine for doing so.  
 
According to the Organismic Integration Theory (OIT), the lowest form of 
autonomy among the different types of external motivation is represented by external 
regulation (e.g., extrinsic rewards or punishments). Here individuals experience an 
external perceived locus of causality driven by control and alienation. Within this 
context, certainly there exist more autonomous types of extrinsic motivation, namely: 
introjected regulation, identification and integrated regulation. In introjected 
regulation, subjects act under feelings of pressure (i.e., anxiety and guilty, or ego-
enhancements and pride). In the process of identification, people identify the 
importance of the behaviour and accept its regulation as their own. Finally, 
integrated regulation occurs when an identified regulation is internalized, even if its 
behaviour is justified by instrumental values (i.e., separate outcomes). However, 
theorists usually consider external regulations the only type of extrinsic motivation 
that would crowd-out intrinsic motivation. Therefore, a central question in the 
literature is how to motivate people to value and regulate such non-interesting and 
externally motivated activities, in order to promote more autonomous regulation. 
This is defined by the SDT theory as the process of internalization and integration, 
and describes how an apathetic person can become a passive compliant person and 
finally can show active commitment to the behaviour. If a norm is internalized, 
individuals feel a sense of obligation to that norm, and acting against this moral 
responsibility results in negative feelings (i.e., feelings of guilt and frustration, 
reduced self-esteem, and other negative self-evaluations). Therefore, if a non-
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intrinsically motivated behaviour (i.e., obeying a social norm) becomes an 
internalized value, the two motives become subtle. Indeed, individuals will not act 
according to their feelings of guilt or pride, but they will follow their intrinsic 
motivation of observing their own moral values.  
 
A central role in this context is represented by the concepts of relatedness and 
competence. On the one hand, relatedness states that subjects adopt a particular 
behaviour given that other people to whom they are connected do so – i.e., friends, 
social groups, neighbours. This suggests that creating a sense of belongingness or 
connectedness to others can facilitate internalization. On the other hand, the more 
competence is acknowledged, the more individuals feel efficacious with respect to 
the adoption of an extrinsic goal as their own, thus promoting the process of 
internalization. As suggested by Ryan and Deci (2000a), competence and relatedness 
can only reduce to an introjected regulation by enhancing self-esteem and therefore 
self-determination. However, people may still feel to be controlled by the regulation. 
Nevertheless, in order to reinforce self-determination and self-regulation it is 
necessary to promote autonomy. It turns out that, in order to fully internalize a 
regulation, individuals must grasp its meaning and worth. This can only be 
guaranteed in environments that support competence, relatedness and autonomy.    
 
For the purpose of this analysis, regardless the distinction between intrinsic and 
extrinsic motivation, what is relevant is the methodical relationship between the two.  
 
2.2.1 The interaction of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation: a psychological 
perspective  
 
Many scholars in psychology17 have shown that external interventions (e.g. monetary 
rewards) under particular conditions undermine intrinsic motivation. According to 
the literature (see Deci and Ryan, 1985, Frey, 1997, Frey, 1999, Frey and Stutzer, 
2006, and Nyborg, 2008) the hidden costs of monetary incentives affect intrinsic 
motivation according to three different processes: 
 
                                                 
17 For a good, although not quite updated overview, see Deci and Ryan (1985). 
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1) Impaired self – determination. In this case individuals substitute intrinsic 
motivation with extrinsic control and reduce their self-determination. This might 
happen because subjects no longer feel liable for their behaviour but attribute the 
responsibility of the task to the external institution (i.e., the controllers of their 
behaviour) that intervened from outside. 
 
2) Impaired self- esteem. Here individuals perceive that their contribution is not 
acknowledged. Therefore external interventions decrease its value and subjects feel 
their involvement and competence are not appreciated. 
 
3) Impaired expression – possibility. This effect is ascribable to Frey (1997) and 
occurs when a person is deprived of the possibility to show their intrinsic motivation 
to other persons. 
 
In all cases, these processes contribute to the conclusion that with external 
interventions individuals feel they are abusing themselves if they maintain the same 
level of intrinsic motivation and therefore they reduce their performance. Changes in 
behaviour after an external intervention may be due to changes in preferences and/or 
task perceptions. Indeed, it can be argued that the former is more likely to occur 
when self-esteem decreases, the latter when self-determination is reduced. 
Furthermore, the above classification allows a delineation of the conditions under 
which the crowding-out effect emerges. On the one hand, crowding-out can occur if 
the external intervention is perceived as controlling. In this case, the external 
intervention reduces self-determination, self-esteem and the possibility for 
expression. However, when an external intervention is perceived as supportive (or 
acknowledging) an opposite effect is created – i.e., crowding-in effect. In this case 
self-esteem is fostered; individuals feel that they are receiving more freedom to act, 
thus increasing their self-determination.  Some studies show, for example, that 
children of parents that are more autonomy supportive learn more spontaneously than 






2.2.2 The interaction between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation: an economic 
perspective 
 
According to Frey and Jegen (2001) one of the most relevant paradigms of 
economics is the relative price effect, which generally advocates that external 
interventions leads homo economicus to increase their provision of activity. 
Therefore, in the economic literature the crowding-out effect of intrinsic motivation 
generates one of the major behavioural anomalies18, since it predicts exactly the 
opposite reaction than that of the relative price effect.  
 
This conclusion derives from the general model of principal - agent (see for 
example Petersen, 1993, Gibbons, 1998)19 and it has been formally contextualized in 
this area of research by Frey (1997, 1999)20. The author suggests that when a 
principal introduces monetary incentives to motivate agents to undertake an activity, 
three different situations can be distinguished as follows: 
 
1) Disciplining effect. External interventions raise agents’ performance either when 
marginal shirking costs increase or, equivalently, marginal costs of performing 
decrease (e.g., using a fine). Ceteris paribus, if individuals are profit maximizers and 
the external intervention does not influence the marginal benefits of performance, the 
relative price effect predicts that the intervention raises performance. In this case, the 
crowding-out effect is neglected because intrinsic motivation is considered to be a 
constant or, alternatively, absent.  
 
2) Crowding-in effect. If marginal benefits of performance are raised by external 
intervention, in addition to the disciplining effect, intrinsic motivation will also be 
raised since agent’s motivation to perform increases. In this case, both the relative 
price and the crowding effects work in the same direction.  
 
                                                 
18 Economics accounts for many other relevant behavioural anomalies (see Thaler, 1992). However 
none of them (e.g. the endowment or the sunk cost effects) seems to reverse the predicted outcomes of 
the relative price effect (Frey and Jegen, 2001).  
19 The assumption here is that if workers are paid according to how they perform their performance 
unequivocally increase. 
20 See also Chang and Lai (1999), Bénabou and Tirole (2000), Frey and Jegen (2001), and Frey and 
Stutzer (2006) for the conflicting nature of the external intervantion on individuals’ behaviour. 
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3) Crowding-out effect. In contrast when external interventions undermine moral 
motivation (thus decreasing the marginal benefits of performance), agent’s 
performance level is reduced. In this case the relative price and the crowding effects 
work in an opposite direction and the latter dominates the former. Whether 
intervening is beneficial from a principal’s perspective depends on the relative size 
of these effects21.  
 
Many authors (see for example Frey, 1997, Frey and Stutzer, 2006, Gawel, 2006) 
point out that external interventions may have also an additional indirect negative 
effect on intrinsic motivation, namely motivational spillover effect, in areas where 
the incentives do not exist. That is, people contribute only when external 
interventions are promoted. This phenomenon may happen for instance when 
performance increases only by means of the relative price effect and individuals do 
not internalize specific norms22, and it can have extremely negative consequences in 
areas where intrinsic motivation represents the only behavioural incentive.  
 
To give an example, can the introduction of monetary incentives on recycling 
activities lead people to stop throwing away litter out of their moving car? If, on the 
one hand, it can be argued that monetary incentives in this context can induce 
improvements in individuals’ performance23; on the other hand, the question is 
whether or not it would be possible to translate this positive behaviour into a 
crowding-in effect and to extend it to similar situations. Given the monetary 
incentives, people may be inclined to reduce their household waste due to the relative 
price effect. However, if intrinsic motivation is assumed to be constant (or absent) 
external interventions might not cause any additional increase in people’s marginal 
utility of performance. As a matter of fact, this will be a deterrent for adopting the 
same behaviour in related contexts where incentives are not provided, leading 
individuals to feel free to continue to pollute.  
                                                 
21 Note that the crowding-out effect here depicted differs from the typical public good crowding-out 
effect as described in Andreoni (1989, 1990). Indeed, in this context, the reduction of individuals’ 
performance is more likely to be attributed to undermined intrinsic motivation rather than instrumental 
considerations. These aspects will be discussed more in details in the following chapter.    
22 For a detailed analysis of the relationship between intrinsic motivation, norms and their 
internalization, see Coleman (1994). 
23 Some countries in the EU have used microchips to control people’s attitudes towards recycling 
activities For example, in the UK rewarding schemes have been applied with success in Windsor and 




Furthermore, one might speculate that, after introducing monetary incentives, if 
motivation is completely crowded-out it might be the case that, when removing the 
monetary incentive, individuals’ motivation stabilizes at a lower level than it was 
when there were no incentives. That is, it is possible to have a motivational 
displacement effect24. This aspect can be easily shown by analysing the relationship 
between the relative price and the crowding-out effects graphically.  
 
















Notes: Author’s elaboration based on Frey (1997, p. 107). 
 
Figure 2.1 illustrates how individuals’ supply of an activity (good) X changes 
when crowding-out is allowed. According to Frey (1997), the supply curve S1 allows 
a positive supply of the good X, 0-XA. This is a supply solely driven by intrinsic 
motivation – labelled in the diagram as ‘environmental concern/t’ (i.e., 
environmental concern per unit of time t). Here, in fact, price or reward is zero. 
                                                 
24 This term is introduced in analogy with the Peacock and Wiseman’s (1961) displacement effect 
hypothesis regarding government spending fluctuations. However, it differs from the same termed 
psychological concept introduced by Noddings (2003) which is referred to feminine’ caring behaviour 









































When prices are not perceived as controlling (i.e., in the interval P0-PB), the 
provision of a specific activity tend to increase (generating a movement up and to the 
right along S1). However, when the price reaches a certain level (i.e., PC) the 
provision of the good decreases due to the crowding-out effect of intrinsic motivation 
(e.g., in the interval XA-XC). This shifts the supply curve S1 to the left (e.g., S2, where 
intrinsic motivation has been partially crowded-out) up to a point where intrinsic 
motivation is completely crowded-out (as supply decreases F to C). At this point, 
performance will start to increase again only by means of the price effect (i.e., S3, 
with PD leading to D and PE to E). That is to say that, individuals will consider 
monetary incentives acceptable up to point F (i.e., hypothetical threshold), where the 
provision of X will be mainly driven by individuals’ intrinsic motivation – i.e., ‘not 
just for the money’.  
 
The question is: what happens if the monetary incentives are eliminated? For 
simplicity, the analysis will be focused only on two extreme situations. However, it 
is important to acknowledge that reality might be more complex and can include 
situations somewhere in between those illustrated below. Thus, going back to the 
previous question, depending on the strength of the crowding-out effect, in the 
extreme individuals can: (i) go back to the initial provision of efforts (moving 
downwards E, D, C, F, B to point A), or (ii) gradually reduce their level of effort 
moving from point C to the origin. Hypothesis (i) is more likely to occur when 
behaviours are reversible. Hypothesis (ii) reflects the motivational displacement 
effect (i.e., moving XA to zero at P0) and it is more likely to occur when history 
matters and behaviours are path dependent. The introduction of controlling market 
incentives has served therefore to irrevocably destroy intrinsic motivation. This 
suggests that governments may not be able to experiment with market solutions in 
other than a modest manner. In this context, in fact, assuming that from point C 
onwards individuals are mainly motivated by monetary incentives as in traditional 
neo-classical supply curves, the original supply of XA is now only feasible if price or 
monetary reward is 0-PD picking up point D on S3. Therefore, when the external 
incentive is removed, individuals experience a decline in their ethical motivation up 
to the point where environmental concern is totally destroyed. Less than complete 
intrinsic motivation destruction (i.e., ‘partial’ intrinsic motivational damage) would 
pick up instead a point between 0 and XA when P0 obtains XC, leading to the supply 
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curve S2. This could happen for example in all situations where people experience a 
change in their preferences rather than in the task’s perception. It might be argued, in 
fact, that when individuals’ preferences are altered it is more difficult to restore the 
pre-existing situation, especially if the behaviour for which intrinsic motivation has 
been crowded-out has a perfect substitute.  
 
2.3 ENVIRONMENTAL MORALE: THE ROLE OF ‘OTHER-
REGARDING’ THEORIES 
 
The preceding discussion offers insights into the relevance of environmental morale 
as the intrinsic motivation to contribute to a better environment. As mentioned in 
chapter 1, the literature appears to be confusing about the definition of environmental 
morale due to some overlap between different concepts (see Frey and Stutzer, 2006) 
– i.e., internalised norms and intrinsic motivation. In order to overcome this problem 
and in line with other areas of research (e.g., tax compliance) dealing with morale 
considerations (see e.g. Torgler, 2005), environmental morale will be defined here as 
the willingness or moral obligation to behave in an environmentally conscious way, 
whereby the inherent satisfaction to contribute to (and/or the moral obligation 
towards) the environment comes from ethical considerations25. The greater such 
satisfaction (and/or the moral obligation), the higher will be the willingness to 
prevent environmental degradation and ‘abuses’.  
 
Drawing on this definition, a further unresolved question in the literature is what 
influences such an intrinsic motivation. In particular, could extrinsic forces also play 
a role here? An increasing number of papers (see e.g., Frey and Stutzer, 2006, 
Nyborg, 2008, and Torgler et. al, 2009) have recently offered insights into the 
relevance of ‘other-regarding’ theories to help an understanding of how 
environmental morale might interplay with external regulation. These include social 
norms, altruism and reciprocal preferences. However, to date it is not clear to what 
extent environmental morale can be influenced by these different intrinsic and 
extrinsic motivations (Frey and Stutzer, 2006). This study provides therefore a first 
                                                 
25 Note that there might be ‘strategic’ interests in environmental morale. However, for the purpose of 
this analysis this possibility has been ruled out.  
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attempt to clarify and analyse these issues. Table 2.1 illustrates taxonomy of relevant 
concepts used below to explain the direction of such relationship.    
 
According to what is stated in the previous section, crowding-out theory 
interferes with the level (i.e., the amount) of motivation by enhancing or reducing it 
according to the interaction between external interventions and internal motivation 
(Ryan and Deci, 2000a). This involves the specification of particular forces that 
undermine intrinsically motivated behaviour. From a psychological perspective, 
external interventions affect individuals’ self-determination and self-esteem via a 
reduction of the perceived level of competence and autonomy in performing a task. 
An economic perspective would be different in that a reduction in motivation has to 
be found in the failure of the relative price effect, which leads the crowding-out 
effect to prevail. 
 
An additional interesting aspect concerns the orientation of motivation, or 
alternatively the reasons why actions take place (Ryan and Deci, 2000a, 2000b). The 
economic perspective suggests that individuals as homo economicus tend to behave 
instrumentally to maximize their own utility. In other words, they behave with the 
expectation of obtaining other material outcomes from the action. The psychological 
perspective suggests distinguishing between intrinsically and extrinsically motivated 
behaviours (see e.g. Ryan and Deci, 2000a, 2000b). Intrinsically motivated 
behaviours associate individuals’ satisfaction to feelings of competence and 
autonomy in performing the activity. Extrinsically motivated behaviours link 
individuals’ behaviour to separable outcomes that come from outside the individuals 
themselves. To summarize, intrinsic motivation is something more inherent to the 
internal sphere of the individual, while extrinsic motivation regards external factors 
(e.g., material gains) that are able to influence individuals’ motivation. The 
discussion here outlined lets us conclude that e.g. feelings of altruism, reciprocity 
and internalized norms fall into the category of intrinsically motivated behaviour, 
whereas social norms feed into extrinsically motivated behaviours. While social 
norms are not directly related to external material gains, it can be argued indeed that 
individuals’ performance depends on extrinsic factors – i.e., social pressure (see also 







A taxonomy of specific ‘other-regarding’ preferences 
Other regarding theory Definition Authors/Year 
Altruism    
Pure Altruism Individuals’ disposition to care about others’ well-being. 
  
Barro (1974), Becker (1974), Andreoni (1988) 
    
Impure Altruism Individuals’ disposition to care about others’ well-being (pure 
altruistic component), and to experience the warm glow of giving 
(selfish component). 
Andreoni (1989,1990) 
    
Reciprocity    
Strong Reciprocity Form of cooperation/retaliation with others similarly/dissimilarly 
disposed. Rewarding and punishing here can be personally costly and 
repeated interactions are not assumed.  
Bowles and Gintis (1998, 2000) 
    
Weak Reciprocity Self-interested form of cooperation enforced by tit-for-tat behaviour. 
Here cooperation is linked to the desire of future material benefits. 
Bowles and Gintis (1998, 2000) 
    
Positive Reciprocity Friendly-conditioned action where fairness emerges from fairness 
received. 
Gouldner (1960), Fehr and Gäcther (1998, 2000) 
    
Negative Reciprocity Unfriendly-conditioned action where unfairness emerges from 
unfairness received. 
Gouldner (1960), Fehr and Gäcther (1998, 2000) 
    
Social Norms Socially shared beliefs about how one ought to behave. Cialdini et al. (1990), Frey and Stutzer (2006) 
    
Internalized Norms Cognitive norm – i.e., External regulation becomes an autonomous 
regulation. 
Coleman (1994) 





First, it can be argued that intrinsically motivated people with altruistic and 
reciprocal preferences might play an important role here (see Figure 2.2 below). 
Altruists will voluntarily contribute to the provision of environmental goods not only 
because of their ‘warm glow’ of giving (see Andreoni, 1989, 1990)26, but also for the 
sake of others’ well-being. According to Frey and Stutzer (2006), the limits of 
government interventions in specific situations (e.g. monitoring those who litter the 
streets with cigarettes or paper) reveal the importance of intrinsically motivated 
behaviours. It is particularly in these cases that environmental morale can be 
strengthened by altruistic preferences. 
 
Secondly, reciprocal preferences can also be of crucial importance for the support 
and enforcement of social norms even in the presence of external regulations 
(Nyborg, 2008). This is particularly so in the case of strong reciprocity27. In contrast 
to weak reciprocity (also known as tit-for-tat behaviour), strong reciprocity implies 
either some form of cooperation with others similarly disposed or some form of 
retaliation towards those who disregard cooperative behaviour, even if both 
rewarding and punishing are personally costly and if individuals are not expecting to 
receive personal gains in the future (see e.g. Bowles and Gintis, 1998, 2000).  The 
question is: how can an external regulation support intrinsic motivation under strong 
reciprocal preferences? Building upon experimental evidence (see e.g., Sudgen, 
1984, and Fehr and Gächter, 2002), in its essentials, the argument runs as follows. 
Assuming individuals’ contribution is conditioned upon others’ contribution, a 
conditional co-operator feels a moral obligation to contribute only if others 
contribute too. By contrast, when others do not contribute, conditional co-operators 
feel no obligation to let themselves be exploited by free-riders (see Nyborg, 2008). 
As discussed further below, in this case, regulation (such as a fine or a tax) can 
control the otherwise undermining behaviour of free-riders (by forcing everyone to 
                                                 
26 The ‘warm glow’ of giving is a ‘selfish motive’ embodied in the definition of ‘impure altruism’ 
coined by Andreoni (1989, 1990). Impure altruism assumes individuals contribute to the public good 
not only because they take into consideration the others well-being, but also because they experience 
some additional benefits “from having done their own bit” (Andreoni, 1989, p. 1448). 
27 For these reasons, reciprocal behaviour differs deeply from ‘cooperation’ and ‘retaliation’ in 
repeated interaction since they are principally motivated by future material benefits.  For a discussion 
see Kolm (2008) and Fehr and Schmidt (2006).  
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contribute at least a little); thus increasing the intrinsic motivation of conditional co-
operators given that now they no longer feel exploited by free-riders. Along the same 
lines, positive reciprocity can also play a role when considering the interaction 
between external intervention and intrinsic motivation. In general, this form of 
reciprocity can be viewed as a friendly-conditioned action where fairness emerges as 
a response to fairness received28. This suggests that if people perceive regulation as 
fair and acknowledging they will respond in kind given their sense of gratitude 
towards the initial ‘giver’ (i.e., the government or the institution that has introduced 
the policy)29. Vice versa, they will fail to be compliant when the regulation is 
considered as unfair and controlling (i.e., negative reciprocity)30, thus reducing their 
intrinsic motivation. Based on these considerations, one can speculate that, compared 
to other monetary incentives (such as taxes and fines), the introduction or the 
expansion of kerbside collection will be more likely to induce individuals to be more 
(rather than less) involved in recycling activities given that such an intervention 
might reasonably enhance a sense of gratitude towards the government.     
 
Finally, social norms or in Nyborg’s (2008, p. 2) words “the desire for a decent 
self-image” might also influence individuals’ behaviour and attitudes towards the 
environment (see e.g. Torgler et al., 2009). In general, social norms can be viewed as 
valuable beliefs about how one ought to act (see Cialdini et al. 1990, and Frey and 
Stutzer, 2006) according to what is socially acceptable/unacceptable or 
approved/disapproved (i.e., avoiding littering the streets, maintaining the quality of 
public parks), so that punishments for not complying come from the society itself 
(i.e., social pressure, namely the extrinsic motivation). Peer pressure may generate 
feelings of guilt or shame across members’ group. Therefore moral obligations 
towards the environment may apply even when people do not feel intrinsically 
motivated (i.e., they do not receive satisfaction) to observe the ‘norm’. This is what 
                                                 
28 This is what distinguishes positive reciprocity from unconditional kindness, which is motivated by 
altruism. Cox (2004, p. 262), e.g., describes positive reciprocity as “a motivation to repay generous or 
helpful actions of another by adopting actions that are generous or helpful to the other person”.   
29 The literature also accounts for other types of reciprocal preferences (e.g., liking reciprocity, 
continuation reciprocity, and guilt-aversion (and promises) reciprocity). A detailed description of 
most of them is provided by Kolm (2008). For a discussion of guilt-aversion reciprocity see e.g. 
Charness and Dufwenberg (2006).  
30 Fehr and Gäcther (2000, p.160) define “the cooperative reciprocal tendencies ‘positive reciprocity’ 
while the retaliatory aspects are called ‘negative reciprocity’”.  Similarly, according to Gouldner 
(1960) and Fehr and Gächter (1998) negative reciprocity can be identified with the principle ‘an eye 
for an eye, a tooth for a tooth’. 
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distinguishes social norms from internalized norms where, as discussed above (see 
also chapter 1), the moral obligation comes from a cognitive process. The 
introduction of kerbside collection, for example, can advise citizens about the 
importance of recycling thus increasing their awareness about the problem and 
consequently their performance. However, if individuals are acting to obey an 
internalized norm rather than a social norm, the nature of sanctions for not 
complying may only be the consequence of negative self-evaluations, which come 
from the inside of the individual (and not from the society). Thus, it can be argued 
that, as compared to social norms and according to CET, an internalized norm is 
more likely to ensure that, when removing the regulation, behaviours will not be 
reversed. What was previously imposed by regulation is now, in fact, considered as a 
‘standard’. 
 





Many of these aspects will be discussed further in the following chapters. Having 
addressed the relevance of environmental morale for the success/failure of 
environmental policies, in what follows the analysis will be focused on describing 
specific conditions under which the relative price effect might dominate the 
crowding-out effect of intrinsic motivation. The identification of particular contexts 
where this occurs has important consequences for the efficiency of environmental 
Environmental morale
(satisfaction + moral 
obligation)
Social Norms




(moral obligation – others’ well 











policies. However, before proceeding with that, the next paragraph provides a 
discussion about feasible areas where the problem of crowding-out can take place.  
 
2.4 ENVIRONMENTAL MORALE AND THE CROWDING-OUT 
EFFECT 
 
2.4.1 The role of the ‘low-cost argument’ 
   
The limited approaches available in the literature about ideology in general suggest 
an inverse relationship between the net cost of pursuing ethics and the extent of 
environmental morale applied. In other words, the more environmental morale costs 
individuals the less they tend to apply ethics in real life contexts. As suggested by 
Frey (1997) when the costs are very high only ecological extremists will follow the 
principles of environmental ethics, while the remaining part of the population will 
find many reasons to desist to collaborate to the well-being of the ecosystem. 
 
An interesting explanation of how it is possible to determine the cost of 
environmental morale under an external intervention lies in the seminal paper of 
Gawel (2006).  Assuming that moral actions refer both to inner directed actions (i.e., 
actions intrinsically derived without any form of coercion or incentive), and to 
morally induced behaviour from external intervention it is possible to conclude that 
individuals’ behaviour is a result of the combination of two different effects namely 
the net effect of costs and benefits of decision’s options and the additional ‘inner 
satisfaction’. Moral actions will prevail only if the latter sum up with a positive net 
effect of the extrinsic sphere. If after the external intervention individuals experience 
a more advantageous situation (i.e., benefits) an incentive induced activity will 
become more attractive (relative price effect). However, the overall effect can 
differently produce the opposite result if intrinsic motivation is destroyed (or 
crowded-out). This is what determines the negative slope for environmental morale. 
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It turns out that environmental ethics as other moral behaviour is more likely to guide 
individuals’ action in ‘low-cost situations’31.  
 
According to Frey (1997) and Gawel (2006) in modern economies relevant areas 
of intervention to boost environmental consciousness can be detected only in the 
private household sector – i.e., disposal and product-related policies such as 
recycling activities and consumption of ‘green’ products. The allocation of 
environmental goods, as well as transport-related behaviour and the diffusion of a 
responsible use of energy are instead generally considered high-cost situations in 
terms of the individual’s private cost. Therefore in these circumstances it is difficult 
to rely on ethical motivation in guiding individuals’ behaviours.  
 
Regarding the competitive sector of firms, the idea that intrinsic motivation does 
not play an important role has generally been challenged in the literature, though 
many aspects of this area remain obscure. A central issue here is the claim that firms 
under perfect competitive market are struggling to afford the costs of acting 
environmentally-friendly (i.e., high-cost motive). A different line of argument is that  
behaving under ‘green’ considerations could be attractive for firms as they can make 
‘special profits’ (see Frey, 1997). However, as suggested by Gawel (2006), these 
motives may reflect purely the consequences of a profit-maximization analysis and 
do not prove either the existence or the importance of intrinsic motivation. Although 
market actors (government, public, environmental activists) can play a role to 
influence the entrepreneurial sector thus increasing environmental consciousness, 
doubts still remain about the origin of this awareness. Indeed, awareness in this 
context can be either induced by the profitability motive or by moral considerations.  
 
Moving to the national-international level, the harmful impact of economic 
growth on environmental conservation has forced many countries to intervene to 
                                                 
31 In line with the tax compliance literature, this does not exclude the possibility that individuals may 
comply (i.e., behave environmentally friendly) even when the costs of following ethical 
considerations are high. However, in line with Frey (1997) – see discussion above –, this seems more 
likely to apply to a minority of individuals (relative to the whole country’s population) especially 
when the costs of complying can be very high (if not prohibitive). For some ‘environmentally 
friendly’ individuals, for example, the time and trouble costs of recycling activities (such as distance 
to a recycling centre, and the costs associated to specific equipment for recycling – e.g., biodegradable 
garbage bags and/or bins for specific waste collection –) can be considered as a deterrent to recycling.        
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prevent the deterioration of the environment and to avoid getting an unsustainable 
consumption of natural resources. Examples are the measures adopted by several 
countries after the introduction of the Kyoto protocol, which represent an important 
step in the process of reducing the negative impact of human behaviour on the 
environment.32 In this sense moral considerations may also acquire more relevance in 
the entrepreneurial sector. However, even in these circumstances it is possible to 
argue that, rather than being related to moral considerations, these actions may 
reflect either the willingness to implement new economic sectors33 or, alternatively, 
the necessity to meet specific national and/or international agreements.  
 
The position of poor or developing countries is different. Here the ‘survival’ 
argument seems to play a major role. In this case the exploitation of the environment 
may be justified by the necessity to fulfil the needs of the population34. It turns out 
that the costs of environmental morale are extremely high. To give an example, it is 
difficult to expect that in the Maghreb regions people will stop producing energy for 
exportation (as this is one of the main economic resources of the country) although 
they might be aware that this represents one of the main causes of CO2 emissions.     
 
To sum up, the ‘low-cost argument’ seems to suggest that an evaluation of policy 
interventions to enhance environmental consciousness is more likely to be effective 
in the private household sector since conflicting arguments for the relevance of 
intrinsic motivation in the entrepreneur sector seem to arise.  
 
 
                                                 
32 The Kyoto agreement was initially adopted in 1997 and ratified later several times. The main 
feature of the protocol is that it commits (albeit previously suggested it) 37 industrialized countries 
and the European Community to reduce their emissions by 5 per cent relative to 1990 levels. After the 
introduction of the Kyoto protocol many countries have introduced eco-stimuli packages in order to 
boost the ‘green sector’ and reduce CO2 emissions.  
33 Germany, for example, has decided to invest in renewable energy sources as they were considered 
strategic for the increase of economic growth. The German Environment Ministry specifically states 
that (see BMU, 2007, p. 17): “In order to prevent climate change, which mankind can no longer 
control, we must set in motion a third industrial revolution – by switching the global energy supply to 
sustainable resources. 
34 These considerations seems to be consistent with some of the main conclusions related to the 
Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) studies that show that developing countries are reluctant to 
introduce environmental target such those envisaged by the Kyoto protocol since they have numerous 
advantages in the pollutting sector and their relatively low level of income cannot cope with the 
stringent regulation introduced in developed countries (see for example He, 2007).   
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2.4.2 The efficiency of incentive instruments and the crowding-out effect 
 
The efficacy of environmental instruments depends therefore on how external 
interventions affect individuals’ behaviour and on how important is environmental 
ethics for behaviour, which is determined by the related costs. Frey (1997) identifies 
four different combinations of this two elements according to which environmental 
policy produces specific outcomes that are summarized in Table 2.2. According to 
Table 2.2 the environment is preserved when:  
 
1) There is low environmental morale and significant intervention. In this context, 
the cost of behaving according to environmental ethics is too high. Therefore it is 
possible to expect that environmental morale weakly affects (or does not affect) 
economic agents’ behaviour. It turns out that the relative price effect of external 
incentives fully determines behaviours generating the predicted outcomes.   
 
2) There is high environmental morale and insignificant intervention. Here subjects 
do not face any costs, and since intervention does not influence their behaviour the 
environment is preserved. This is what is generally called “voluntary behaviour”. 
Environmentalists and non-economists include in this sector actions such as waste 
separation and disposal or care of public places. However, recent literature on 
recycling activities strengthens the idea that the separation of household waste 
involves personal costs albeit not very serious ones (see for example Bruvoll et al., 
2002, and Callan and Thomas, 1997). In addition the necessity of reducing landfill 
waste is leading many countries to the introduction of monetary incentives. This 
generates important consequences in terms of reversing the above conclusions. In 
particular, the considerations connected with case (4) might better suit this situation. 










The interaction between environmental morale and external intervention 









Ambiguous effect on the 
environment 
Notes: Author’s elaboration based on Frey (1997, p. 60). 
 
By contrast the environment is destroyed when: 
 
3) There is low environmental morale and insignificant intervention. This case 
depicts a situation where economic agents do not exert environmental morale 
because this will be too costly to them. Therefore the absence of any internal and 
external intervention generates a destructive effect for the environment. Possible 
examples are given by developing countries where people have low interest to 
behave environmentally-friendly and government intervention is little or even absent. 
Other examples are all areas where individuals are not able to establish a connection 
between their own behaviour and the possible outcome (e.g., global warming or the 
preservation of animal species). Acting according to eco-conscious behaviours 
becomes in these contexts very expensive. In addition, the public good nature of such 
problems makes it difficult for governments to intervene externally.  
 
4) There is high environmental moral and significant intervention. Here 
understanding the interaction between the relative price effect and the crowding-out 
effect becomes very important. The question is whether it is predominant the 
destructive effect of intrinsic motivation or the relative price effect of the external 
intervention. The necessary condition for the occurrence of the crowding-out effect is 
therefore the presence of a certain level of environmental morale when external 
interventions are introduced. However, as suggested by Frey (1997) the outcomes 
derived from interventions depend on several conditions identified as prerequisites 
for the crowding-out effect. These prerequisites can be classified in two separate 
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groups according to the way they affect agents’ behaviour: control-directed 
prerequisites and acknowledge-directed prerequisites.  
 
2.4.2.1 Control-directed prerequisites versus acknowledge-directed prerequisites 
 
Control-directed prerequisites shift the individual locus of control from an internal to 
an external sphere by assigning the responsibility of the task to the principal (e.g., the 
government or the institution that is promoting the intervention). In this case intrinsic 
motivation is redundant and slowly disappears by means of a reduction in self-
determination. The crowding-out effect is likely to occur when: 
 
(a) There is a personalized relationship between agents. Therefore the more 
anonymous is the relation between economic agents; the lower is the strength of the 
crowding-out effect given that the intrinsic motivation to cooperate is weak35. In this 
case the disciplining effect plays a major role. However, the outcome depends on the 
peculiarity of the regulation. In the case of command and control instruments, for 
example, the relative price effect may be efficacious (through a disciplining effect) if 
and only if regulation states clearly what kind of cost (i.e., punishment) is associated 
to the violated environmental behaviour.  
 
(b) The level of interest for the task is high. In other words, if individuals perceive a 
specific ecological issue is externally imposed when previously observed on a 
voluntary base, they will experience a severe loss of motivation. An example is given 
by the voluntary participation to ecological groups’ activities.  
 
(c) Rewards are contingent on behaviour. Here intrinsic motivation becomes 
superfluous since individuals are guiding their behaviour according to the relative 
price effect. In general, the adoptions of price-based instruments (i.e., taxes, fines, 
and subsidies) may send the wrong signal that cares for the environment has a price 
instead of being an individual responsibility. The introduction of subsidies, for 
example, may lead those who are willing to contribute on a voluntary basis to lose 
their intrinsic satisfaction given that they are receiving a payment. However, there is 
                                                 
35 For a critical discussion of anonymity in this context, see Gawel (2006). 
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not a general consensus on the idea that subsidies may be counterproductive. To give 
an example, when monetary transfers are introduced to enforce standards (i.e., 
command and control instruments), the relative price effect and the crowding-out 
effect can reinforce each other. This is because individuals are well informed about 
the outcome that the regulation wants to achieve and they know that by changing 
their behaviour they will receive monetary incentives. However, for many other 
reasons subsidies are disregarded as an ideal policy instrument36. In particular, many 
authors underline the importance of the undesirable effects of monetary incentives 
for the so called ‘Not In My Back Yard’ (NIMBY) problem. The NIMBY situation 
occurs when a locally unwanted project (such as a nuclear waste repository) is 
supported given that monetary compensations are offered to individuals (see for 
example Frey and Oberholzer-Gee, 1997). It turns out that the harmful impact of the 
undesirable project is not taken into account any more, leading to the crowding-out 
effect of intrinsic motivation.  
    
Acknowledge-directed prerequisites can cause instead a sense of frustration given 
that previous efforts seem not to be acknowledged. In this case self-esteem is 
reduced and the crowding-out effect can occur when:  
 
(a) The intervention is not designed to discriminate among economic agents with 
high and low environmental ethics. Frustration arises for those who act according to 
high environmental morale since they perceive the intervention as disregarding their 
commitment and competence, thus destroying their initial motivation. Interesting 
results in this context have been achieved by Grepperud (2007) who formally shows 
that for a social cost function a first-best solution could be reached under a 
discriminatory scheme, which would impose a tax depending on the level of 
environmental morale, with higher rate for those with low morale and vice versa.37 
However, this conclusion does not hold for a moral welfare function, for which 
voluntarism performs better. The introduction of a tax to improve the kerbside 
collection, for example, can be negatively perceived by those who are already 
                                                 
36 Among other reasons, subsides may provide an incentive to increase pollution for those who were 
not polluting to benefit from the monetary incentive. For a detailed description of them, see Frey and 
Stutzer (2006) and Gawel (2006). 
37 In particular, those with low morale will receive a Pigouvian tax, whilst those with higher 
environmental morale will receive a Pigouvian tax less the ex-post marginal voluntary utility. 
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recycling, thus crowding-out their self-determination. Individuals may think that the 
authority does not acknowledge their actual contribution and they are therefore 
overjustified to maintain the same level of motivation. Nevertheless, a different 
result can be expected if instead of imposing a tax the local authority introduce a fee 
on those who are not recycling. This is because only those who are initially reluctant 
to recycle will pay the price of receiving the service.   
 
(b) The intervention fails to acknowledge the agents’ intrinsic motivation. Tradable 
permits, for example, allow for a specific amount of pollution, but do not morally 
punish polluters as long as they do not overcome established limits. In other words, 
tradable permits introduce a sort of licence to pollute. In this sense environmentally 
intrinsic concerns seem to be irrelevant (see Frey, 1997), as “it is acceptable to sin, 
provided you pay for it” (Frey and Stutzer, 2006, p. 15). As in the case of 
environmental taxes, the relative price and the crowding-out effects follow an 
opposing direction and the latter dominates the former. However, in this context the 
crowding-out effect of the tradable permits might be even stronger as, unlike the case 
of environmental taxes, these instruments do not send the signal that polluting the 




The discussion outlined provides insights into the importance of environmental 
morale as the intrinsic motivation to contribute to a better environment. On the one 
hand, environmental morale can increase the demand for a clean environment and for 
‘green’ products. On the other hand, it can help to overcome the free-riding problem 
that is embodied in the provision of pro-social behaviours.  
 
In this context, intrinsically motivated people with ‘other-regarding’ preferences 
may also play an important role. Altruists voluntarily will contribute to the provision 
of environmental goods not only because of their warm glow of giving, but also for 
the sake of others’ well-being. Similarly, reciprocal preferences can be of crucial 
importance for the support and enforcement of social norms and external regulations. 
This is particularly so in the case of strong and positive reciprocity. Finally, the 
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disposition to observe social norms may also boost individuals’ motivation to 
contribute to environmental preservation. 
 
The literature on environmental morale and the crowding-out effect suggests that 
external intervention can undermine morale motivation. In line with the more 
developed analyses on the provision of public goods, there are many situations in 
which extrinsic incentives are expected to lead to counterproductive effects. 
However, the lack of specific empirical evidence in this area of research cannot 
support the conclusions outlined and summarized in this chapter. 
 
The importance of the ‘low-cost argument’ implies the necessity to understand 
the interaction of price-based instruments (i.e., subsidies, taxes and fines) and 
intrinsic motivation. Specifically, under which conditions will these instruments 
undermine morale motivation? Is there any case where intrinsic motivation is 
strengthened by a particular price-based instrument? CET indicates that if an 
instrument is perceived as controlling, environmental motivation can be undermined. 
In addition if individuals understand the instrument as ‘a means to reach an end’ it 
might be argued that intrinsically motivated behaviours will be discouraged. 
However, if the instrument is judged as acknowledging and supportive, intrinsic 
motivation can be reinforced. The introduction of a fine or a tax, for example, makes 
every polluter pay at least a little, so that complete free-riding no longer holds. This 
can certainly enhance conditional co-operators’ motivation given that now they will 
not feel exploited by others. Based upon these considerations, it is possible to 
conclude that price-based instruments do not always undermine moral motivation. 
However, if this is the case the following questions can be raised. That is, is it better 
to leave the care of the environment to the voluntary contribution of intrinsic 
motivated individuals? Or would it be better to intervene with specific policies that 
take into account a more psychological actor –i.e., homo realitus? If, on the one 
hand, sceptics about voluntary contribution will argue that, even if substantial, this 
cannot bring the economy to its first-best situation – which might explain why 
certain environmental problems (e.g. greenhouse emissions, and preservation of 
particular species of animals) are still in need of a solution –; on the other hand, for 
governments and institutions that support price-based instruments, it might be even 
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more challenging to design specific environmental policy measures that take into 
account the wide variety of reasons that motivate individuals’ behaviour.  
 
As with other areas of research, small-scale experiments and survey analyses 
might be useful to gather information about individuals’ attitudes towards the 
environment under different regulatory schemes. Given the scarce contribution in the 
literature analysing these issues, a specific study in this context could be of 
fundamental importance to shed light on particular solutions to overcome the free-
riding problem and to understand the motivations that encourage individuals to eco-









ECONOMIC INCENTIVES AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
MORALE: AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION OF 
RECYCLING 
 
Do the ends justify the means? 




Neoclassical theory regards environmental degradation as a specific type of ‘market 
failure’ (Pearce, 1976). As such, welfare economics in general and cost-benefit 
analysis in particular provide an understanding of what an ‘optimal’ configuration of 
an economy would look like in terms of a reduction of environmental damages. 
Methods of securing an ‘optimal’ amount of pollution and resource exploitation of 
non-renewables, as well as resource conservation are generally addressed in the 
literature as possible ways to reduce environmental degradation. Recycling 
represents a key component in this arena. Indeed, it can be considered the ‘most 
widely entertained mechanism for extending the life of a resource’ (Pearce, 1976, p. 
168).  
 
The ‘optimal’ impact of human activities on environment conservation and non-
renewable resource exhaustion widens the analysis of environmental degradation to 
include efficiency as well as equity aspects38. Regarding recycling, this therefore 
includes the questions of how an optimal recycling rate should be as well as what is 
its impact on future generations. Likewise other ‘green’ activities (e.g., pollution 
reduction), neoclassical theory predicts that the optimal recycling rate should be 
reached at a point where the marginal costs of recycling equals the marginal benefits. 
However, there are a number of limitations in the use of the ‘optimal’ recycling 
approach in this way.  
                                                 
38 Equity refers to the impact of environmental degradation on future generations, and efficiency is 




Looking at the entrepreneur sector (see Pearce, 1976), for example, if on the one 
hand for many pollutants the costs of recycling might exceed its benefits (e.g., toxic 
metals), on the other hand, for some wastes the ‘optimal’ level of recycling might not 
coincide with the maximum amount of recycling that technology permits. Similarly, 
in the private household sector, since it is generally agreed in the literature that 
recycling is not a costless exercise, individuals might choose their recycling level 
according to strategic considerations (e.g., although individuals might be enthusiastic 
about recycling, they might decide not to recycle when the opportunity cost of 
participating is too high). These problems can be exacerbated by the fact that both in 
the entrepreneur and household sectors the private decision to recycle generally 
ignores the social costs (e.g., increase of required external inputs for the recycling 
process) and benefits of recycling (e.g., extension of resource life, pollution 
reduction, and reduction of demand of landfill sites). 
 
This is what renders in practice recycling a complex issue and might explain 
why, despite the numerous efforts made at the national and international levels to 
encourage recycling, the current perception in modern economies is that people and 
firms still seem hesitant to adopt separate collections. As such, this introduces the 
problem of how to incentivize people to recycle, and, given the discussion outlined 
in Chapter 2, also raises the question of understanding how people react to different 
government signals (i.e., instruments) according to their underlying motivation (i.e., 
environmental morale). 
 
The present study seeks to make a contribution to this area of research and to 
identify conditions under which incentives may crowd-in/out environmental 
motivation. To examine these themes, a large sample of students took part in a 
survey designed to gather information on how environmental morale can be 
connected with individuals’ attitudes towards recycling under different policy 
interventions, and to investigate the direction of its linkage with ‘other-regarding’ 
theories, such as social norms, reciprocity, and altruism. 
 
The description of the survey will be the focus of this chapter, whereas a detailed 
analysis of the empirical results will be presented in the following chapter.  The next 
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section describes the rationale and aims of the survey analysis. It is followed by a 
brief outline of the recent literature on recycling and intrinsic motivation. Section 3.4 
describes the methodology and the questionnaire. Brief concluding remarks are 
presented in section 3.5. 
 
3.2 RATIONALE AND AIMS OF THE STUDY 
 
Given the importance recycling activities are afforded nowadays39, they provide a 
rich area for investigation. The purpose of this study is to consider information about 
people’s attitudes towards recycling participation. As noted in the previous chapter, 
incentives can be either acknowledging (or effective) or controlling (and less 
effective). In general, when external regulation is perceived as ‘a means to reach an 
end’ (e.g., Pigouvian taxes, subsidies, and fines) intrinsic motivation may be 
crowded-out. By contrast, a ‘supportive’ policy may direct people towards desirable 
behaviour40. In this light, the analysis considers three different instruments: a 
voluntary scheme, a facilitating nudge scheme, and a mandatory scheme backed by a 
fine. The first two hypotheses to be tested are: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Individuals’ reaction to government policies is sensitive to the nature 
of signals (e.g., acknowledging versus controlling regulation). 
 
Hypothesis 2: The extent of individuals’ reaction to government policies depends on 
their level of environmental morale.  
 
According to Grepperud (2007), it is reasonable to expect that those who initially 
have a higher environmental morale would not be positively affected by any policy – 
i.e., they can be either discouraged to persist in their behaviour or neutral. However, 
in practice it can be expected that even those who are initially environmentally 
friendly can become more motivated to contribute to a better environment when 
                                                 
39 The EU’s Sixth Environmental Action Programme (EAP) set waste management as one of a major 
priority of the European Commission. ‘The three Rs strategy (i.e. Reduce, Reuse and Recycle)’ 
represents nowadays the guideline of all actions taken at the national/international level to prevent and 
reduce waste generation (European Commission, 2001).   
40 According to the Kantian philosophy, a desirable behaviour could be compared to a universal 
morale maxim that should be independent of individuals’ identity and of any other physical aspects 
(see Kant, 1785).   
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others are encouraged to do so. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the introduction of 
economic incentives can lead conditional co-operators to feel no longer exploited by 
others, thus increasing their contribution towards the environment. Therefore, a 
further aspect to investigate is whether monetary incentives affect only those people 
with an initial low environmental morale. 
 
The nature of homo economicus has been examined both at the individual level in 
studies of interpersonal cooperation (see Frank et al., 1993, and Yezer et al., 1996) 
and tax evasion (see, Lewis et al., 2009), and at the cultural level in studies of tax 
evasion (see, Alm and Torgler, 2006, and Lewis et al., 2009). This study pursues a 
similar evaluation with respect to environmental policies. The hypothesis to be tested 
here is that, among other things: 
 
Hypothesis 3: Individuals’ behaviour depends on differences in individuals’ 
sensitiveness towards environmental issues and cultural differences. 
 
Previous works (see  Lewis et al., 2009) indicate, in fact, that instrumental 
behaviour depends on attitudes, values and culture. A number of papers in 
behavioural economics suggest that economics majors act more selfishly than those 
who have other majors (e.g. ‘other social sciences’)41. Surveys (see Frank et al., 
1993) and laboratory experiments (see e.g. Marwell and Ames, 1981, Kahneman et 
al., 1986, and Selten and Ockenfels, 1998) highlight for example that male 
economists tend to contribute to public goods less than male non-economists. Recent 
studies show that this tendency is not only due to different indoctrination (which 
suffers from ‘identification problem’ criticisms)42, for which “exposure to the self-
interest model commonly used in economics alters the extent to which people behave 
in self-interested ways” (Frank et al, 1993, p.159). Self-selection, meant as a natural 
way for individuals of pursuing their own interest (against others’ well-being), seems 
also to play an important role (Frank and Schulze, 2000). Given these considerations, 
economists may not be representative of the student population especially when 
drawing conclusions in situations that require a trade-off between profit 
                                                 
41 According to Frank et al. (1993), other social sciences include psychology, sociology, political 
sciences, and antropology. 
42 See Yezer et al. (1996). 
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maximization and ethical considerations (Cipriani et al., 2009). Thus, at the 
individual level the questionnaire aims to shed light on the self-regarding and 
instrumental attitudes of people who study economics and those who study 
psychology. 
 
At the cultural level, the survey offers a cross-country comparison between 
respondents in Italy and the UK. According to the latest available statistics (see 
Appendix 3A), although in the past decade the recycling sector has massively 
increased in both the UK and Italy, the UK performed better than Italy43. There is 
reason to believe that these differences may not only be due to the financial 
constraints faced by the two countries with respect to recycling activities. Among 
other reasons, it can be argued that these variations might be due to late (or lack of) 
public acceptance of separate collections, which can be attributed to differences in 
culture and in individuals’ level of environmental morale. Many studies in the tax 
compliance literature show, for example, that the higher is tax morale in a country 
the lower is the level of evasion. Thus, if moral motivation plays a role, it is 
reasonable to argue that in countries where there is a high level of environmental 
morale, subjects will be more willing to contribute to the conservation of the 
environment. Torgler et al. (2008), analysing individuals’ preferences towards the 
environment in 33 countries in Western and Eastern Europe, provide evidence that 
people are willing to contribute to a better environment through different channels –
i.e., monetary payments (such as taxes or income donations) or voluntary work. It 
turns out that people behave differently in different cultures. Among other reasons, 
this can be related to the level of individuals’ environmental morale as well as to 
their perception of fairness and legitimacy of governments. Therefore, the present 
analysis tries to assess: whether Italian and British students contribute differently to 
recycling activities; and whether these differences can be attributed to differences in 
culture and in the levels of environmental morale.  
 
Among the methodologies that can be used to analyse environmental preferences, 
primary data in general and surveys in particular have the advantage of being able to 
employ many independent variables and therefore to control for specific factors 
                                                 
43 Some 24.7 per cent of total waste generated in the UK was recycled in 2011, against 19.6 per cent 
recycled in Italy (excluding composting and digestion). 
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explaining individuals’ behaviours. As it will be discussed further below (see also 
Chapter 1), this provided us a unique opportunity to use specific questions to build 
the environmental morale index, a variable that was not possible to obtain if relying 
on E/WVS data. Compared to laboratory experiments, which generally involve only 
a few number of participants (maximum 24 per each session of the experiment), 
surveys also have the advantage of being able to provide large data sets for 
regression analyses. Given the different objectives of this study, the employment of 
experimental data could have prevented us to gather significant results from the 
empirical analyses. Furthermore, ad hoc surveys are generally useful in providing 
comparisons between different countries and might be particularly helpful to 
overcome the problem of unavailability of data from different sources. In line with 
other areas of research attempting to obtain information about individuals’ 
preferences44, this work will take advantage of these features of survey evidence. 
Some economists seem to be sceptical about survey results given that respondents’ 
answers might be biased “towards what they perceive as socially acceptable or 
normal behaviour” (see Frank and Schulze, 2000, p. 103). However, the present 
study uses questions on hypothetical scenarios rather than asking people questions 
about their actual behaviour. This may help in reducing the problem of bias. This 
aspect will be further discussed in the concluding section of Chapter 4 along with 
possible limitations of the study.   
 
3.3 INTRINSIC MOTIVATION AND RECYCLING 
 
Recent contributions to the literature offer insights into the importance of 
environmental morale and motivation for recycling behaviour. As suggested by 
Nyborg (2008), on the one hand cognitive evaluation theory and the more recent self-
image approach provide arguments in favour of the crowding-out effect. Cognitive 
evaluation theory is concerned with actions individuals are willing to undertake even 
in the absence of external interventions – i.e., they are intrinsically motivated. In 
contrast, the self-image approach assumes that individuals are not aware of their 
moral values, but they can learn how good they are by observing their own 
behaviours.  
                                                 
44 Surveys have been largely used to analyse tax morale (Klepper and Nagin, 1989, Orviska and 




Pioneered by Bénabou and Tirole (2006) the self-image approach implies that, 
when making decisions, individuals are influenced by a mix of intrinsic, extrinsic 
and reputational motivations that are context related. In the words of Bénabou and 
Tirole (ibid, p. 1653) people’s behaviour is “influenced by a strong need to maintain 
conformity between ones’ actions, or even feelings and certain values…they seek to 
uphold”. It turns out that individuals care about their self-image and assess their own 
conduct through the eyes of an impartial spectator by imagining how he/she would 
evaluate it. Placing their self in his/her situation they develop feelings of 
approbation/disapprobation and accept or condemn actions according to different 
passions and motives. However, later on they will lose some information about their 
values given that there will be incentives to recall them in a self-serving way (see 
Bénabou and Tirole, 2006). In other words, actions will be easier to remember, and 
individuals will define themselves according to their past actions.   
 
In this light, contributing to the environment might increase individuals’ 
confidence in their own goodness. However, when external interventions are 
substantial enough to keep emissions at a socially optimal level (e.g., a Pigouvian 
tax) moral motivation is crowded-out since people believe that their contribution 
may not be worth very much. These arguments are in line with a theoretical model 
introduced by Brekke et al. (2003). The authors provide a formal proof of the effect 
of introducing either a symbolic fee (i.e., introduced merely as an incentive) or a 
sufficient fee (i.e., introduced to fully finance external provision of the good) to boost 
individuals’ motivation to perform tasks that were previously done on a volunteering 
do-it-yourself basis. In the first case the fee is perceived as encouraging responsible 
individuals to increase their efforts. In the second case, individuals erroneously 
believe that responsibility of the public good provision is left to the government, 
leading therefore to a reduction of their contribution. This differs in some way with 
cognitive evaluation theory (see Deci and Ryan, 1985) that generally assumes that 
external interventions reduce morale motivation when individuals perform 
interesting tasks and perceive monetary incentives as controlling. However, as 
Brekke et al. (2003) point out, moral motivation here is not only narrowly related to 
interesting tasks, but to morality as such. Thus, the key concept is the individuals’ 
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trade-off between the benefits of maintaining a self-image of being socially 
responsible against the costs of doing so. This is done by evaluating individuals’ 
actual and morally ideal efforts. A case study relating to dugnads (voluntary 
community work) in Norway shows that when a fee for non-participation was 
introduced individuals were more willing to decrease their work participation.  
 
On the other hand, cognitive dissonance suggests that individuals experience a 
negative feeling when behaviour is in contrast with their positive self-conception as 
good people (Aronson et al., 2005,  cited by Nyborg, 2008). According to the self-
image model developed by Brekke et al.(2003), cognitive dissonance can be reduced 
by adapting actual behaviour. However, the psychology literature suggests that in 
order to reduce the unpleasant feeling of cognitive dissonance a change in one’s 
values rather than behaviour is much more effective. In particular, individuals tend to 
be more prone to change their values if it becomes costly to support a moral idea (see 
Ostling, 2009). In such a context, introducing an environmental tax makes it less 
costly for individuals to be environmentally-friendly, thus reinforcing their moral 
values. In addition, according to theories based on reciprocity and conditional 
cooperation it seems that the introduction of green taxes may keep up the moral 
motivation of the conditional cooperators as opposed to free riding behaviour. 
    
These considerations suggest that while moral motivation seems to be crucial for 
environmental protection when Pigouvian instruments cannot be applied, it is much 
less clear how intrinsic motivation interplays with efficient and feasible monetary 
incentives (Nyborg, 2008).   
 
Even though many studies in the literature cite moral motivations as a possible 
explanation for differences in voluntary recycling45, the influence of environmental 
regulation on environmental morale has been analysed more theoretically (see for 
example Grepperud, 2007). As a matter of fact, a large body of the theoretical and 
empirical studies have been mainly focused on the analysis of the determinants and 
the variation in recycling behaviours. Some of them discuss the importance of 
households’ recycling efforts as a social cost and examine the extent to which these 
                                                 
45 This has been especially done in studies that considers recycling as a pro-social behaviour (see for 
example (see Hopper and Nielsen, 1991, and Thøgersen, 1996). 
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costs should be taken into account in cost-benefit analyses for alternative waste 
treatment systems (Bruvoll et al., 2002, Berglund, 2006). Some others analyse 
empirically the determinants of the differences in demand for waste disposal and 
recycling within and across countries based on different policies adopted to 
encourage these behaviours (Callan and Thomas, 1997, Jenkins et al., 2003, 
Kipperberg, 2007, Abbot et al., 2011). An emerging empirical literature refers 
instead to the self-image approach (see Brekke et al., 2003) as a possible explanation 
for recycling and/or for individuals’ reaction to public policies. Thus, in the survey 
conducted by Brekke et al. (2003), the introduction of a kerbside pick-up system to 
collect households’ waste leads to a substantial proportion of subjects considering 
increased efficiency as a disadvantage for them. In the study presented by Brekke et 
al. (2007), duty-oriented individuals are guided, instead, by responsibility ascriptions 
that influence their self-image. Responsibility here is not considered as a mere choice 
but as an inference, meaning that when individuals are not sure about the right thing 
to do they follow others’ behaviour. The authors find a positive relationship between 
duty-based individuals and recycling behaviour.         
 
However, to the best of the author’s knowledge, there seems to be only one study 
that directly examines the mechanisms that tend to erode (or encourage) moral 
motivation and contributions to recycling activities using multiple instruments 
(Feldman and Perez, forthcoming)46. Differently from the current study, Feldman 
and Perez (forthcoming) consider deposit, a mandatory scheme and voluntary 
contribution as external incentives. The authors point out the potential regulatory 
advantage of using deposit schemes over other instruments. Drawing on this finding, 
they conclude that the design of recycling policy should be sensitive to the framing 
of regulatory instruments and to the interplay between intrinsic and extrinsic 
motivation on the desirability and efficacy of the policy schemes.  
 
 
The scarce empirical evidence on the relationship between intrinsic motivation 
and recycling participation might be due to problems in disentangling behaviour 
arising from intrinsic and extrinsic motivation using secondary (rather than primary) 
                                                 
46 In a relatively recent study, Thørgersen (2003), for example, considers only the effect of 
introducing a pay-by-weight scheme for garbage collection on individuals’ willingness to recycle.  
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data. It might be difficult, for example, to understand whether a voluntary behaviour 
is related to other-regarding preferences or to moral issues. However, since most of 
the theoretical analyses conclude that it is better to leave individuals’ compliance to 
voluntary behaviour (due to the crowding-out effect on moral motivation); more 
evidence on these issues represents a priority for economic research. This, in fact, 
seems to be in contrast with actual governments’ interventions aimed at increasing 
citizens’ effort in various ways. In addition, it seems hazardous to over-generalize 
and attribute the above conclusion to all types of environmental activities. One might 
expect, in fact, that moral motivations are context-related and depend on the nature 
of the activity.   
 
Furthermore, it might be the case that external interventions have a positive 
impact on intrinsic motivation as their presence might strengthen social norms, thus 
leading to a possible positive long-term effect47. As suggested by Rege (2004) in a 
different context temporary taxes or subsidies might be sufficient to reach a 
permanent Nash equilibrium. Therefore the introduction of external interventions and 
their subsequent removal would not alter individuals’ perception that recycling is the 
right thing to do. However, such a long-term effect requires both that people exhibit 
different initial environmental morale (to create different equilibria) and that the 
percentage of individuals with high environmental morale is sufficiently increased 
after the tax and subsidy removal (for a similar discussion about green consumers' 
attitudes, see for example Nyborg et al., 2006, p. 359 ).          
 











                                                 
47 This may occur, for example, if individuals perceive it as “a symbolic device underlining the 
individual’s responsibility” (see Nyborg et al., 2006, p.359). 
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The empirical analysis presented here is based on a questionnaire survey conducted 
in the cities of Bath (United Kingdom) and Florence (Italy). Before proceeding with 
the collection of the questionnaires two pilot analyses48 were carried out. After 
introducing the necessary changes a final version of the questionnaire was built 
according to respondents’ suggestions and field-experts’ opinions. 
 
The survey was administered by the author during the periods October-December 
2011 and February-April 2012. The questionnaires were collected from students 
taking first year courses in psychology and economics at the University of Bath (UK) 
and at the University of Florence (Italy) according to the following procedure49. 
After a brief introduction to the study, participants received a printed version of the 
questionnaire. The following preamble was read out: 
 
‘There are many reasons why governments are promoting recycling activities. In 
particular, they are aimed at reducing: waste to landfill; excessive consumption of 
raw materials; methane emissions; water contamination; and odours and noise 
pollution. 
 
The purpose of this questionnaire is to gather information on people’s attitudes 
towards recycling activities. The questionnaire is divided into three different 
sections. In ‘SECTION 1’ you are requested to answer questions about hypothetical 
                                                 
48 The first pilot analysis involved a sample of 100 respondents interviewed among the student/adult 
population of the University of Bath and of the University of Florence. The second one included 
approximately 50 students recruited among the student population of the University of Bath.   
49 It has to be noted that some of these students were not strictly ‘economists’ or ‘psychologists’ (e.g., 
a minority of students – roughly one-third of the sample interviewed – taking first year courses in 
economics at the University of Bath were politics majors). However, for simplicity they will be 
referred to as ‘economists’ and ‘psychologists’, respectively. Note that pooling the data obtained from 
students who were exposed to (and not strictly enrolled in) the economics and psychology courses 
seems not to represent a major problem here. Indeed, the objective of the study was not to test whether 
differences between students’ behaviours and attitudes are due to self-selection (see e.g., Frank and 
Schulze, 2000), but to investigate whether differences between students’ responses are consistent with  
exposure to different indoctrinations.  
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scenarios regarding recycling activities. Each setting varies according to different 
policies introduced by the local authority, which is officially responsible for the 
provision of public services in your area. Remember these are imaginary situations 
that do not have to be necessarily related to your actual personal experience. In 
‘SECTION 2’ and ‘SECTION 3’ you are asked to provide general information about 
yourself and to state your opinion on particular issues. 
 
To answer the questions, please tick ONE of the boxes next to the answer(s); or, 
when appropriate, write your answer in the space provided. Unless the question 
allows you to tick more than one answer, please just tick one box per question. 
 
I would be very grateful for your contribution to this study. All responses will remain 
anonymous. Thank you for your help.’ 
 
Participants were then asked to complete the questionnaire on their own and 
without consulting their colleagues. The time taken to hand out the questionnaires, 
and to complete and collect them again was approximately 20 minutes. In all 1,190 
responses were collected. Data from 25 participants were excluded. Among them, 10 
did not complete the questionnaire, 8 answered all questions without following the 
instructions provided in the answers (next to each option), and the remaining 7 
provided answers that were not consistent with the structure of the questionnaire (e.g. 
they answered question Q3.b after choosing ‘I would increase my effort’ in question 
Q3)50. After omitting these data the full sample is based on 1,165 observations for 
the regression analysis (60% economists, and 40% psychologists). Main sample 
characteristics are reported in Table 3.1. As shown in the table, the sample is 
generally balanced: 377 observations constitute the Italian-economists subsample, 
325 comprise the British-economists subsample, and of the remaining 463 
questionnaires collected, 253 were taken from psychology lectures at the University 
of Bath and 210 were gathered from psychologists at the University of Florence. The 
questionnaire is reproduced in Appendix 3B.  
 
 
                                                 
50 This provides evidence in support of the conclusion that generally respondents understood the 
questionnaire.   
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3.4.2 Dependent variables 
 
In the first part of the questionnaire (i.e., ‘SECTION 1’) participants were asked to 
answer questions on three hypothetical scenarios. Answers to these questions were 
aggregated into a scale that served as dependent variables for the regression analysis. 
In the first setting (hereafter VOLUNTARY scenario), respondents were asked to 
assess their level of contribution in terms of effort spent on recycling activities given 
the assumption that they had to bear the time and trouble costs of recycling activities 
(e.g., separate their waste and/or buy different bins and garbage bags for specific 
waste). Responses were based on a five-point Likert scale (from 1 = I will do hardly 




TNO Economists % TNO Psychologists %TNO 
Italian sample 377 53.7% 210 45.4% 
British sample 325 46.3% 253 54.6% 
Full sample 702 60.3% 463 39.7% 
Notes: The table reports sample characteristics of data collected from Economics and Psychology 
taught units at the University of Bath (British sample) and at the University of Florence (Italian 
sample). TNO = Total Number of Observations. For the full sample, % TNO refers to the percentage 
of students exposed to Economics and Psychology teaching relative to the total number of observation 
in the data set (i.e., 1,165). For the two subsamples of observations (namely, the Italian and British 
samples), % TNO refers to the percentage of students studying Economics and Psychology in 
Florence and Bath relative to the total number of Economics and Psychology students in the whole 
sample (i.e., 702 and 463, respectively). 
  
In order to understand which reason was the most important for their decision 
over the alternatives ‘high’ and ‘low’ provision of effort, two follow-up questions 
were also asked51. The alternatives provided in the answer were based on the most 
common factors mentioned in the literature as possible explanations for pro-
environmental behaviours (see Barr, 2003, and DEFRA, 2002). In particular, the 
present analysis considers: 
 
- Awareness (i.e., ‘I believe environmental damages caused by not recycling are 
significant/insignificant’), which seems to be one of the crucial factors for active 
engagement of citizens towards more sustainable behaviour. It turns out that 
                                                 
51 Given that the same reasons may apply for a medium provision of effort, those who chose a 
medium provision of effort were asked to select one option among the possible alternatives presented 
in the follow-up questions related to high and low provision of effort.     
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increasing general consensus and awareness for the need to recycle represent a core 
priority for governments. This should be guaranteed not only by appropriate 
information-campaigns about the separation of waste but also by public accessibility 
to specific (scientific) documents, which recognize the need for the necessity of 
environmental actions and guide local and national policies. Among other factors, 
Barr (2003), for example, in a survey conducted in Exeter, found that those 
respondents who were more concerned about waste issues (and perceived it as a 
threat for their personal wealth) were more willing to reduce the waste that they 
produced. 
 
 - Appropriate information-campaigns (i.e., ‘I am/I am not well informed about 
waste recycling collection), which is strictly connected with the concept of 
awareness, as it seems to represent one of its casual attributions. In a relatively recent 
report DEFRA (2002, p.7) states that ‘through informed dialogue, appropriate 
solutions can be found to complex problems involving many different issues.’ 
However, it might be argued that in some circumstances information is unlikely to be 
effective without actions directed to develop an environmental consciousness. This is 
specifically the case of recycling activities. To give an example, if a good 
information campaign is employed in order to explain to citizens how to separate 
specific waste, but individuals are myopic about the necessity and significance of 
their actions, the information alone would be less likely to generate the desirable 
outcomes. This justifies the need to separate the two factors in order to evaluate 
which one plays a major role in engaging/not engaging in recycling behaviour. 
 
- Social pressure (i.e., ‘Ido/I do not participate in recycling activities because others 
do so’), that is the acceptance of the norm to recycle given that others do participate 
in such activity. Many studies in the literature provide evidence for the importance of 
this factor in recycling behaviour. Barr (2003) and Brekke et al. (2007) for example 
show a positive relationship between individuals’ participation in recycling and the 




An open answer option (i.e., ‘Other reasons’) was also provided to allow 
respondents to answer in their own terms and to locate other factors influencing 
voluntary contribution to recycling activities.  
 
The VOLUNTARY scenario represents a benchmark situation designed in order 
to facilitate comparisons with two other scenarios where individuals’ behaviour was 
designed to be driven by external incentives enforced by a local authority. The 
choice of these scenarios reflects the on-going debate over the mandatory/voluntary 
nature of recycling activities52 versus a more (liberty-preserving) paternalistic 
strategy that tries to direct people’s behaviour towards recycling (see Thaler and 
Sunstein, 2008). The second scenario (hereafter BIN scenario – i.e., a facilitating 
nudge policy), was modelled, in fact, with the objective of sending the signal that 
recycling is the ‘right thing to do’, thus acknowledging individuals’ contribution to 
recycling but preserving their freedom to choose not to recycle. To this end, this 
setting considers improving the provision of kerbside collection without charging 
any fees53. Besides these improvements, the third framework (hereafter FINE 
scenario – i.e., a mandatory scheme) introduces a money fine on those who are 
caught not recycling as requested. Similar to other areas of research (e.g., see the tax 
evasion literature), the FINE scenario seems to pose the problem of introducing a 
risk element into the analysis. Therefore it might be argued that a decrease in the 
provision of effort could be biased by individuals’ misperception of the probability 
of being detected not recycling rather than from the crowding out effect. However, 
the fine here serves as a vehicle to avoid responsibility costs (i.e., time and trouble 
costs) contingent on recycling activities, rather than just as a punishment for not 
recycling as requested54. Therefore, these aspects do not play a major role here. In 
addition, unlike the tax evasion literature, the fine is independent of the amount of 
non-recycled waste and it is fixed to the local littering fine. Thus, the decision on 
                                                 
52 In the UK, for example, The Sunday Telegraph has supported a strong campaign against the 
introduction and maintenance of fines contingent on recycling non-compliance. Examples of penalty 
schemes introduced in UK are those who allow councils to fine people between a minimum of £110 to 
a maximum of £1000 (e.g. in Lambeth). In Italy most of these schemes have been introduced in 2011 
in many municipalities from the North to the South of the country (e.g. in Trento, Ponsacco, and 
Cagliari) and penalties varies between 150 to 500 euros. 
53 It is worth emphasizing that given the hypothetical nature of the questions, nudge is here referred to 
the signal (or perception) of government intervention rather than to a real stimulus as suggested in 
Thaler and Sunstein (2008). 
54 For similar approaches see Gneeze and Rustichini  (2000b), and Bruvoll et al. (2002). 
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whether to decrease/increase private contribution or not may reflect intrinsic 
motivation related to the activity itself rather than being dependent on the amount 
and intensity of the fine.  
 
In both scenarios respondents were presented with a question where they were 
asked to compare the new situations with that presented in the first setting. Thus, 
they were required to think about whether the changes provided by the new scenarios 
would in some way affect their behaviour. The assumption here is that individuals 
may react in different ways to different policies (i.e., signals). In particular, external 
interventions may either reduce/increase individuals’ motivation and effort or not 
influence individuals’ behaviours at all. Possible responses to these questions were: 
‘I would exert the same level of effort’, ‘I would increase my effort’, and ‘I would 
decrease my effort’.   
 
In order to provide possible explanations for respondents’ decisions and to 
capture the reasons for the crowding-in/out effect, two follow-up questions for the ‘I 
would increase my effort’ and ‘I would decrease my effort’ options were used55.  
Depending on the context, the answers provide a mixed combination of a 
disciplining effect motivation, a crowding-in/out motivation, a social pressure 
explanation (i.e., ‘I believe others will do so’) and a general open answer (i.e., ‘Other 
reasons’). These reflect theoretical explanations provided in the literature for 
increasing/decreasing individuals’ effort (see e.g. Frey, 1997). 
 
The disciplining effect motivation used in this analysis comprises possible 
instrumental considerations individuals may take into account when the external 
intervention increases marginal shirking costs (e.g., using a mandatory scheme) or 
decreases marginal costs of performing (e.g., facilitating nudge policy). In both cases 
the disciplining effect raises individuals’ performance56. 
 
                                                 
55 Since the study mainly focuses on the crowding-out/in effect, no follow-up question was built for 
the answer ‘I would exert the same level of effort’, where individuals are indifferent to policy 
changes. Possible explanations for this could be either that they are already providing their maximum 
level of effort or they do not exhibit any form of initial motivation. 
56 Here the crowding out effect is neglected because intrinsic motivation is considered to be a constant 
or, alternatively, absent. For a discussion see e.g. Frey (1997).  
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The crowding-out effects are captured by two different types of reasoning: one 
assumes that instrumental considerations play a major role in determining a decrease 
in individuals’ performance when others, including Government, increase their 
efforts (i.e., typical public good crowding-out effect57); the other one is more related 
to intrinsic motivations (see Frey, 1997 – hereafter the Frey’s crowding-out effect) 
and to the extent to which external regulations affects performance via a reduction in 
individuals’ self-determination and self-esteem.  
 
Finally, in both scenarios the crowding-in effects (see Frey, 1997 – hereafter the 
Frey’s crowding-in effect) are driven respectively by positive and strong reciprocal 
preferences (see Nyborg, 2008). As discussed in chapter 2, on the one hand, positive 
reciprocity predicts that those who perceive the policy improvement as a fair and 
acknowledging policy will enjoy increasing their contribution. People, for example, 
can feel gratification from responding in kind to an improvement of recycling 
materials and services. On the other hand, when introducing the fine, strong 
reciprocal preferences might increase the intrinsic motivation of conditional co-
operators who no longer feel exploited by free riders.  
 
The current study has therefore the advantage of being able to disentangle 
behaviours induced by instrumental evaluations (i.e., disciplining effect and public 
good crowding-out effect) from those induced by ethical considerations (Frey’s 
crowding-out/in effect). Table 3.2 summarizes the options used to capture these 
effects in the BIN and FINE scenarios. 
 
Overall this comprises a combination of 5 × 3 × 3 possible behaviours. Among 
them, it is interesting to isolate those that can be attributed to social men, from those 
ascribed to economic men. In this context a social man is a man that voluntarily 
contributes to recycling activities (and presumably has an initial intrinsic 
motivation), whilst an economic man is a man who does not care about recycling 
                                                 
57 For a discussion see Andreoni (1989, 1990). 
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activities and seemingly about the environment (and presumably has a low or no 
environmental morale)58.  
 
Table 3.2 
The interaction between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation and the relative change in efforts 




Crowding-in effect Crowding-out effect 
Bin Scenario 
Increase 
Recycling will be 
less time and 
effort consuming 
I am happy to spend more 
effort if recycling 
facilities increase (Frey’s 
crowding-in effect)a 
- 
Decrease - - 
- Recycling (or not) should be 
an individual choice and not 
treated as an almost moral 
obligation (Frey’s crowding-out 
effect) 
- I would put in less effort 
because I can achieve the same 
quantity of recycling as before 
given the improved recycling 




I will increase my 
effort because I 
do not want to 
incur a fine 
Given that now we all 
contribute at least a little, 
I would like to exert more 
effort than I believe others 
do to show that I care 




Decrease - - 
- Recycling (or not) should be 
an individual choice and not 
treated as an almost legal 
obligation (Frey’s crowding-out 
effect) 
- I prefer to pay someone else 
to do my recycling (Public 
good crowding-out effect) 
a Positive Reciprocity.  
b Strong Reciprocity. 
 
                                                 
58 It has to be noted that this distinction has been made only for simplicity of exposition. ‘Real’ people 
are more complex and there might be situations somewhere in between that have not been considered 
in this taxonomy – e.g., people may care about the environment (social man), but might think that 
recycling does not contribute much to environmental conservation.   
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Table 3.3 and Table 3.4 show a behavioural taxonomy outlining all possible 
combinations of both men’s reactions to external interventions (namely BIN and 
FINE in the tables). As shown in Table 3.3, feelings of pro-voluntarism and anti-state 
intervention translate into crowding-out intrinsic motivation of social men. 
Conversely, economic men who respond to enforcement and punishment are more 
likely to increase their contribution to recycling activities (see Table 3.4). These 
considerations may also play a role in determining respectively the crowding-in of 
social men contribution and the crowding-out of economic men intrinsic motivation.  
 
However, it might be argued that, in this case, what matters more is the initial 
level of individuals’ motivation. To give an example, a social man who affirms 
he/she would recycle at a voluntary base, but with medium effort, will probably not 
change his/her behaviour if recycling materials and services are improved, but he/she 
might increase his/her provision of effort because of feelings of anxiety and fear of 
receiving a fine. Similarly, an economic man who is reluctant to recycle on a 
voluntary base, showing low environmental morale, may react to a fair policy (such 
as the BIN scheme) by providing the same level of effort. However, feelings of anti-
state intervention may crowd-out his/her intrinsic motivation, even when this is 
almost absent as, when facing the fine, he/she might dislike being forced to do things 
he/she does not like.   
 
Finally, at the very extreme of this taxonomy there is an ‘ardent’ social man and 
an ‘ardent’ economic man. The former is a man who exhibits high environmental 
morale and therefore respond to external ‘signals’ by providing the same level of 
effort as before (i.e., always cares). By contrast, ‘ardent’ economic men may react 
either by maintaining their (low) initial level of effort or by lowering their effort as 
incentives are provided. Whilst the taxonomies are detailed drawing on a number of 
distinctions, in the empirical study reported below it was possible to find some 
respondents in 16 of the possible 18 cases. This provides a measure of support for the 











Social man and crowding-out effect 
  Are you a recycler? Yes = Social man  
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Economic man and crowding-in effect 
  Are you a recycler? No = Economic man  
































   








  (Responds to 
punishment) 


















3.4.3 Independent variables 
 
In ‘SECTION 2’ and ‘SECTION 3’ of the questionnaire respondents were asked to 
provide information about their socio-demographic/economic background as well as 
their opinion on particular issues. Answers to these questions were used to model the 
independent variables (i.e., socio-demographic/economic variables, attitudinal 
variables and ethics) used in the regression analysis. Most of these variables were 
taken from the World Value Survey (WVS, 2009). However, here scales were 
modified and reduced (or increased) to a five point Likert scale to allow for 
consistency in the questionnaire and for the identification of a clear mid-point 
category. A detailed description of these variables along with the reasons for their 
inclusion in the survey is provided below. 
 
3.4.3.1 Socio-demographic/economic variables  
 
1- Gender (dummy variable, 1=female). The role of gender has been evaluated in 
numerous studies in many areas of research, such as charitable donations, tax evasion 
and corruption. There has been a decrease in gender differences over the past few 
decades, and the opportunity cost argument in economics suggest that men and 
women should not necessarily show different motivations in making their decisions 
(see Torgler et al., 2008). However, many studies in the literature not only provide 
evidence that females are less selfish than males and more social-oriented (see e.g. 
Eckel and Grossman, 1998), but also show that women are more willing to be 
compliant and dislike cheating on taxes and/or accepting bribes59.How can this be 
related to recycling and more generally to environmental preferences? Henderson 
(1996 p. 148) provides a possible explanation for the differential importance of 
women in social context, suggesting that the reason why women spend their leisure 
time on social activities has to be found in their intrinsic “identities of nurturing, 
caring, passivity, gentleness…”. These characteristics make women more likely to be 
more likely to be concerned about the environment. In addition, their ‘traditional’ 
role of working at home predisposes them to be more involved in private 
contributions aimed at preserving the environment (see Torgler et al., 2008, 2009). 
                                                 
59 For the relationship between gender and tax evasion, see for example Schalteger and Torgler 
(2005), Torgler (2006), Lewis et al. (2009). For the relationship between gender and corruption see 
Dollar et al. (2001) and Frank et al. (2010). 
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Most of the available studies in the literature seem to confirm this tendency and show 
that pro-environmental behaviours are more common in females than males (e.g., 
Hines et al., 1987, and Whitmarsh and O'Neill, 2010). However, many studies 
attempting to evaluate households’ determinants of recycling activities show that 
gender is not a fundamental determinant of recycling behaviours (see for example 
Domina and Koch, 2002, and Do Valle et al., 2004). Indeed, Barr (2003) shows that 
gender plays a major role for waste reduction rather than recycling behaviours and 
this trend might be due to the particular responsibilities females have in their house 
(such as doing shopping), where they might be more likely to make choices related to 
waste minimization.   
 
2 – Age (ordinal variable, from 1 (15-24) to 5(55-64)). Instead of using a 
continuous variable, age has been classified in six categories. These include: 15-24, 
25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-64, 65 and more years. As with gender effects, empirical 
findings on the relationship between age and recycling also seem to be controversial. 
Some studies show for example that older people are more likely to be engaged in 
recycling schemes than younger people (e.g., Ewing, 2001, and Barr, 2003). 
However, others show an insignificant or negative relationship between the two 
variables (see Werner and Makela, 1998, and Torgler et al., 2008). This might be due 
to two different reasons. On the one hand, as suggested by Oskamp et al. (1991), it 
might be expected that as soon as recycling becomes easier and accessible to all 
members of the society, the relationship between demographic variables and 
recycling is more likely to be weaken.  On the other hand, according to Torgler et al. 
(2008) the controversy among age effects might be due to two different effects: one 
is a life cycle effect which is determined by being a member of a certain age group; 
one is a cohort effect resulting from being part of a specific generation. The former 
generally results into a negative correlation between age and the willingness to 
contribute to environmental protection given that older people are less likely to enjoy 
the long-term benefits of preserving the environment. The latter, by contrast, in 
addition to the idea that older people strongly depend on others’ approval and/or 
reactions (Tittle, 1980), helps to explain why older people seems to be more 




3 – Occupation (set of dummy variables, 1 = reference category). Job position is 
generally considered as a complement for the economic situation of individuals. 
Hence, likewise the variables ‘income’ and ‘financial satisfaction’, occupation may 
also play a role in determining different individuals’ recycling attitudes. 
Unfortunately, there are not many studies in the literature that consider the role of 
occupation on recycling behaviour. Among the available analyses (e.g., Torgler and 
Garcia-Valiñas, 2007, and Torgler et al., 2008, 2009), some show that retired people 
seem to contribute less to the prevention of the environment, whereas part-time and 
full-time employees, and students seem to be more likely to contribute (e.g. Torgler, 
2008)60. Some others (see Torgler et al., 2009), on the contrary, highlight that people 
on retirement have higher environmental morale than people with a different 
occupational status. Therefore it seems difficult to make predictions about the 
expected signs of estimated coefficient. 
 
4 - Marital Status (set of dummy variables, 1 = reference category). A large body 
of empirical studies demonstrate the relevance of marital status as a determinant for 
individuals’ contribution to environmental quality (see e.g., Torgler et al., 2008, 
2009) In general, awareness about environmental damages leads married people to 
comply more than single individuals as “they are more constrained by their social 
network and they are often very involved in the community” (Torgler et al., 2009, p. 
15 ). Differences between married and single people have also been founded in their 
level of environmental morale and attitudes (see Torgler et al., 2009), with the 
former showing higher levels of environmental preference and morale. A possible 
explanation for this is given by the so called parent effect, which assumes married 
people as being more concerned about local environmental problems and their 
consequences on future generations (see Dupont, 2004).  Drawing on this evidence, it 
is possible to expect a positive relationship between those who are married (or live as 
a couple) and their willingness to recycle. However, also in this case empirical 
evidence of recycling analyses seems to be inconclusive. Among those studies 
analysing the relationship between households’ type (e.g., single, couple, couple with 
one child, etc.) and recycling, some have found a significant relationship between the 
number of people living in the house and the frequency of recycling (see e.g. Gamba 
                                                 
60 These results are consistent with the life cycle effect, thus strengthening the argument that older 
people care less about environmental protection. 
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and Oskamp, 1994). Some others (see e.g. Werner and Makela, 1998, Torgler and 
Garcia-Valiñas, 2007) have found no relationship between the two variables. Thus 
the effect of marital status on recycling attitudes is difficult to predict and may lead 
to contradictory results.   
      
5 - Financial Satisfaction (ordinal variable, from 1 = extremely dissatisfied to 10 
= extremely satisfied). Respondents were asked to define, on a scale of 1 to 10, their 
financial satisfaction (where 10 is extremely satisfied, and 1 is extremely 
dissatisfied). Although the inclusion of an income variable is common practice 
among survey analyses, the reasons for its omission here are twofold: first, 
respondents might be sensitive to this kind of question, and secondly, different 
incomes may not to be comparable across different countries. This said, there are 
reasons to believe that financial satisfaction is strongly related to income and 
represents therefore a good proxy for this variable. In fact, it can be argued that high 
income leads to a more comfortable life and more satisfaction, whereas low income 
tends to create a sense of dissatisfaction thus affecting negatively individuals’ life 
style. Put differently, as income increases, people should be more willing to care and 
contribute to environmental prevention if this is considered as a normal good61. 
Nevertheless, also in this context there is not a general consensus about the effect of 
income on recycling. Some studies show a positive relationship between household 
with higher incomes and participation in recycling schemes (see Domina and Koch, 
2002, and Torgler and Garcia-Valiñas, 2007). Some others do not find any 
significant relationship between the two variables (see, for example, Do Valle et al., 
2004, and Whitmarsh and O'Neill, 2010).   
 
6 – Religion (ordinal variable, from 1 = not at all important to 5 = very 
important). Respondents were asked to assess the importance of religion in their life. 
Options varied from ‘very important’ to ‘not at all important’ on a five-point Likert 
scale62. This variable has been extensively used in the tax evasion literature to 
evaluate how religion might influence tax morale (see Torgler, 2006). Indeed, it 
might be argued that religiosity influences beliefs about what is right or wrong in real 
life contexts. Torgler et al. (2008, 2009) analysing the differences in preference 
                                                 
61 This fact explains for example the existence of the so-called Kuznets curve. 
62 See WVS, section ‘A. Perceptions of life’.   
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towards the environment found that churches can work as enforcement of social 
norms and that attendance to church is positively related to voluntary works63. 
Therefore there might be a positive relationship between environmental morale, 
individual’ attitudes towards the environment and the importance of religion. 
 
7 – Nationality (set of dummy variables, 1 = reference category). The variable 
comprises the following nationalities: British, Italian, Other European, African, 
American, Asian, Australian, Middle Eastern, and Pacific Islander. However, given 
the purposes of this study, the empirical analysis will be mainly focused on the 
differences between Italians and British.  
 
8 – Psychologists (dummy variable, 1 = psychologist). Along the same lines, the 
analysis includes also a variable aimed at capturing the differences between 
psychologists and economists.  
 
3.4.3.2 Attitudinal variables  
 
1 - Risk Aversion (dummy variable, 1 = risk averse). Respondents were required to 
rank (according to their relative importance) five different attributes about a job 
position. Those who put as their first or second choice “A safe job with no risk” were 
therefore considered as risk averse. As with other areas of research (see e.g. Torgler, 
2006), this WVS question64 is used here to infer individuals’ risk aversity. To the 
best of the author’s knowledge, this is the first survey in the field that considers the 
relationship between environmental morale, environmental contribution and risk 
propensity. Why might risk aversion play a role in this context? Recent studies in the 
literature suggest that, given the uncertainty of their intangible costs over time, 
environmental risks65 represent a special category of risks (see Gattig and Hendrickx, 
2007). Due to its characteristics, environmental risks are generally discounted less 
than other domains. How can this be related to environmental morale and attitudes? 
On the one hand, it might be argued that those who exhibit higher environmental 
                                                 
63 These works, however, infer importance of religion by asking respondents the following question: 
‘Apart from weddings, funerals and christenings, how often do you attend religious services these 
days? (8 = More than once a week to 1 = practically never or never)’. 
64 See WVS, section ‘C. Work: first choice when looking for a job’.  
65 The term here is referred to negative consequences. 
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morale are generally more aware of environmental damages and therefore more 
willing to contribute to environmental quality (with respect to those who show a 
lower environmental morale). As suggested by Gattig and Hendrickx (2007, p. 22), 
individuals’ “…support for policy measures depend on the extent to which they 
consider environmental problems…to be a risk”. Thus, risk propensity might 
influence environmental morale and individuals’ responses to different policies. Risk 
averse people might be therefore more compliant and, when an environmental risk is 
perceived as a loss, people will tend to avoid risk. However, on the other hand, if 
environmental risk constitutes a special kind of risk, being risk averse does not 
necessarily translate into being more willing to contribute given that other factors 
might play a role in determining individuals’ decisions and behaviours (e.g., spatial 
and social distance of the negative outcomes)66. Therefore, it seems difficult to 
predict the effect of this variable on environmental morale and behaviour.   
 
2 – Trust in Government (Ordinal variable, from 1 = none at all to 5 = a great 
deal). Individuals’ political participation and trust in governments also seem to be 
key variables here. The present analysis infers trust in government by asking the 
respondents67 what is the level of confidence they have in governments (5 = a great 
deal to 1 = none at all). Confidence in government seems to be a crucial factor when 
it comes to seeing how people react to variation of policy measures. Furthermore, 
trust in waste disposal authorities might increase cooperation especially among 
respondents with reciprocal preferences as ‘most people build trust in and networks 
to others and come to cooperate with them’ (Paldam, 2000, p. 629). Thus, trust in 
government might have a positive impact on individuals’ contributions to 
environmental protection.   
 
3- Social responsibility (continuous variable, sum score of selected items). As 
mentioned above, the literature suggests a positive relationship between being duty-
oriented individuals and environmental morale and attitudes. The variable ‘social 
responsibility’ is employed here to test the direction of this relationship. However, 
rather than using a single question to infer individuals’ social responsibility, the 
present analysis considers using a multi-item index. Despite the complexity 
                                                 
66 For a detailed discussion on these aspects see Gattig and Hendrickx (2007). 
67 See WVS, section ‘E. Politcs and Society’. 
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associated with the construction of this variable, it might be argued that social 
responsibility can be viewed as a multi-dimensional concept for which it seems more 
appropriate a multi-item measurement tool, as in psychometric analysis. Likewise 
individuals’ ‘moral values’ or people’s ‘tax mentality’ and/or ‘tax morale’, also 
individuals’ social responsibility seems to be best captured by observing people’s 
responses to a set of different questions rather than only to one question68.  A multi-
item index of social responsibility has, in fact, the advantage of being able to connect 
the interrelated facets of social responsibility and might reduce problems related to 
random errors in measurements, which are commonly present when using a single-
item measure (see Alm and Torgler, 2006). Four questions (i.e., items) were used in 
order to analyse individuals’ pro-social attitudes and to assess their social 
responsibility towards ‘public’ issues. The questions were chosen among those 
present in the ‘justifiability section’ of the WVS and more related to public injuries69. 
Respondents were thus required to state their opinions about justifiability of: 
cheating on taxes, throwing away litter in a public place, avoiding a fare on public 
transport, smoking in public place. To create the index, the degree to which 
respondents justified these statements was ranked from 1 (always justified) to 5 
(never justified). The generated index was built by aggregating these values for each 
respondent, thus leading a range between 4 and 20. Internal consistency of the index 
was assessed using the Cronbach’s (1951)   psychometric test, which provided a 
moderate and acceptable (see Loewenthal, 1996) alpha-coefficient of reliability 
 57.0 70. This test statistic provides a measure of the correlation between the 
present scale and all other possible four-item scales measuring the latent variable 
‘environmental morale’. Full results are reported and discussed in Appendix 3C.  
 
4 – Altruism. Respondents were asked to state how important is service to others 
in their life (5 = very important to 1 = not at all important). Answers to this WVS 
                                                 
68 In the tax evasion literature, Torgler and Schneider (2007) for example use the following questions 
to develop an index for individuals’ moral values: justifiability of claiming government benefits to 
which they are not entitled, justifiability of avoiding a fare on public transport, and buying something 
knowing that it is stolen (1=never justifiable, 0=all other scales). Similarly, Kirchler (1997, 1999) uses 
different items to measure individuals’ tax morale and tax mentality. He confronted individuals with 
various scenarios where a fictitious individual evaded and/or underreported income and they were 
asked to express their agreement/disagreement to them.   
69 See Section ‘F. Religion and Morale’ of the WVS. 
70 A preliminary investigation over the reliability of the index based on data from the WVS (2009) 
using the combined Italian and UK sample provides a Cronbach’s   of 0.61 (see Appendix 3C).  
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question71 were therefore used as a proxy for individuals’ altruism. The question 
captures the subjective importance of helping other people – i.e., the warm glow of 
giving. Carpenter and Myers (2010), for example, show that service to others (such 
as being a volunteer for the fire service) is positively related to altruism72. Similarly, 
Stern et al. (1995) and Corraliza and Berenguer (2000) suggest that altruistic people 
are more likely to take part to environmental activities. Finally, Ludemann (1999) 
find a positive relationship between altruistic motives for recycling and recycling. 
Therefore it might be predicted that altruism has a positive impact on environmental 




1 – Environmental morale (continuous variable, sum score of selected items). A 
multi-item index was also created in order to infer individuals’ environmental morale 
and to assess the direction of its relationship with recycling attitudes.  
 
Previous studies in the literature (see e.g. Torgler et al., 2009) inferred 
environmental morale making use of the following WVS question: 
 
‘In the following statement, please tell me whether you think it is never justified, 
always justified or somewhere in between: … to throw away litter in a public place’, 
where available options were based on a ten-point Likert scale (1 = never justified, 
10 = always justified).  
 
Although it is common practice to use a single-item question to define more general 
concepts, there are several reasons why in the present analysis environmental morale 
has been derived by individuals’ attitudes towards the environment. First, the 
question usually employed in the literature is a specific question about the 
justifiability of a particular behaviour towards the environment. However, one might 
argue that environmental morale needs to be defined in a more comprehensive 
                                                 
71 See WVS, section ‘A. Perceptions of life’.   




manner73. In other words, rather than inferring individuals’ preferences towards the 
environment only using a single question, it could be useful to observe their 
preferences among different alternatives. This might help to shed light on how 
environmental morale drives individuals’ behaviour when facing different 
opportunity costs in specific contexts. Second, as suggested by Torgler et al. (2009), 
when the WVS question is decontextualized from the more general set of the 
‘justifiability’ questions, respondents might be biased to ‘socially correct’ answers. 
In other words, due to the nature of the question, individuals might be driven towards 
the answer ‘never justified’ as this seems the ‘socially acceptable’ answer. This poses 
the problem of systematic biases and of assessing reliability to the level of 
environmental morale inferred by the question. In other words, respondents will not 
state their real preferences but will tend to answer in the most ‘politically correct’ 
manner possible. This could also be exacerbated in a controlled environment such as 
the one used to conduct this survey. For the same reasons, a direct/specific question 
such as one asking 
 
‘Do you feel it is wrong or not wrong if a person does not contribute to the 
prevention of environmental degradation? (0 = not wrong, 1 = a bit wrong, 2 = 
wrong, 3 = seriously wrong)’, 
 
seems not to be feasible in this context. In addition, as the present analysis is based 
on a cross-country comparison, a question like this might also pose problems of 
interpretation. If values are formed in a particular country according to its own 
traditions and history, individuals will have, in fact, a different perception of what is 
right or wrong in specific countries. Therefore, in this context data comparison might 
be difficult.  
 
Given these considerations, environmental morale was inferred using two 
different sets of questions regarding environmentally-friendly attitudes towards the 
environment. Previous research has also developed measures of pro-environmental 
self-identity using the same methodology (e.g., Berglund, 2006, Whitmarsh and 
                                                 
73 Torgler et al. (2009, p.8) also seem to allude to a broader definition of environmental morale as they 
define it (i.e., individuals’ willingness to avoid littering the street) as “a particular case of 
environmental morale”.  
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O'Neill, 2010). The index-items comprises: a question about individuals’ willingness 
to buy a green product rather than a conventional identical good for which the price 
difference will help to protect the environment; and a question where individuals 
were asked to indicate how often they take specific actions (such as save water, 
recycle74, turn off light, and walk, cycle or take public transport)75 for environmental 
reasons. The first question tries to infer individuals’ willingness to sustain 
environmental protection through monetary contribution (i.e., a more explicit 
opportunity cost)76, whereas the second set of questions tries to capture their 
willingness to bear the time and trouble costs to contribute to a better environment 
(i.e., a more implicit opportunity cost).  
 
Monetary contributions in the first question ranged between a minimum of ‘zero’ 
(i.e., only the same price as the conventional good) to a maximum of ‘more than 30 
per cent’ (i.e., more than 30 per cent than the price of the conventional good). Each 
item in the second set of questions used instead a five-point Likert scale from 1 
(never) to 5 (always). Despite these differences, a viable comparison between the 
item-answers was possible by assuming that those who were both willing to give a 
high monetary contribution (i.e., more than 30 per cent), and to provide ‘always’ pro-
environmental behaviours exhibited very high environmental morale. Thus, as with 
the social responsibility index, after rescaling all item-answers with a common five-
point Likert scale (where 5 = very high environmental morale, and 1 = very low 
environmental morale), a Cronbach’s   test was run to assess the reliability of the 
index  59.0 . This suggested removing the item assessing individuals’ 
willingness to buy a green product from the index measurement (see Appendix 3C). 
All other items were therefore aggregated to form an index ranging from 4 to 20
 61.0 . 
                                                 
74 The inclusion of this item into the index measurement increases the reliability of the index (i.e., 
Cronbach’s Alpha increases from 0.54 to 0.61).  While it might appear circular to include this item, all 
of the tests reported below remain robust when this item is excluded from the index measurement.  
75 These actions are generally considered the most common green activities, i.e. water conservation, 
energy conservation, recycling, and traffic reduction (Whitmarsh and O'Neill, 2010).   
76 Monetary contributions have also been considered in other surveys to provide information about 
individuals’ propensity to contribute to the environment. Torgler et al. (2008) analyse individuals’ 
pro-environmental values asking respondents to provide their level of agreement/disagreement to the 
following WVS statements: ‘I would give part of my income if I were certain that the money would 
be used to prevent environmental pollution’, and ‘I would agree to an increase in taxes if the extra 




The impact of socio-demographic/economic and attitudinal variables on recycling 
participation was then analysed using ordered probit and multinomial logit, since the 
dependent variables show respectively a natural and a non-natural order in their 
alternatives. This technique generates parameters providing information on 
respondents’ likelihood to be involved in recycling activities. Probit regressions were 
also used in order to check the robustness of the results. A detailed description of 
these methodologies can be found in Verbeek (2008) and Long and Freese (2006), 
though they will be briefly illustrated in the following chapter along with regression 




This chapter discusses the objectives of the present analysis and the methodology 
employed in order to test the hypotheses that: first, people react differently according 
to different government ‘signals’ (i.e., policies); secondly, individuals’ reaction to 
external interventions differs according to respondents’ level of environmental 
morale; and 3) thirdly, different degree choice and cultures may affect behaviour 
towards the environment.  
 
The literature provides insights into the relevance of social norms as well as 
reciprocal and altruistic preferences in determining environmental morale and 
behaviour. Given that none of the available studies analyses the sign of the direction 
of this relationship, the present analysis also attempts to investigate this. 
 
A seven-page questionnaire survey was developed in order to investigate the 
importance of these considerations in determining recycling behaviour and the 
crowding-out/in of individuals’ intrinsic motivation and effort. The ‘low cost’ 
argument suggests, in fact, that a rich area of investigation to analyse the impact of 
policy interventions on individuals’ intrinsic motivation is likely to be found in the 
private household sector. The questionnaire is divided into three different sections. 
The first section asks respondents to imagine themselves in hypothetical scenarios 
varying according to different policies. In particular, the analysis considers voluntary 
contributions to recycling activities (i.e. VOLUNTARY scenario) and ‘induced’ 
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contribution to recycling activities by means of an improvement of recycling services 
and (in addition to that with the use of) a fine (respectively the BIN and the FINE 
scenarios). The second and third sections were employed to evaluate how socio-
demographic/economic variables and attitudinal variables influence recycling 
attitudes.     
 
The impact of external regulations (VOLUNTARY versus BIN and FINE 
scenarios), the relationship between individuals’ attitudes towards the environment 
and environmental morale, and the impact of social norms, reciprocal and altruistic 
preferences on environmental morale and behaviour are all discussed in the 





























EU policies have certainly played an important role in changing environmental 
attitudes of its Member States. Many EU Directives have been introduced to modify 
waste management practices in order to prevent environmental damage (e.g., 
greenhouse gas emissions, conservation of raw materials, and reduction of energy 
consumption), and to reduce and divert waste from landfill. In this context, the 
European Environment Agency (EEA, 2009) suggests that over time Italy and the 
United Kingdom have shown similar features regarding the diversion of municipal 
waste from landfill. According to the EEA’s report (2009), they belong to those EU 
countries with high material recovery rates (> 25 per cent) and medium level of 
incineration (< 25 per cent) and dependence on landfill. Both countries also 
introduced policy instruments after the introduction of the Packaging Council 
Directive (94/62/EC)77 and the Landfill Council Directive (99/31/EC)78 by the EU.  
 
Despite these considerations and the fact that the European Directives aimed at 
harmonizing the legislation within Member States, the flexibility of the EU’s laws 
and the heterogeneity of Member State governments has fostered different policy 
measures to improve individuals’ behaviour towards the environment either in 
countries with similar characteristics (e.g., UK and Italy) or even within countries 
(e.g., Italy). The United Kingdom, along with other new Member States79 of the EU, 
made use of a 4-year derogation from the Landfill Directive and introduced the 
                                                 
77 The Packaging Directive was introduced by the European Union in order to prevent and manage 
packaging waste. The Directive set quantified targets for recycling and recovering packaging waste. 
The objective of the Directive was to push Member States to recycle between a minimum of 25 per 
cent to a maximum of 45 per cent of the total packaging materials within the 30 June of 2001, and to 
recycle between a minimum of 55 per cent to a maximum of 80 per cent of the total packaging 
materials within the end of 2008.  
78 The main objective of the Landfill Directive is to reduce and divert waste from landfill. This 
Directive has therefore important implication for waste management and disposal. Likewise the 
Directive 94/62/EC, the Landfill Directive imposed targets to Member States. According to them, 
EU’s countries must reduce the amount of biodegradable municipal waste (BMW) going to landfill to 
75 per cent, 50 per cent and 35 per cent of the 1995 level by 2006, 2009 and 2016, respectively.  
79 Greece, for example, had a 4-year derogation from both the Landfill Directive and the Packaging 
Directive.   
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Landfill Allowance Trading Scheme (LATS) only in 200580. In contrast, Italy passed 
the Landfill Directive into national law in 2003 (despite the deadline expiring 18 
months before). Other differences can also be found in the implementation of 
measures to reach the targets set by the EU and, as a consequence, in the results they 
have been able to attain (see Table 3A.1).  
 
According to the latest available comparative figures (see European Commission, 
2013), during the last decade both countries have considerably reduced the amount of 
waste diverted to landfill81. However, compared to the EU-27 (i.e., 36 per cent) they 
still overuse landfill. In 2008 Italy and the UK were also able to meet the target for 
recycling packaging waste (with 59.6 and 61.5 per cent of the total packaging 
materials respectively recycled), and they set new ambitious targets for the following 
two years82. The amount of waste incinerated shows an increasing trend even if in 
both countries the percentage of waste incinerated on total waste is generally below 
the EU-27 average percentage. However, when looking at municipal waste 
recycling83 the differences between the two countries appear more clearly. Statistics 
provide evidence that overall recycling activities massively increased with respect to 
2000, and in 2011 the percentage of material recycled, including other forms of 
recycling (i.e., composting and digestion), was doubled and quadrupled in size in 
Italy and UK respectively. Nevertheless, the data shows that the UK performed better 
in material recycling than Italy. Some 24.7 per cent of total waste generated in the 
UK was recycled in 2011, against 19.6 per cent recycled in Italy. In this regard, it 
might be argued that among other reasons, separate collection of waste (i.e., BMW 
and packaging) seems to play a major role (see for example EEA, 2009). 
 
                                                 
80 This option was offered to all Member States who landfilled more than 80 per cent of their 
municipal waste in 1995. Italy who was landfilling 82 per cent of its BMW waste, decided not to take 
advantages of the derogation. 
81 Compared with 2000 data, Italy has reduced the amount of waste dumped to landfill of about 36 per 
cent, while for UK the reduction amounts to 39 per cent. 
82 The new target for UK packaging recycling are 68.1 per cent in 2011 and 2012 (DEFRA, 2011), 
whilst for Italy they are 65.0 and 65.4 per cent in 2011 and 2012, respectively (CONAI, 2010).   
83 According to European commission, in addition to household waste, municipal waste includes 
waste generated by small businesses and public institutions that is collected by municipalities.  
According to the Classification of Economic Activities in the European Community (NACE - 
Division 37), recycling is only referred to the processing of used or unused materials, sorted or 
unsorted, which, after being treated, can be used by other sectors as an intermediate good. Therefore, 
recycling is not extended to the production of new final products and to re-used products (unless they 
require specific transformation processes). 
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Table 3A.1: Waste management. A Comparison between EU-27, Italy and the UK 
Country Years TW  L I MR OFRa TR RPb 
EU-27 
2000 522.0 55.2 15.1 14.9 9.4 24.3 N/A 
2001 520.0 53.5 15.6 15.8 9.6 25.4 N/A 
2002 526.0 51.1 16.2 18.1 10.1 28.1 N/A 
2003 514.0 49.6 16.3 18.9 10.5 29.4 N/A 
2004 513.0 46.6 17.3 19.3 11.3 30.6 N/A 
2005 515.0 42.9 18.4 20.2 11.7 31.8 54.6 
2006 521.0 42.0 19.0 20.7 12.1 32.8 56.9 
2007 522.0 40.8 19.2 22.0 12.3 34.3 59.2 
2008 519.0 38.3 19.7 22.9 13.7 36.6 60.5 
2009 509.0 37.7 21.2 24.2 13.9 38.1 62.5 
2010 505.0 37.2 21.8 24.6 13.5 38.0 63.3 
2011 500.0 36.0 22.2 24.6 14.0 38.6 N/A 
Country Years TW  L I MR OFRa TR RPb 
ITALY 
2000 509.0 75.6 7.7 10.0 4.3 14.3 38.4 
2001 516.0 67.6 8.5 12.0 5.8 17.8 45.5 
2002 522.0 63.2 9.0 9.2 5.7 14.9 51.4 
2003 521.0 59.9 10.6 10.4 6.0 16.3 51.4 
2004 535.0 57.0 11.2 11.2 6.4 17.6 53.3 
2005 540.0 54.4 12.0 11.7 6.9 18.5 53.7 
2006 552.0 53.8 12.7 11.8 7.4 19.2 54.9 
2007 548.0 52.0 12.4 12.4 8.0 20.4 56.8 
2008 543.0 49.5 12.7 14.2 9.4 23.6 59.6 
2009 533.0 48.4 14.4 18.8 10.9 29.6 64.0 
2010 537.0 46.2 16.6 19.7 12.1 31.8 64.4 
2011 535.0 46.4 16.4 19.6 11.8 31.4 N/A 
Country Years TW  L I MR OFRa TR RPb 
UK 
2000 577.0 81.1 7.3 8.3 2.8 11.1 39.9 
2001 591.0 80.0 7.3 9.1 3.2 12.4 42.4 
2002 599.0 77.5 7.5 10.5 4.0 14.5 44.2 
2003 592.0 74.2 7.6 13.3 4.7 18.1 46.8 
2004 603.0 69.3 8.0 15.6 7.0 22.6 49.7 
2005 583.0 64.3 8.4 18.2 8.6 26.8 54.4 
2006 586.0 60.1 9.2 20.0 10.2 30.2 57.5 
2007 570.0 56.7 9.3 22.1 11.6 33.7 59.3 
2008 544.0 52.8 10.3 23.3 13.2 36.6 61.5 
2009 526.0 49.2 11.6 27.0 14.6 41.6 61.8 
2010 521.0 48.9 11.5 24.8 14.0 38.8 60.7 
2011 518.0 48.8 11.6 24.7 14.1 38.8 N/A 
a Other forms of recycling include composting and digestion. b Domestic recycling packaging (% on 
tot packaging waste).  
Notes: Eurostat Statistics (European Commission, 2013). TW = Total Waste, L = Landfill, I = 
Incineration, MR = Material Recycling, OFR = Other Forms of Recycling (i.e., composting and 
digestion), TR = Total Recycling, and RP = Recycling Packaging. Total waste unit: kg per capita. All 




Although Italy has continuously increased the amount of sorted and collected 
waste by types84, many improvements still need to be made. A recent report from the 
Institute of National Statistics (ISTAT, 2012) shows that in 2011 the proportion of 
sorted waste in the total amount of municipal waste was 33.4 per cent, representing 
an increase of 1.8 per cent over the previous year. Nevertheless, this figure is not 
encouraging given that Italy has not yet met the target agreed in 2006 (i.e., 35 per 
cent of waste recycled at source), and is a long way away from the one set in 2011 
(i.e., 60 per cent of waste recycled at source). In addition, municipal waste 
fluctuations can make it even more difficult to meet the recent EU Waste Council 
Directive (2008/98/EC) target that requires EU’s Member States to recycle, compost 
and reuse 50 per cent of household waste by 202085.  
By contrast, DEFRA’s Statistical Release (DEFRA, 2012) reveals that on average 
total waste generation has been falling steadily since 2007/2008 by 2.6 per cent per 
year. Therefore it is not surprising that the proportion of material recycled, 
composted or reused between April 2011 and March 2012 reached 43 per cent, 
increasing by 3.4 per cent over the previous fiscal year. This is also strengthened by 
an additional reduction of produced waste per capita (that amounts to 431kg of waste 
per person).   
   
The considerations above are exacerbated by the numerous differences between 
the performances of the various regions of Italy. The ISTAT’s report (2012) shows 
that in 2011 in Northern Italy separate collection of municipal waste was higher than 
40 per cent, with some municipalities meeting the 60 per cent target introduced by 
the national waste framework legislation (i.e., Legislative Decree 152/06). In Central 
Italy separate collection was around 30 per cent, whilst in the South of Italy it was 
only 19.5 per cent. Although all regions experienced a better performance over the 
previous year, these figures show that there is much to be done to homogenize and 
harmonize these areas to the national and international regulations. It might be 
argued that heterogeneity in the country is certainly due to the disaggregation of 
                                                 
84 A report from the Institute for Environmental Protection and Research (ISPRA, 2009) shows, for 
example, that the percentage of separate collection has increased from 22.7 in 2004 to 30.6 in 2009.   
85 According to ISTAT (2011), for example, after a decreasing trend registered in the past three years, 




responsibility between the different levels of governments (Central Government, 
Regions, Provinces and Municipalities), which makes it more difficult to secure the 
necessary cooperation and monitoring between various authorities.  
 
Differences derive also from the disparate methods used in the two countries to 
divert waste from landfill not only with respect to other EU countries but also 
nationally. To give an example, landfill tax86 rates in Italy range between 1 and 25 
euros per tonne depending on the waste types (i.e., active or inactive waste). These 
tax rates are still much lower than other EU countries such as the UK where recent 
legislation (i.e., Landfill Tax Order, 2011) has raised the landfill tax rates from £40 
to £48 per tonne, with an increase of £8 each year until 2014, with the aim of 
establishing a floor tax of £80 for the remaining 6 years (i.e., 2020)87. In addition, the 
Italian law allows regions to apply and enforce waste landfill tax rates. As a result, 
although the landfill tax was introduced in Italy by the Financial Act of 199688, there 
are regions where it applied only in 2009 (e.g., in the Campania region).  
 
Despite these considerations, in both countries recycling activities are still mainly 
based on voluntary contributions. Therefore, there is reason to believe that these 
differences are more likely to be related to late (or lack of) public acceptance of 
separate collection rather than to the financial constraints faced by the two countries. 
To the extent that lack of public acceptance might increase heterogeneity between 
(and within) countries and weaken policy measures that are positively regarded by 
the public (e.g., separate collection) (see EEA, 2009), understanding the interaction 
between government intervention and individuals’ behaviour (and motivation) is of 









                                                 
86 The tax, paid by businesses and local authorities, is calculated by weight on total waste disposal at 
landfills or incineration plants without energy recovery.  
87 Law also provides a lower tax rate of 2.5 pounds per tonne for inactive waste. 
88 Law 549/1995.  
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APPENDIX 3B: QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
 
University of Bath 




There are many reasons why governments are promoting recycling activities. In 
particular, they are aimed at reducing: waste to landfill; excessive consumption 
of raw materials; methane emissions; water contamination; and odours and 
noise pollution. 
 
The purpose of this questionnaire is to gather information on people’s attitudes 
towards recycling activities. The questionnaire is divided into three different 
sections. In ‘SECTION 1’ you are requested to answer questions about 
hypothetical scenarios regarding recycling activities. Each setting varies 
according to different policies introduced by the local authority, which is 
officially responsible for the provision of public services in your area. 
Remember these are imaginary situations that do not have to be necessarily 
related to your actual personal experience. In ‘SECTION 2’ and ‘SECTION 3’ 
you are asked to provide general information about yourself and to state your 
opinion on particular issues. 
 
To answer the questions, please tick ONE of the boxes next to the answer(s); or, 
when appropriate, write your answer in the space provided. Unless the question 
allows you to tick more than one answer, please just tick one box per question. 
 
I would be very grateful for your contribution to this study. All responses will 
remain anonymous. Thank you for your help. 
 
SECTION 1: Hypothetical scenarios 
 
Q1 – Suppose you have to bear the time and trouble costs of recycling activities 
(i.e., separate your waste and bring it to the closest recycling centre; buy 
biodegradable garbage bags and different bins for specific waste; etc.). How 
would you define your level of contribution in terms of effort spent on recycling 
activities? 
 
Very high (Go to Q1.a below)           □ 
High  (Go to Q1.a below)       □ 
Medium   (Please select ONLY ONE option among the possible alternatives 
presented in Q1.a or Q1.b below to explain your position)   □ 
Low  (Go to Q1.b below)       □ 






Q1.a – Please, indicate which of the following reasons was the most important 
for your decision: 
 
I believe environmental damages caused by not recycling are significant  □ 
I am well informed about waste recycling collection     □ 
I participate in recycling activities because others do so    □ 
Other reasons (please write in): 
           
           
            
 
Q1.b – Please, indicate which of the following reasons was the most important 
for your decision: 
 
I believe environmental damages caused by not recycling are insignificant  □ 
I am not well informed about waste recycling collection    □ 
I do not participate in recycling activities because others do not   □   
Other reasons (please write in): 
           
           
            
 
Q2 - Suppose that in order to improve recycling activities the local authority 
decides to provide recycling materials (e.g. containers for waste and recyclables; 
liners; etc.) and to improve collection services (e.g. provision of convenient 
collection pavement points and/or increase the number of drop-off sites for 
recyclables; and for those with convenient collection points, increase the range 
of material collected; etc.). For this you will not be charged any fee. 
 
Given your answer in QUESTION Q1, how do you think this will affect your 
behaviour? 
 
I would exert the same level of effort   (Go to Q3 below)   □ 
I would increase my effort   (Go to Q2.a below)   □ 
I would decrease my effort   (Go to Q2.b below)   □ 
 
Q2.a – Please, indicate which of the following reasons was the most important 
for your decision: 
 
I am happy to spend more effort if recycling facilities increase   □ 
Recycling will be less time and effort consuming     □ 
I believe others will do so        □ 
Other reasons (please write in): 
           
           






Q2.b - Please, indicate which of the following reasons was the most important 
for your decision: 
 
I would put in less effort because I can achieve the same quantity of recycling as 
before given the improved recycling activities     □ 
Recycling (or not) should be an individual choice and not treated as an almost moral 
obligation          □ 
I believe others will do so        □ 
Other reasons (please write in): 
           
           
            
 
Q3 – Suppose now, in addition to the provision of recycling materials and the 
improvement of collection services, the local authority will introduce a money 
fine on those that do not recycle as requested. The money collected will be used 
to pay a company that manages to make use of the unsorted waste collected 
from your home. The environmental effect will be the same as if you did it by 
yourself. The money fine is set at the local littering fine if you are found to be 
not recycling.  
 
Given your answer in QUESTION Q1, how do you think this will affect your 
behaviour? 
 
I would exert the same level of effort   (Go to Q4 below)   □ 
I would increase my effort   (Go to Q3.a below)   □ 
I would decrease my effort   (Go to Q3.b below)   □ 
 
Q3.a - Please, indicate which of the following reasons was the most important 
for your decision: 
 
I will increase my efforts because I do not want to incur a fine   □ 
Given that now we all contribute at least a little, I would like to exert more effort 
than others to show that I care more about the environment    □ 
I believe others will do so        □ 
Other reasons (please write in): 
           
           
            
 
Q3.b - Please, indicate which of the following reasons was the most important 
for your decision: 
 
I prefer to pay someone else for doing my recycling     □ 
Recycling (or not) should be an individual choice and not treated as an almost legal 
obligation          □ 
I believe others will do so        □ 
Other reasons (please write in): 
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SECTION 2: About you  
 
Q4 – Gender: 
 
Male            □ 
Female          □ 
 
Q5 – Age: 
 
15 - 24           □ 
25 – 34          □ 
35 – 44          □ 
45 – 54          □ 
55 – 64          □ 
65 + years          □ 
  
Q6 – Nationality: 
 
British           □ 
Italian           □ 
Other European         □ 
African          □ 
American          □ 
Asian           □ 
Australian          □ 
Middle Eastern         □ 
Pacific Islander         □ 
 
Q7 - Marital status: 
 
Married          □  
Live as a couple         □ 
Divorced          □  
Separated          □ 
Widowed          □ 
Single           □  
 
Q8 – On a scale of 1 to 10, how would you define your financial satisfaction? 
Where 10 is extremely satisfied and 1 is extremely dissatisfied. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
 
    





Q9 – Occupation: 
 
Self – employed          □ 
Part - time employed         □ 
Full – time employed         □ 
Unemployed          □ 
At home          □ 
Student          □ 
Retired          □ 
Other (Please state)            □ 
 
SECTION 3: General information 
 
Q10 - Which of the following attributes would be most important for you about 
a job? Rank 1 to 5 each option below, with 1 = very important, 2 = important, 3 
= moderately important, 4 = of little importance, 5 = unimportant. 
 
A good income         □ 
A safe job with no risk        □ 
Working with people you like       □ 
Doing an important job        □ 
Doing something for community       □ 
 
Q11 - How important is religion in your life?  
 
Very important         □ 
Important          □ 
Rather important         □ 
Not very important         □ 
Not at all important         □ 
 
Q12 – What is the level of confidence you have in governments?  
 
A great deal          □ 
Quite a lot          □ 
A moderate amount         □  
Not very much         □ 
None at all          □ 
 
Q13 – How important is “service to others” in your life?  
 
Very important         □ 
Important          □ 
Rather important         □ 
Not very important         □ 
Not at all important         □ 
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Q14 – How would you consider the following statements? 
 
a) Cheating on taxes: 
 
Never justified         □ 
Rarely justified         □ 
Sometimes justified         □ 
Often justified          □ 
Always justified         □ 
 
b) Throwing away litter in a public place: 
 
Never justified         □ 
Rarely justified         □ 
Sometimes justified         □ 
Often justified          □ 
Always justified         □ 
 
c) Avoiding a fare on public transport: 
 
Never justified         □ 
Rarely justified         □ 
Sometimes justified         □ 
Often justified          □ 
Always justified         □ 
 
d) Smoking in a public place: 
 
Never justified         □ 
Rarely justified         □ 
Sometimes justified         □ 
Often justified          □ 
Always justified         □  
 
Q15 - Suppose you have two identical ‘supermarket’ type goods: one is 
environmentally - friendly, the other one is a conventional product. Compared 
to the price of the conventional good, what price would you be willing to pay to 
buy the environmentally-friendly item? The difference in price helps to protect 
the environment. 
 
Only the same price as the conventional good     □ 
10 % more than the price of the conventional good     □ 
20 % more than the price of the conventional good     □ 
30 % more than the price of the conventional good     □ 







Q16 - Please indicate how often you take each action for environmental reasons: 
 
a) Save water when taking a shower or brushing your teeth: 
 
Never           □  
Rarely           □ 
Sometimes          □ 
Often           □ 




Never           □  
Rarely           □ 
Sometimes          □ 
Often           □ 
Always          □ 
 
c) Turn off lights you are not using: 
 
Never           □  
Rarely           □ 
Sometimes          □ 
Often           □ 
Always          □ 
 
d) Walk, cycle or take public transport: 
 
Never           □  
Rarely           □ 
Sometimes          □ 
Often           □ 




























α if Item Deletedb 
F 2.32 2.00 2906 0.49 0.47 
T 2.41 2.16 2906 0.33 0.59 
L 1.88 1.60 2906 0.42 0.54 
S 3.67 2.72 2906 0.38 0.57 
α=0.61, Number of Items = 4, Mean = 10.27, SD = 5.85 
a The corrected Item-Total correlation shows how each item correlates with the others. Correlations 
<0.15 suggest excluding the item from the index. 
b This column shows the Cronbach’s   when the item is deleted. Unless   in this column is higher 
than that estimated for the total number of items, the item cannot be excluded from the analysis. 
Notes: F = Avoiding a fare on public transport, T = Cheating on taxes, L = Throwing away litter in a 
public place, S = Smoking in a public place. Both the ‘Corrected Item-Total Correlation’ and the 
estimated ‘ if Item Deleted’ suggest that, with this data, no further improvements can be made to 














α if Item Deletedb 
F 2.28 1.00 1165 0.37 0.48 
T 1.89 0.95 1165 0.32 0.52 
L 1.54 0.84 1165 0.41 0.46 
S 2.10 1.20 1165 0.33 0.53 
Cronbach's α=0.57, Number of Items = 4, Mean = 7.80, SD = 2.65 
a The corrected Item-Total correlation shows how each item correlates with the others. Correlations 
<0.15 suggest excluding the item from the index. 
b This column shows the Cronbach’s   when the item is deleted. Unless   in this column is higher 
than that estimated for the total number of items, the item cannot be excluded from the analysis. 
Notes: F = Avoiding a fare on public transport, T = Cheating on taxes, L = Throwing away litter in a 
public place, S = Smoking in a public place. Both the ‘Corrected Item-Total Correlation’ and the 
estimated ‘ if Item Deleted’ suggest that, with this data, no further improvements can be made to 
















α if Item Deletedb 
GP 2.12 0.86 1165 0.18 0.61 
SW 3.29 1.14 1165 0.46 0.47 
R 3.81 1.06 1165 0.34 0.54 
SE 4.10 0.94 1165 0.40 0.51 
PT 2.95 1.29 1165 0.37 0.53 
Cronbach's α = 0.59, Number of Items = 5, Mean = 16.27, SD = 3.29 
a The corrected Item-Total correlation shows how each item correlates with the others. Correlations 
<0.15 suggest excluding the item from the index. 
b This column shows the Cronbach’s   when the item is deleted. Unless   in this column is higher 
than that estimated for the total number of items, the item cannot be excluded from the analysis. 
Notes:GP = Green Product, SW = Safe Water, R = Recycling, SE = Save Energy, PT = Public 
Transport. The estimated ‘  if Item Deleted’ suggests removing the item ‘GP’ to improve the 















α if Item Deletedb 
W 3.29 1.14 1165 0.46 0.48 
R 3.81 1.06 1165 0.34 0.57 
S 4.10 0.94 1165 0.43 0.52 
T 2.95 1.29 1165 0.35 0.58 
Cronbach's α = 0.61, Number of Items = 4, Mean = 14.16, SD = 3.03 
a The corrected Item-Total correlation shows how each item correlates with the others. Correlations 
<0.15 suggest excluding the item from the index. 
b This column shows the Cronbach’s   when the item is deleted. Unless   in this column is higher 
than that estimated for the total number of items, the item cannot be excluded from the analysis. 
Notes:GP = Green Product, SW = Safe Water, R = Recycling, SE = Save Energy, PT = Public 
Transport. Both the Corrected Item-Total Correlation and the estimated ‘  if Item Deleted’ suggest 








ECONOMIC INCENTIVES AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
MORALE: AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION OF 
RECYCLING 
 





The survey described in chapter 3 provides a unique opportunity to examine the 
impact of different policy measures on individuals’ motivation to contribute to 
recycling and might help to shed light on the determinants of environmental morale 
as the intrinsic motivation to behave in a more conscious way in environmental 
contexts. Data collected in this survey might serve as a complement to previous 
analyses conducted in the laboratory and/or using survey methods to demonstrate the 
existence of the crowding-out effect of intrinsic motivation in environmental 
contexts and to provide a contribution to understand what shapes environmental 
morale.  
  
The chapter is organized as follows. The next section provides a general 
description of the survey data. It is followed by a detailed presentation of empirical 
results in section 4.3. The chapter concludes with overall remarks and a discussion of 
possible policy implications of the empirical results.  
 
4.2 DESCRIPTION OF THE DATA 
 
The responses to the different scenarios are reported in Table 4.1 which is informed 
by the taxonomies detailed in Tables 3.2 and 3.3 above. The table shows answers to 
the VOLUNTARY, BIN and FINE hypothetical scenarios for the full sample. In the 
table, social men are those who were willing to contribute at least at a ‘medium’ 
level to recycling activities, while economic men are those who were willing to 
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provide low, or no effort for recycling in the VOLUNTARY scenario. Responses 
reported in the table are conditioned on those provided in the benchmark setting. 
This allows a viable comparison across scenarios in terms of private contribution to 
recycling activities and offers a possible interpretation of individuals’ reaction to 
different policy measures.  
 
Table 4.1 highlights that in general attitudes were ‘friendly’ to recycling activities 
as the majority of respondents (i.e., 82%) declared they would voluntarily contribute 
to recycling at least at a medium level. However, there is also a reasonable fraction 
of respondents that seems to be reluctant to recycle when this has to be done on a 
voluntary basis (i.e., 18%).  
 
Results provide evidence of a strong crowding-in effect of effort among 
individuals’ attitudes. A large body of respondents (44% and 73% of social and 
economic men, respectively), stated, in fact, they would increase their provision of 
effort both with the policy improvement and with the introduction of the fine, or 
alternatively when one of the two policies was considered. However, there are also a 
significant proportion of respondents that declared they would decrease their effort, 
providing support for the existence of a crowding-out effect.  
 
In line with results obtained by Feldman and Perez (forthcoming), a considerable 
number of respondents seem to be resistant to the mandatory scheme. According to 
this survey, the effect was predominant among economic men. Indeed, about 8% of 
respondents (against 3% among social men) demonstrated resentment to the 
enforcing state intervention. By contrast, social men reacted more actively to the 
introduction of the fine. Some of 18% of respondents (vs. 6% among economic men) 
stated in fact they would maintain/decrease their initial level of effort with the 
improvement of facilities, whereas they would increase their provision of effort with 








Social Man versus Economic Man 
Are you a recycler? Yes = Social Man 
Voluntary scenario yes yes yes Yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Bin Scenario as before as before as before More more more less less less 
Fine Scenario as before more less as before more less as before more less 
N. obs. 159 139 7 176 421 10 12 36 5 
% on Tot. 16% 14% 1% 18% 44% 1% 1% 4% 1% 
Are you a recycler? No = Economic Man 
Voluntary scenario No No No No No No No No No 
Bin Scenario as before as before as before More more more less less less 
Fine Scenario as before more less as before more less as before more less 
N. obs. 7 12 1 22 145 10 0 0 3 
% on Tot. 4% 6% 1% 11% 73% 5% 0% 0% 2% 
Notes: Proportion of responses of social men (965 observations) and economic men (200 observations). The table reports different responses to the VOLUNTARY, BIN, and 




A possible explanation for this lies on the idea that individuals might be either 
indifferent to the policy improvement given their high contribution or resistant to it if 
this is perceived as controlling (i.e., moral obligation imposed by the Government), 
but, at the same time, they can be more willing to cooperate when state intervention 
(such as a mandatory scheme) is regarded as a sort of assurance against free riders 
(see also Feldman and Perez, forthcoming).  
 
Table 4.1 seems to indicate that people react to different policies in different 
ways. However, from the table it is not possible to capture the linkage between 
respondents’ reactions to policy change and environmental morale, or to discern the 
motivation (Frey, 1997) from the public good crowding-out/in effect (see Andreoni, 
1989, 1990).  Therefore, Table 4.2 reports the proportion of responses to the three 
hypothetical scenarios depending on individuals’ level of environmental morale, 
whereas responses to the follow up questions described in chapter 3 (see Table 3.2) 
are reported in Table 4.3. 
 
In Table 4.2, for simplicity, the index of environmental morale was grouped in 
three different categories, showing low (index score < 12), medium (index score = 
12) and high level of environmental morale (index score > 12)89. The Pearson chi-
square  2  test was used here to assess the mutual independence of individuals’ 
reactions on their level of environmental morale. This tests the null hypothesis that 
the occurrence of two paired observations on two categorized variables (i.e., two 
cells in a contingency or cross-tabulated table) is independent of one another. The 
test statistic (which approaches asymptotically a 
2 distribution) is given by the sum 
of the ratio between the squared differences of observed and expected frequencies 
(asserted by the null hypothesis)90 and the expected frequencies in each cell of the 
table. Independence is assessed by comparing the calculated 
2  to the critical value 
                                                 
89 Using a five-point Likert scale (see Chapter 3), the mid-point category is identified by aggregating 
the mid-point category (i.e., 3 = sometimes) of each single item, which leads to a total of 12. 
However, all tests remain robust even when considering separated levels of environmental morale.  
90 In other words, expected frequencies are obtained assuming that the two variables (here, different 
levels of environmental morale and individuals’ responses to policy change) were independent. In 
contingency tables, this translates into computing the expected frequencies by multiplying together the 
totals for the row and column of each cell and dividing by the total sample size. For a detailed 
discussion about the Pearson chi-square test, see e.g. Howell (2013).    
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Proportion of responses according to individuals’ level of environmental morale 
VOLUNTARY scenario 
  Low Medium High No. Obs. 
Low 41.83% 20.43% 10.88% 17.17% 
Medium 34.13% 46.24% 42.01% 40.94% 
High 24.04% 33.33% 47.10% 41.89% 
No. Obs. 17.85% 7.98% 74.16% 100.00% 
% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
                                Pearson χ2 (8) = 134.88 , p-value = 0.00a   
BIN scenario 
  Low Medium High No. Obs. 
Same effort 19.71% 26.88% 29.98% 27.90% 
Increase effort 72.60% 65.59% 66.20% 67.20% 
Decrease effort 7.69% 7.53% 3.82% 4.81% 
No. Obs. 17.85% 7.98% 74.16% 100.00% 
Pearson χ2 (4) = 14.21 , p-value = 0.00b 
FINE scenario 
  Low Medium High No. Obs. 
Same effort 20.67% 33.33% 34.95% 32.27% 
Increase effort 72.60% 64.52% 62.73% 64.64% 
Decrease effort 6.73% 2.15% 2.31% 3.09% 
No. Obs. 17.85% 7.98% 74.16% 100.00% 
Pearson χ2 (4) = 24.02 , p-value = 0.00c 
a 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 15.97. 
b 1 cells (11.1%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 4.47. 
c 1 cells (11.1%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.87. 
Notes: For simplicity responses to the VOLUNTARY scenario were grouped as follows: Low = 
Low/I will do hardly any recycling; Medium = Medium; and High = High/Very high.  
 
 
As shown in Table 4.2 there is a substantial and significant difference (Pearson’s 
 
2
8  = 134.88, p-value < 0.01) between those who exhibit high environmental 
morale and those with low environmental morale in their willingness to voluntarily 
contribute to recycling, with those with high environmental morale contributing 
                                                 
91 One of the main assumptions of the Pearson’s chi-squared test is the independence of observations. 
Given that a question about recycling is included into the computation of the index of environmental 
morale, one might argue that this can question the assumption of independence. However, all tests and 
regressions included in this chapter remained robust even when excluding the recycling scores from 
the index of environmental morale. Therefore, to improve the reliability of the index (see Cronbach’s 
alpha test in Chapter 3), it was decided to leave this item into the index measurement.    
 90 
 
more92. According to the table, there is also evidence of a significant difference 
between individuals’ reaction to policy measures depending on individuals’ 
environmental morale (Pearson’s 
2  has p-value < 0.01 in both scenarios)93. 
 
In general, respondents seem to be willing to increase their provision of effort 
both with the policy improvement and with the introduction of the fine, regardless of 
their level of environmental morale. However, the effect is moderately stronger 
among those who exhibit low environmental morale. Indeed, in both scenarios, about 
72.60% of respondents with low environmental morale declared they would increase 
their provision of effort. A detailed analysis of the data shows (results not reported 
here) that this trend rapidly grows when approaching a medium level of 
environmental morale (i.e., 12), but slows down with higher levels of environmental 
morale (i.e., when the index ranges between 16 and 20). In contrast, those who are 
located at the very extremes of the index-scale of environmental morale were less 
likely to respond to policy changes – i.e., they were either deflected from their 
current behaviour or neutral. The tables suggest in fact that there are a substantial 
proportion of respondents who exhibited high/low environmental morale that were 
either willing to decrease their provision of efforts (3.83% and 7.69% of respondents 
vs. 2.31% and 6.73% of respondents, respectively in the BIN and FINE scenario) or 
indifferent to policy changes (20.67% and 34.95% of respondents vs. 29.98% and 
19.71% of respondents, respectively in the FINE and BIN scenarios). 
 
In order to capture the reasons for individuals’ reactions, Table 4.3 reports the 
proportion of responses to the follow-up questions. In line with previous findings 
(e.g., Barr, 2003), awareness and lack of information represent crucial factors for 
individuals’ willingness/unwillingness to voluntarily contribute to recycling. It is 
interesting to note that, in this context, a large body of respondents (43%) chose the 
option ‘Other reasons’. Figure 4.1 below reports answers provided by respondents in 
                                                 
92 It is worth noting that, in addition to recycling, the index of environmental morale is inferred using 
individuals’ willingness to contribute to other ‘green’ activities. On the one hand, this explains why 
some of the respondents with low environmental morale are also willing to recycle. On the other hand, 
this justifies why some respondents who exhibit medium and high environmental morale seems to be 
reluctant to contribute to recycling activities.   
93 As a general rule of thumb, the Pearson chi-squared test is reliable when no more than 20% of the 
cells have expected count less than 5 (see Blalock, 1979, and Howell, 2002), and/or the minimum 
expected frequency is higher than 5. 
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these circumstances. Although part of the respondents attributed their low disposition 
to contribute to recycling to carelessness or laziness (28%), the majority of them 
stated they would do so because of the time and trouble costs of recycling (55%). 
This result provides further evidence for the observation that recycling represents a 
social cost and strengthens the idea that such costs should be taken into account in 
cost-benefit analyses of different policy measures (see e.g. Bruvoll et al., 2002, 
Berglund, 2006, and Nyborg, 2008). 
 
Looking at the other two hypothetical scenarios, in the BIN scenario instrumental 
behaviour seems to be predominant (see Table 4.3). However, data also show that the 
quality improvement led some respondents with positive reciprocal preferences 
(37%) to respond in kind, and some others who perceived the policy as controlling 
(i.e., by imposing a moral obligation on recyclers) to state they would reduce their 
provision of effort with the policy (30%).  
 
Table 4.3 
Individual attitudes towards recycling and policy measures 
Medium/High Voluntary Contribution Low (Medium) Voluntary Contributiona 
Answers   Answers   
Awareness  74% Lack of awareness  12%(18%) 
Information 16% Lack of information 32% (55%) 
Conform to norms 9% Conform to norms 13% (12%) 
Other Reasons 1% Other Reasons 43% (15%) 
N. obs. 869 N. obs. 200 (96) 
Increase effort in BIN scenario Deacrese effort in BIN scenario 
Answers   Answers   
Crowding-in effect 37% Public good crowding-out  70% 
Disciplining effect 61% Frey’s crowding-out  30% 
Conform to norms 2% Conform to norms 0% 
Other reasons 0% Other Reasons 0% 
N. obs. 784 N. obs. 56 
Increase effort in FINE scenario Decrease effort in FINE scenario 
Answers   Answers   
Crowding-in effect 19% Public good crowding-out  19% 
Disciplining effect 78% Frey’s crowding-out  81% 
Conform to norms 3% Conform to norms 0% 
Other reasons 0% Other reasons 0% 
N. obs.  753 N. obs. 36 
a Percentage of answers of those who declared they would provide a medium level of effort in the 
VOLUNTARY scenario is reported in parentheses.  
Notes: The proportion of responses of each follow-up question is calculated according to the total 





Figure 4.1: Distribution of ‘Other reasons’ answers 
 
Notes: The figure reports percentage responses to ‘Other reasons’ to the question Q1.b of the 
questionnaire (see Chapter 3, Appendix 3B). Percentages are calculated on the total number of 
individuals that chose the option ‘Other reasons’, i.e. 99 students. 
 
In the FINE scenario there is evidence of both a disciplining and a crowding-out 
effect, working in an opposite direction (see Table 4.3). In line with previous 
analyses (see for example Gneeze and Rustichini, 2000b, Fehr and Gächter, 2002, 
and Falk and Kosfeld, 2006) the crowding-out effect of intrinsic motivation seems to 
be stronger than the disciplining effect (81% vs. 78%, respectively). Results also 
indicate that a reasonable proportion of respondents (19%) exhibited strong 
reciprocal preference, thus confirming the hypothesis that external interventions may 
crowd-in intrinsic motivation of conditional co-operators. Finally, it is interesting to 
note that, among those individuals that stated they would decrease their effort 
because of the introduction of a fine, Frey’s crowding-out effect (81%) was 
predominant with respect to public good crowding-out effect (19%).  
 
In summary, given that the crowding-in effect of intrinsic motivation was 
stronger in the BIN scenario than in the FINE scenario and the crowding-out effect 
of intrinsic motivation dominated in the FINE scenario compared to the BIN 
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scenario, it is possible to conclude that respondents perceived the facilitating nudge 
policy measure as more desirable than the mandatory scheme94. 
 




The impact of socio-demographic/economic, attitudinal variables and ethics on the 
willingness to contribute to recycling activities under different policy schemes was 
analysed using ordered probit and multinomial logit regressions since, as stated in the 
previous chapter, the nature of the dependent variables show respectively an ordered 
nature in the VOLUNTARY scenario and a non-natural ordering in the BIN and 
FINE scenarios.  
 
To model the willingness to contribute to recycling activities in the 
VOLUNTARY scenario it was assumed that the outcomes iy  took values 1iy  (I 
will do hardly any recycling), 2iy  (low contribution), 3iy  (medium 
contribution), 4iy  (high contribution) and 5iy  (very high contribution). Ordered 
response models are based on one underlying latent variable, 
*
iy , that consider a 
different match from the latent variable, 
*
iy , to the observed one (i.e. 
5,4,3,2,1iy ). Thus, assuming a vector of exogenous variables 
'
ix  (where   is 
a vector of unknown parameters)95, the relationship between 
'
ix  and 
*
iy  can be 
written as follows (see Verbeek, 2008)96: 
 
                                                 
94 It could be argued that the receipt of the bins might have changed respondents’ perception of real 
income positively thereby inducing them to be more willing to increase their provision of effort and 
motivation. However, given the hypothetical nature of the questions and the interventions, there is 
reason to believe that this effect is negligible here. 
95 The symbol ‘
'
’ denotes the transpose of the k -dimensional vector ix  containing the 
characteristics of individual i  (including an intercept term). 
96 This model assumes that the standard deviation is equal to one, i.e., 1 , and the intercept is equal 




iii xy  
'*






































,                              (4.2) 
 
where i  is an unobserved error term, independent on ix  and normally distributed 
with mean equal to zero and variance equal to 2  (i.e., i  is  2,0 NID )97, sj  are 
unknown parameters98 that are estimated jointly with  , 5,4,3,2,1j  and 
ni ,,1  (i.e., represents individual observations in the sample). Therefore the 
probability of choosing j  is equal to the probability that the latent variable 
*
iy  ranges 
between the boundaries 1j  and j
99.  
 
In general, the probability of observing a particular outcome is expressed by: 
 
      '1' ijijii xxxjyP   ,               (4.3)   
 
where   represents the standard normal cumulative distribution function (CDF). 
However, when j  is equal to the highest outcome, the generic form reduces to: 
 
         '1'1' 1 iiiii xxxxyP   ,                     (4.4) 
 
where   represents the highest category among the available outcomes.  
 
This estimation technique is based upon maximum likelihood, where the 
described probabilities enter the likelihood function. Generated parameters provide 
information on respondents’ willingness to contribute to recycling activities and can 
                                                 
97 The acronym stays for ‘normally and identically distributed’. 
98 These are generally known as cutpoints or threshold parameters. 
99 The standard model assumes that 0 ,  and j . 
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be interpreted either in terms of the effect generated on the underlying latent variable 
(i.e., a positive value of   increases the willingness to contribute to recycling) or in 
terms of the effects generated on the respective probabilities (i.e., a positive value of
  means that the probability that 5iy  will increase, while the probability that
1iy  will decrease). However, in the second case the effect on intermediate 
categories in ambiguous (i.e., the probability that 4,3,2iy  may increase or 
decrease). Therefore in order to capture the impact of the estimated parameters on 
the latent variable marginal effects need to be computed. Marginal effects are defined 
as the partial derivatives of the probability that iy  equals a specific thj   outcome 
with respect to a specific explanatory variable ikx  and can be obtained as follows: 
 
















  ,             (4.5) 
 
where ik  represents the marginal effect,   is the standard normal cumulative 
distribution function and k  is the thk  estimated coefficient of ikx . Note that when 
2,1j  the model reduces to the standard binary probit100.  
 
To model the willingness to increase/decrease or provide the same level of effort 
in the BIN and FINE scenarios a multinomial logit model was also employed. 
Alternatives provided in both scenarios, in fact, could not be rescaled in an ordered 
way. Therefore, the options were indexed as follows: 1iy  for the alternative ‘I 
would exert the same level of effort’, 2iy  for ‘I would increase my effort’, and 
3iy  for ‘I would decrease my effort’. This model is based on the assumption that 
the alternative chosen provides the highest level of utility. Utilities provided by each 
alternative are assumed to be linearly related to a vector of explanatory variables 
'ix  (where   is a vector of unknown parameters to be estimated in the model and 
                                                 
100 Binary probit regression analyses were employed in order to check the robustness of the results 
using appropriate recoding of the alternatives as will be explained further below. 
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the vector ix  includes an intercept term) and to an error term i . As with the 
ordered probit, multinomial logit models are estimated by maximum likelihood 
(where the probabilities of the observed outcomes enter the loglikelihood function) 
and represent a generalization of a logitistic regression model where more than two 
options can be considered. Therefore, making specific assumptions on the 
distribution of the disturbances, the relationship between 
'
ix  and the probability of 
observing a particular outcome jyi   rather than an alternative one can be written as 








 ,                  (4.6) 
 
where the left-hand side part of equation (4.6) represents the log odds ratio, 
 iiij xjyPp   and  iiiJ xjyp   are respectively the probabilities of 
observing outcome j  and J , and 1,,2,1  Jj  . The main difference with a 
binary logit model is that the single logistic regression equation contrasts the 
probability of one outcome (e.g., successes) against that of another outcome (e.g., 
failures). By contrast, the multinomial logit model compares each of the categories 
1,,2,1  Jj   with category J . The latter is usually defined as the base category 
(outcome 1 in this analysis)101 and it is commonly represented by the denominator of 
equation (4.6). Therefore, the estimated   coefficients can be interpreted in terms of 
the effect generated upon the log odds ratio. Ceteris paribus, a positive k  
coefficient means that a unit increase of ikx  is associated with an increase (measured 
by the estimated coefficient) of the log odds ratio of being in category j  rather than 
in the base category.  Marginal effects can also be used in order to obtain information 
about the change in probability for an event to occur when one of the dependent 
variable change by one unit, holding all the other variables constant.  
                                                 
101 There is no difference in the results in the choice of the reference category. By default Stata 
chooses the category with the highest number of responses. However, in this analysis the reference 
category is represented by outcome 1 (i.e., ‘I would exert the same level of effort’) to make a viable 





According to the methodologies above described the following relationship was 
estimated: 
 
iiiii ethicsattitudessociodemdep   3210 ,             (4.7) 
 
where idep  represents the dependent variables (i.e. VOLUNTARY, BIN and FINE 
scenarios). A description of the variables included in the analysis with their summary 
statistics and expected sign are reported in Appendix 4A102. 
 
4.3.2 Regression results 
 
Before proceeding with the discussion of the results two issues are worth 
emphasizing when focussing on the validity of the data. First, in order to circumvent 
cognitive problems (see for example Torgler et al., 2009) related to manipulations in 
ordering questions or changing the wording scale, the correlation between two 
similar questions asked at the beginning and at the end of the survey was explored. In 
particular, the answers provided in the VOLUNTARY scenario (VOL) were 
compared to those provided in question Q16 (part b) of the questionnaire described 
in chapter 3, where respondents were required to state their actual behaviour towards 
recycling activities (REC). The correlation between the VOL and the REC is 0.39 
 01.0p . The fact that the variables are highly correlated although the order of 
responses was reversed seems to reduce problems related to framing biases. Note 
that the survey was conducted in a controlled environment, which might help to 
guarantee that subjects paid attention to the whole list of alternative responses. 
 
Second, the survey seems not to suffer of problems related to ‘socially 
acceptable’ answers as the majority of respondents did not provide the more ‘socially 
                                                 
102 In order to analyse the different impact of age, occupation, marital status and nationality on the 
dependent variables, a set of dummy variables (coded 1 for each category in which respondents 
belonged to, and 0 otherwise) were also considered into the regressions. However, given the small 
number of observations obtained for most of the variables, they were mainly statistically insignificant. 
Therefore, it was decided to remove these variables from the analyses and to consider those described 




correct’ answer both in the VOLUNTARY scenario (i.e., ‘high’ and ‘very high’ 
provision of effort), and in question Q16 (part b) of the questionnaire (i.e., ‘I always 
recycle’). Alternatively responses with the highest frequency were respectively ‘I 
would contribute at a medium level’ (40.94% of respondents) and ‘I recycle often’ 
(40.77% of respondents).  
 
 
4.3.2.1 Policy changes, instrumentality and environmental morale 
 
This said, the first issue addressed in the empirical analysis investigates how 
individuals’ contribution to recycling activities varies according to the interaction 
between government signals and environmental morale. To this end, regression 
analyses used in this section consider the full sample of respondents interviewed and 
enrolled in the economics and psychology departments. The analysis also includes an 
interaction term ‘European × Bath’ (dummy variable, 1 = Europeans living in Bath) 
to take into account differences in nationalities and in the place of data collection. 
Results are reported in Tables 4.4 and 4.5.  
 
Table 4.4 reports regression results for the VOLUNTARY scenario. The table 
shows three groups of estimation results. The first regression considers only the 
impact of socio-demographic/economic variables. It is followed by a second 
regression including attitudinal variables. Finally, in addition to the socio-economic 
and attitudinal variables, the model introduces into the regression analysis the index 
of environmental morale. This allows gaining better insights regarding the impact of 
each variable on the dependent variable as most of the covariates might also play a 
role in explaining different levels of environmental morale. As mentioned above, 
when using ordered probit regression, estimated coefficients can be interpreted only 
in terms of their sign and significance level. In particular, estimated parameters 
provide information in terms of the effects generated on respondents’ willingness to 
strongly contribute to recycling activities. Thus, in order to measure the quantitative 
effect of the independent variables on the ranking information of the dependent 
variable, marginal effects were also included in Table 4.4. For simplicity, marginal 
effects are presented only for the highest score of the willingness to voluntarily 
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contribute to recycling (i.e., for the answer ‘very high’ to the VOLUNTARY 
scenario). Results can be interpreted as follows. For the binary independent variables 
the marginal effects represent the change in the probability of reporting a very high 
contribution that result from changing the base characteristic, holding all other 
variables constant at their mean values. For non-binary independent variables in 
levels, the marginal effects measure the impact of a unit increase of the independent 
variable on the probability of showing a very high contribution to recycling, 
evaluated at its mean. Finally, for non-binary independent variables that are included 
in natural logarithmic form, the marginal effect indicates the probability of reporting 
a very high contribution to recycling arising from a 1% increase in the underlying 
independent variable from its mean value.  
 
The table also reports the Ramsey RESET test and the Linktest (_hatsq) test. The 
former is a test of mis-specification of the model’s functional form, whereas the 
latter tests the validity of the model specification in terms of the presence of omitted 
variables. The Ramsey RESET test was performed introducing the predicted values 
of the dependent variable in their second and third power into the regression and 
testing the joint significance of the respective coefficient estimates (using a Wald (
2 ) test). The Linktest test employed the predicted values of the dependent variable 
(i.e., _hat) and its second power (i.e., _hatsq) as the predictors to rebuild the model. 
A well specified model (with neither omitted variables nor functional specification 
problems) is then obtained when the variable _hat is statistically significant (since it 
represents the predicted value from the model), and the variable _hatsq has no 
predictive power except by chance. In this context, both tests suggest the model is 
well specified and exclude possible omitted variables (i.e., Prob > |z| > 0.1 in both 
cases). This result is also strengthened by the statistical significance of the variable 
_hat in the Linktest (1% level). 
 
Going back to the description of the results, among the socio-
demographic/economic variables (see Table 4.4, regression 1) there is strong 
evidence of gender and age differences. Results suggest that females were more 
likely to provide a higher contribution to recycling than males (by 2.6%). This result 
seems to contradict that reached by Barr (2003) in his survey where females played a 
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major role for waste reduction rather than recycling activities and seems to support 
the literature on pro-environmental behaviours that highlight that eco-conscious 
behaviour and attitudes towards the environment are more common in females than 
males. According to previous analyses (see for example Torgler and García-Valiñas, 
2007), the willingness to contribute shows an inverted U-shaped relationship with 
age, meaning that the willing to voluntarily contribute to recycling tend to increase 
with age, though in this sample the slope gradually decreases when age reaches just 
the second category (i.e., 25-34 years)103.  
 
It is worth noting that these results remain generally robust when attitudinal 
variables are introduced (see Table 4.4, regression 2) into the regression analysis and 
when controlling for risk attitudes. Thus, results show: a smaller negative impact of 
age meaning that older students were more risk averse than younger ones; and a 
smaller difference between sexes, which can be related to the fact that women are 
generally more concerned with the risks associated with a poor quality environment 
(see Dupont, 2004). However, when ethical considerations are introduced into the 
analysis (see Table 4.4, regression 3) the coefficient of the variable gender becomes 
less robust in terms of its size and significance level. A possible explanation for this 
is that the effect of this variable is partially captured by the index of environmental 
morale, suggesting evidence for stronger ethical concerns among female. An 
independent samples t-test was used to test this hypothesis 
  01.0,97.71163  pt . In general, the test compares the difference between two 
independent sample means (here, the mean score of environmental morale) and tests 
the null hypothesis that the mean difference in the population between two groups 
(here, males and females) is equal to zero. The test statistic is then defined as the 
difference between the two independent sample means divided by the pooled 
standard deviation of the sampling population104. Results show that females have a 
significant higher (14.69) mean score environmental morale relative to males 
(13.26), providing evidence in favour of gender differences in individuals’ 
sensitiveness towards the environment.   
 
                                                 
103 However, here the effect of age is mostly due to the Italian sample of respondents as in the 
University of Bath (UK) students belonged mainly to the category 15-24 years.  
104 For a detailed discussion of this test statistic see Blalock (1979), and Howell (2013). 
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As with other studies in the literature (see for example Torgler and García-
Valiñas, 2007), there is no evidence of significant differences between married and 
unmarried105 respondents, and between respondents’ employment situations in their 
level of contribution to recycling activities. The variables ‘financial satisfaction’ (see 
Do Valle et al., 2004, and Whitmarsh and O’Neill, 2010) and ‘religion’ seem also not 
to play a role on the willingness to voluntarily contribute to recycling. According to 
this survey, Europeans living in Bath were less compliant than people from other 
nationalities surveyed in Bath and in Florence (see Table 4.4, all regressions). By 
contrast, in line with predictions (see Table 4.4, regression 1), psychologists were 
significantly more willing to contribute to recycling than economists. In particular, 
being trained in Psychology rather than Economics increases the likelihood of highly 
contributing to recycling activities by 1.8 percentage points. However, likewise the 
variable gender, these differences become less robust when controlling for attitudinal 
variables and for environmental morale which represents the most dominant 
regressor into the analysis. An independent samples t-test   01.0,61.81163  pt  
suggests again that there is a significant difference between individuals’ 
sensitiveness towards the environment, with those who study economics showing a 
mean score environmental morale (13.55) significantly lower than those who study 
psychology (15.06). Thus, results provide further evidence into the hypothesis that 
enrolment into economics is associated with increased instrumental behaviour and 
free riding. 
 
Considering the attitudinal variables (see Table 4.4, regressions 2 and 3), results 
show that risk aversion positively and significantly (10% level) affected the 
willingness to contribute to recycling, and increased the probability of subjects 
reporting the highest willingness to contribute between 1.4% and 1.6%. Social 
responsibility and altruistic preferences are also of major importance in the decision 
to participate in recycling. In particular, high levels of social responsibility and 
strong altruistic preferences were almost 9% more likely to increase contribution to 
recycling (see Table 4.4, regression 2). However, trust in government seems not to 
play a role here. 
                                                 
105 Given the small number of observations falling into the categories married, live as a couple, 
divorced, separated and widowed, it was decided to compare never married (or single) respondents 
versus those who were (or have been) married.  
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Table 4.4             
Voluntary Contribution  – Ordered Probit Results (Full sample) 
Independent variables Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3  
 
β M.E. β M.E.   β M.E. 
Socio-demographic/economic variables      
Female 0.192*** 0.026*** 0.157** 0.020** 0.091 0.011 
  (2.65) (2.69) (2.16) (2.20) (1.24) (1.26) 
Age 1.11** 0.154** 1.04** 0.138** 0.838* 0.103* 
  (2.23) (2.23) (2.15) (2.15) (1.71) (1.70) 
Age2 -0.264** -0.036** -0.259** -0.034** -0.223** -0.027** 
  (-2.22) (-2.23) (-2.28) (-2.28) (-1.97) (-1.96) 
Working student 0.246 0.040 0.202 0.030 0.186 0.026 
  (1.74) (1.51) (1.42) (1.25) (1.22) (1.07) 
Never married 0.020 0.003 -0.049 -0.007 -0.227 -0.032 
  (0.13) (0.14) (-0.32) (-0.03) (-1.45) (-1.26) 
Financial satisfaction (log) -0.057 -0.008 -0.096 -0.013 -0.046 -0.006 
  (-0.72) (-0.71) (-1.21) (-1.20) (-0.58) (-0.58) 
Importance of religion -0.006 -0.001 -0.039 -0.005 -0.024 -0.003 
  (-0.22) (-0.22) (-1.43) (-1.42) (-0.86) (-0.86) 
European × Bath -0.531*** -0.069*** -0.50*** -0.062*** -0.452*** -0.052*** 
  (-8.06) (-7.35) (-6.79) (-6.45) (-6.22) (-5.80) 
Psychologists 0.129* 0.018* 0.074 0.010 -0.038 -0.005 
  (1.83) (1.80) (1.03) (1.02) (-0.51) (-0.51) 
Attitudinal variables             
Risk aversion     0.120* 0.016* 0.112* 0.014* 
      (1.80) (1.74) (1.69) (1.63) 
Trust in government     0.054 0.007 0.040 0.005 
      (1.35) (1.36) (0.98) (0.99) 
Social responsibility (log)     0.470*** 0.062*** 0.171 0.021 
      (2.69) (2.70) (0.99) (0.99) 
Altruism     0.184*** 0.024*** 0.109*** 0.013*** 
      (4.44) (4.24) (2.63) (2.58) 
Ethics             
Environmental morale (log)          1.37*** 0.168*** 
          (8.32) (7.75) 
Sample size 1,161   1,160   1,160   
Prob > chi2 0.000   0.000   0.000   
Pseudo R2 0.030   0.044   0.073   
Prob > chi2 Ramsey RESET Test         0.154   
Prob > |z| Linktest (_hat) Test         0.006   
Prob > |z| Linktest (_hatsq) Test         0.143   
Notes: Marginal effects (M.E.) are estimated for the highest willingness to voluntarily contribute to 
recycling activities (i.e., outcome 5). *, **,*** , denote significance level at 10%, 5%, and 1% 
respectively. (.) denotes z-score. Robust standard errors. The table includes the Prob > chi2 and the 
Pseudo R2 for the fitted model. The table also reports the Ramsey RESET test and the Linktest 
(_hatsq) test for the full model specification.  
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Table 4.4. (see regression 3) shows that, as with other variables in the regression 
analysis, when the index of environmental morale is introduced into the regression 
analysis most of the attitudinal variables become less robust in terms of their size and 
significance level. This is particularly the case of the variables ‘trust in government’ 
(though not significant), ‘social responsibility’ and ‘altruism’. A possible explanation 
for this is that these variables (in addition to the socio-economic/demographic 
variables) might play an important role in determining individuals’ environmental 
morale, thus lending support to the hypothesis (see Chapter 2) that environmental 
morale can be driven by feelings of altruism, needs to conform to norms and 
reciprocal preferences (proxied in the regression analyses by the variables ‘social 
responsibility’ and ‘trust in government’, respectively). 
 
Finally, the index of environmental morale has the expected sign and it is highly 
significant (1% level), suggesting strong evidence into the importance of ethical 
considerations for the provision of recycling activities. In particular, results show that 
a 1% increase in the level of environmental morale increases the willingness to 
contribute to recycling by 16.8% points. However, given the nature of the index of 
environmental morale (which is expressed in logarithmic form), results seem to 
indicate that this effect slows down when the index reaches high levels, thus 
suggesting that differences in respondents’ contribution to recycling become smaller 
among those who already exhibit high levels of environmental morale106.  
 
In order to capture individuals’ reactions to policy changes according to their 
underlying motivation, the ranking of answers to the BIN and FINE scenarios were 
regressed on all socio-demographic/economic and attitudinal variables using 
multinomial regression analyses. Multinomial regression analyses are based on the 
independence of irrelevant alternatives assumption (IIA), which implies that the odds 
of one outcome are not related to the availability of another outcome. The full model 
                                                 
106 In addition to the Ramsey Reset Test and Linktest, the robustness of these results was also assessed 
using a binomial probit regression for the full model (results not reported here), where the highest 
outcomes of the willingness to contribute (i.e., outcomes 4 and 5) were converted into 1 (and all other 
values = 0). In general results remained robust, though moving from the ordered probit to the probit 




(as in Table 4.4, regression 3) passed the (suest-based) Hausman test (see Long and 
Freese, 2006), thus confirming the validity of this assumption (results are reported in 
Appendix 3B). In addition, a direct check on the correlation coefficient and some 
preliminary OLS estimations revealed (results not reported here) that no 
multicollinearity problems existed between the explanatory variables of all models 
considered in this analysis. Given the focus of this section on the effect of 
environmental morale on the willingness to contribute to recycling, Table 4.5 reports 
only the estimated associations between the willingness to change effort and the 
individuals’ level of environmental morale. Full results are reported in Appendix 4B. 
 
Table 4.5 
   Willingness to change effort relative to category 1 (= same level of effort) 
Model Environmental Morale (log)  
  β z-score M.E. 
Bin scenario 
   Increase  -0.585 -1.59 -0.063 
Decrease -2.309*** -4.00 -0.068*** 
Same level of effort - -  0.132* 
Fine scenario 
   Increase  -1.392*** -4.05 -0.283*** 
Decrease  -2.635*** -3.31 -0.022** 
Same level of effort - -  0.306*** 
Sample size     1,160  
Notes: Multinomial logit regression analyses. Full model as in Table 4.4 (regression 3). The reference 
category is 1 (= same level of effort). M.E. represents marginal effects. In the BIN scenario the sample 
size = 1,160 (willingness to increase effort = 784, willingness to decrease effort = 56). In the FINE 
scenario the sample size = 1,160 (willingness to increase effort = 753, willingness to decrease effort = 
36). *,** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Robust 
standard errors. 
 
In general the results in both scenarios show that higher levels of environmental 
morale are significantly and negatively correlated (not significant for increase effort 
in the BIN scenario)107 with the willingness to change the provision of effort in both 
directions (i.e., increasing or decreasing effort). Among other reasons, a possible 
explanation for this is that, given their higher initial level of environmental morale, 
individuals were indifferent to changes in policy measures to enforce recycling 
behaviours (Feldman and Perez, forthcoming). However, data seem also to suggest 
                                                 
107 The insignificant relationship between environmental morale and increasing effort in the BIN 
scenario might be due to the fact that a significant proportion of respondents with high environmental 
morale were likely to state they would increase their level of effort with the policy improvement (see 
Table 4.2 above).  
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that people in the BIN scenario were more likely to respond to policy change. 
Indeed, the relative probability of choosing to maintain the same level of efforts 
versus the other two outcomes increases in the BIN and the FINE scenarios 
respectively by 13.2% (at 10% significance level) and 30.6% (at 1% significance 
level) for every percentage point increase in the level of environmental morale above 
the average.  
 
4.3.2.2 What shapes environmental morale? 
 
Having established the relevance of environmental morale to individuals’ responses 
to policy signals, this section focuses on the determinants of environmental morale. 
As discussed in the previous section, most of the socio-demographic/economic and 
attitudinal variables might also play a role in explaining what shapes environmental 
morale. In order to analyse these aspects, Table 4.6 reports regression results of all 
socio-demographic/economic and attitudinal variables on environmental morale108. 
In general, results shown in Table 4.6 follow the same pattern of those presented in 
Table 4.4 in terms of the signs and significance levels of the estimated coefficients 
(although they differ in their relative magnitude). This not only suggest a strong 
correlation between environmental morale and the willingness to voluntarily 
contribute to recycling activities (Pearson correlation is 0.36, significant at the 1% 
level), but also intimates that social responsibility and altruism play an important role 
in determining individuals’ moral obligation towards the environment. However, the 
variable ‘trust in government’ remains insignificant, thus suggesting that 
environmental morale and, more generally, voluntary contribution to the 
environment are less likely to be influenced by individuals’ trust in government 
when policy measures are not taken into account109. 
 
 
                                                 
108 The Ramsey RESET test and the Linktest test suggested the employment of a level-log model 
specification (Prob > |t| > 0.1 in both cases). However, differently from the ordered probit regression 
analysis, the Ramsey RESET test was performed here introducing the predicted values of the 
dependent variable in their second, third and fourth power into the regression and testing the joint 
significance of the respective coefficient estimates (i.e., using an F-test).  
109 Looking at Tables 4B.3 and 4B.2 in Appendix 4B, trust in government seems to play a major role 
when taking into account a change in policy schemes. This, in addition to responses to the follow-up 
questions (see Table 4.2) strengthen the conclusion that reciprocal preferences do play a role in 




Environmental morale - OLS Results (Full sample) 
Independent Variables Regression1 Regression2 
  β β 
Socio-economic demographic variables   
Intercept 10.187*** 1.508 
  (6.76) (0.76) 
Female 0.853*** 0.701*** 
  (4.39) (3.80) 
Age 3.181** 2.762* 
  (1.98) (1.91) 
Age2 -0.601* -0.546 
  (-1.57) (-1.57) 
Working student 0.306 0.150 
  (0.81) (0.43) 
Never married 1.531*** 1.187*** 
  (2.96) (2.69) 
Financial satisfaction (log) -0.454** -0.612*** 
  (-2.08) (-3.18) 
Importance of religion -0.011 -0.134** 
  (0.16) (-1.90) 
European × Bath -0.913*** -0.747*** 
  (-5.31) (-3.95) 
Psychologists 1.369*** 1.086*** 




























Sample size 1,161 1,160 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 
R2 0.168 0.127 
Prob > F Ramsey RESET Test 
 
0.319 
Prob > |t| Linktest (_hat) Test 
 
0.021 
Prob > |t| Linktest (_hatsq) Test   0.269 
Notes: *, **, ***, denote significance level at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. Robust standard errors. (.) 
denotes t-statistic. The table includes the Prob > F and the R2 for the fitted model. The table also 






This said, moving from Table 4.4. to Table 4.6, a few differences can be observed 
that require some explanation110. Among the socio-demographic/economic variables 
there is evidence of significant differences between the levels of environmental 
morale of those who were not married and those who were (or have been) married 
with never married people showing higher environmental morale than that of 
different marital statuses. This result seems to be in contrast with findings of Torgler 
et al. (2009), where the authors conclude that in general married people are more 
compliant and exhibit high environmental morale compared to ‘singles’. However, 
given the lack of variation in all other marital status categories, it might be argued 
that results in this case can be biased by the sample characteristics and should 
therefore be interpreted with caution. 
 
Different to previous analyses (see e.g. Torgler and Garcia-Valiñas, 2007) Table 
4.6 also provides evidence of a negative relationship between financial satisfaction 
and environmental morale. In particular, a one percentage increase in the level of 
financial satisfaction is associated with a modest decrease of individuals’ 
environmental morale (between 0.0045 and 0.0061). Interestingly, this relationship 
becomes stronger in size when attitudinal variables are introduced into the 
regression. A possible explanation for this can be that, depending on risk preferences, 
the perception of a higher financial satisfaction might have led individuals to be less 
willing to bear the time and trouble costs of eco-conscious behaviours as they might 
contribute to environmental protection through different channels (e.g., monetary 
payments). Alternatively, those who considered their financial situation extremely 
disappointing might have been more reluctant to take risks related to environmental 
degradation because of high marginal utility loss (in terms of health reduction), 
which, in this context, translates into higher environmental morale and concern. This 
argument is in line with prospect theory that states that people evaluate gains and 
losses relative to a reference point (see for example Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). 
Individuals might have compared their actual situation (reference point) with a 
hypothetically worse scenario where no one would take any actions towards the 
environment and evaluated losses and gains of doing so in their social environment. 
A further aspect to point out is that results from this survey do not contradict the 
                                                 
110 Also in this case a binary probit regression analysis (where, 1 = index of environmental morale > 
12, and 0 otherwise) lend support to the robustness of the results. 
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existence of an environmental Kuznets curve given that what affects the willingness 
to contribute to environmental protection might not be necessarily related to what 
affects environmental morale and vice versa.  
 
Finally, results highlight a negative relationship between religion and 
environmental morale. In particular, Table 4.6 (regression 2) shows that, as the 
importance of religion increases, the level of environmental morale decreases by 
0.134 (at the 5% significance level). The question included in the survey served as a 
proxy for “religious identity salience” (see Torgler, 2007, p.118). In contrast with 
predictions, results from this survey seem to contradict the long-held belief in the 
literature that religious people tend to be more compliant and charitable. Specifically, 
internalized religious convictions here did not lead either to higher environmental 
morale or to an increase of voluntary contribution to recycling (see also Table 4.4). 
Although this finding might appear surprising, a possible explanation for this can be 
that respondents who declared religion is very important in their life might not have 
internalized religious values and, as suggested by Malhotra (2011), they might be 
more likely than non-religious individuals to behave pro-socially only when they 
attend their place of worship (i.e., Sunday effect). On the other hand, it is also 
possible that there can be other non-God related stimuli that led non-religious 
individuals to exhibit higher environmental morale and to behave eco-consciously 
(see Shariff and Norenzayan, 2007, and Malhotra, 2011). However, this remains a 
question of future research since the methodology employed in this study cannot 
disentangle the different reasons that guide non-religious individuals to be more 
environmentally-friendly. Note that the negative relationship between environmental 
morale and religion is strengthening when controlling for altruism as the coefficient 
of the variable ‘religion’ becomes more robust in its size and significance level. This 
seems to suggest that there might be other variables that influence altruistic 
behaviours rather than religion beliefs.   
 
4.3.2.3 The impact of culture on individuals’ attitudes towards recycling 
 
The last issue investigated in the empirical analysis concerns the effect of nationality 
on the willingness to voluntary contribute to recycling activities. Regression results 
are reported in short in Table 4.7 which restrict the analysis to the European sample 
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of respondents where two dummy variables for Italian and British have replaced the 
interaction term ‘European × Bath’ in Table 4.4. Full results are reported in 
Appendix 3B. 
 
Results show that controlling for individuals’ level of environmental morale and 
all other covariates (see Table 4.7, regression 3), Italian and British respondents 
show different attitudes towards recycling if compared to all other Europeans. In 
particular, Italians were more willing to contribute to recycling (at the 10% 
significant level, with a marginal effect of 2.8%) than other Europeans, while the 
British were less willing to do so on a voluntary basis (at the 5% significance level, 
with a marginal effect of 3.9%). A possible interpretation of this result can be that, if 
the variation in individuals’ attitudes towards the environment can be attributed both 
to differences in culture and their level of environmental morale, then the difference 
in the differences between Italian and British (Wald test = 49.76,  01.0p ) can be 
attributed to the net effect of environmental morale on respondents’ view. An 
independent samples t-test   01.0,15.4970  pt  suggests indeed that on average 
there is a significant difference between Italian respondents’ environmental morale 
(14.49) and that of British (13.69). Given the available statistics (see Chapter 3, 
Appendix 3A), this result might appear surprising. However, rather than a 
discrepancy between actual and self-reporting behaviours, this can be a consequence 
of the geographical area in which respondents were interviewed. According to the 
latest available ISTAT’s report (2012), in fact, the amount of sorted and collected 
waste in Florence reached 40.2% in 2011, a value that is a long way away from the 
average percentage value registered in the central of Italy (i.e., 30%). Therefore in 
Florence respondents might be more open to recycling activities than in other areas 
of central Italy. Nevertheless, it is worth emphasizing that different results could 
have been reached by considering a broader sample of respondents (e.g., including 









      
Voluntary Contribution  – Ordered Probit Results (European sample) 
Independent variables Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 
 
β M.E β M.E. β M.E. 
Italian 0.235* 0.030* 0.225 0.028 0.240* 0.028* 
  (1.67) (1.68) (1.61) (1.61) (1.73) (1.73) 
British -0.373*** -0.046*** -0.385*** -0.046*** -0.350** -0.039** 
  (-2.60) (-2.66) (-2.74) (-2.82) (-2.53) (-2.59) 
Sample size 1,040   1,039   1,039 
 












Prob > chi2 Ramsey RESET Test 
    
0.101 
 
Prob > |z| Linktest (_hat)  
    
0.005 
 
Prob > |z| Linktest (_hatsq)          0.105   
Notes: As in Table 4.4. 
 
4.4 DISCUSSION OF RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
4.4.1 Discussion of results 
 
This section briefly discusses the main results obtained in this study. Figure 4.2 
provides a stylised presentation of them.111 As shown in the figure, low 
environmental morale in the interval 0-M leads respondents to be unwilling to 
contribute to recycling (see Figure 4.2 (a)).  However, when the level of 
environmental morale reaches a certain level (i.e., M), the willingness to contribute 
to recycling tends to increase considerably – i.e., the curve has a discontinuity at M. 
As can be seen at high levels of environmental morale (beyond H) there is not much 
variation among respondents’ contribution. Therefore, the figure suggests that major 
differences in individuals’ level of contribution can be found between M and H. 
Figure 4.2 (b) shows that the relationship between positive responses to policy 
measures and environmental morale has a S shape. In particular, individuals’ 
responsiveness to policy measures rapidly increase towards an inflection point (i.e., 
A – corresponding to a medium level of environmental morale), followed by a 
further increase in a curve that whilst increasing it does so at a decreasing rate. The 
tapering occurs when the level of environmental morale departs from a medium 
                                                 
111 Results are focused on the willingness to voluntary contribute to recycling and on positive 
responses to policy measures (i.e., willingness to increase effort’s provision). The small number of 
observations of negative responses to policy measures (i.e., willingness to decrease effort’s provision) 
does not allow a vivid representation of the results.   
 111 
 
value. At this point responsiveness to policy measures slows down, especially when 
environmental morale reaches very high levels (i.e., H). A possible explanation for 
this is that for respondents who in the voluntary scenario made a high contribution 
(i.e., H and beyond in Figure 4.2 (b)) the policy instruments have no impact because, 
as far as they were concerned, they were already making a maximum contribution. 
Again, the figure shows a point of discontinuity in the function (i.e., M), meaning 
that individuals seem not to react to policy measures for a lower level of 


















In summary, results in this survey suggest that individuals’ voluntary contribution 
to recycling and reactions to policy measures depends on their initial level of 
environmental morale. However, effects seem to be neutral for those who initially 
exhibit high environmental morale. According to Figure 4.2 (b), it is also evident that 
responsiveness to policy measures is higher in the BIN scenario (see the solid line in 
Figure 4.2 (b)), thus illustrating the hypothesis that facilitating nudge policy 
measures tend to encourage recycling more than mandatory schemes.  
 


















This result has important consequences from a policy perspective and has a role 
in the ongoing debate over the voluntary/mandatory nature of recycling schemes. On 
the one hand, mandatory schemes might serve as a deterrent to not recycling. On the 
other hand, sceptics argue that mandatory measures may create feelings of pressure 
(by forcing people to comply) and may result in other irresponsible behaviours (e.g., 
fly tipping), and further that they do not serve as instruments to acknowledge the 
importance of environment. This raises the question of how to motivate people to 
value what may appear to be non-interesting and externally motivated activities with 
a view to fostering autonomous regulation. Results from this survey suggest that a 
facilitating nudge policy measure might be more effective in generating a positive 





This chapter describes the empirical results of the questionnaire survey presented in 
chapter 3. The study investigates the linkage between government signals and 
individuals’ willingness to contribute to recycling according to their underlying 
motivation. Furthermore the analysis helps an understanding of what shapes 
environmental morale. In line with predictions, the empirical findings suggest that 
environmental morale plays a major role in motivating individuals’ contribution to 
recycling. The description of the follow-up responses and empirical results described 
in previous sections generally support this conclusion. As expected, environmental 
morale seems to be driven by feelings of altruism, needs to conform to social norms 
and reciprocal preferences.  
 
The differences between the levels and the reasons for respondents’ reactions to 
policy changes lend support to the hypothesis that individuals react to government 
policies not only according to their level of environmental morale (Hypothesis 2), but 
also according to the nature of the signals generated by different policies (Hypothesis 
1). In particular, according to results obtained from this analysis recycling can be 




The results reported in this study also indicate that there is a difference in 
individuals’ sensitiveness towards the environment (Hypothesis 3). According to 
previous survey analyses and laboratory experiments (see Frank et al., 1993; Selten 
and Ockenfels, 1998; Torgler et al., 2009), there is a strong effect of gender, with 
females showing greater environmental morale and willingness to voluntarily 
contribute to recycling activities. In addition, in line with the tax compliance 
literature (e.g. Cullis et al., 2006; Cullis et al., 2012) instrumental behaviour (i.e. free 
riding) seems to be stronger amongst those exposed to economics teaching. This 
result corroborates previous evidence over the hypothesis that exposure to different 
indoctrination may influence the way in which individuals behave, especially when 
facing situations that require a trade-off between profit/utility maximization and 
ethical considerations. Indeed, students trained in psychology tend to be generally 
more willing to contribute to recycling, a predisposition that according to results 
obtained from this analysis can be attributed to higher levels of environmental 
morale112. Regarding the effect of culture, results suggest that in countries with lower 
level of environmental morale, individuals’ willingness to contribute to recycling is 
also poor.  
 
This said, it is also important to acknowledge that the survey is based on 
students’ responses and on hypothetical scenarios rather than on a representative 
sample of households and their actual behaviour. This might explain why there was 
not very much variation in many of the socio/demographic – economic indicators 
(e.g., age, financial satisfaction, occupational and marital status). However, a 
growing experimental literature relies on students’ responses and as suggested by 
Alm and Jacobson (2007, p. 143) “there is no reason to believe that the cognitive 
processes of students are different from those of “real” people”. Regarding the 
hypothetical bias of stated preferences methods it might be argued that this problem 
seems to play a major role in fostering misleading conclusions for quantitative 
analyses rather than for qualitative ones. The purpose of this study was not to assess 
                                                 
112 As mentioned in Chapter 3, it is common practice in the behavioural economics literature to 
compare different attitudes and behaviours using experiments and/or survey analyses taken from 
psychology and economics students. However, it might be of interest to extend in future research the 
survey to a broader sample of students to further explore how different indoctrination might affect 




which is the best policy to adopt in order to encourage individuals to recycling 
activities among those mentioned in the hypothetical settings, but to shed light on 
how individuals react (in terms of intrinsic motivation) to different policy schemes 
(i.e., signals). Thus, this bias seems not to play a major part here. In addition, 
hypothetical scenarios served to reduce ‘socially acceptable’ responses bias (see 
Orviska and Hudson, 2003). Furthermore, although it is important to recognize the 
relevance of these criticisms it has to be recognised that the costs of extending the 
survey to a broader sample of respondents or to analyse these aspects in a ‘real life’ 
experiment are large.  
 
The results here provides a contribution to that part of the literature that indicates 
that monetary incentives (i.e., taxes, subsidies and fines) can be counterproductive 
and undermine environmental morale as the intrinsic motivation to contribute to a 
better environment. A good understanding of the interaction between external 
regulations and individuals’ environmental morale is relevant when designing policy 









APPENDIX 4A: DEFINITION AND DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES 
 
Table 4A.1 
Description of the variables 




Voluntary contribution Ordinal variable that assumes values 1=I will do hardly any recycling to 5=very high N/A 
Willingness to change effort (BIN scenario) 
Categorical variable that assumes value 1=I would exert the same level of effort, 2/3=I would increase/decrease my 
effort 
N/A 




Female Dummy coded 1 if female and 0 if male + 
Age Ordinal variable that assumes values 1(15-24) to 5(55-64) +/- 
Age2 Square of variable ‘age’ +/- 
Working student Dummy coded 1if working student and 0 otherwise +/- 
Never married Dummy coded 1 if never married and 0 otherwise +/- 
Financial satisfaction (log) Log of the degree of respondents' financial satisfaction (1=extremely dissatisfied, 10=extremely satisfied) + 
Importance of religion Ordinal variable that assumes values 1=not at all important to 5=very important + 
Italian Dummy coded 1 if Italian and 0 otherwise - 
British Dummy coded 1 if British and 0 otherwise + 
European × Bath Dummy coded 1 if european and 0 otherwise +/- 
Psychologists Dummy coded 1 if psycologist and 0 otherwise + 
Risk aversion Dummy coded 1 if risk averse and 0 otherwose +/- 
Trust in government Ordinal variable that assumes values 1=none at all to 5=a great deal + 
Social responsibility (log) Log of respondents' level of social responsibility (multi-item index ranging from 4 to 20) + 
Altruism  Ordinal variable that assumes values 1=not at all important to 5=very important + 





Descriptive statistics  
Variable Obs Mean Std.dev. Min Max 
Voluntary contribution 1165 3.295 0.918 1 5 
Facilitating nudge (BIN) 1165 1.769 0.523 1 3 
Enforcing (FINE) 1165 1.708 0.518 1 3 
Female 1165 0.623 0.484 0 1 
Age 1165 1.064 0.334 1 5 
Age2 1165 1.244 1.462 1 25 
Working 1165 0.064 0.245 0 1 
Never married 1165 0.941 0.234 0 1 
Financial satisfaction (log) 1161 1.797 0.444 0 2.302 
Importance of religion 1165 2.175 1.240 1 5 
Italian 1165 0.484 0.499 0 1 
British 1165 0.349 0.476 0 1 
European × Bath 1165 0.4 0.490 0 1 
Psycologists 1165 0.397 0.489 0 1 
Risk aversion 1164 0.337 0.473 0 1 
Trust in government 1165 2.431 0.895 1 5 
Social responsibility (log) 1165 2.767 0.207 1.386 2.995 
Altruism  1165 3.713 0.922 1 5 
Environmental morale 
(log) 
1165 2.622 0.252 1.386 2.995 
Notes: The table reports the total number of observations (Obs.), the mean value (Mean), the standard 
deviation (SD), and the minimum/maximum value (i.e., Min and Max, respectively) of the variables 


















APPENDIX 4B: FULL RESULTS FOR MULTINOMIAL 




(Suest-based) Hausman test for Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) 
BIN scenario 
Omitted chi2  Df Prob > chi2  Evidence 
2 13.534 15 0.561 for Ho 
3 12.001 15 0.679 for Ho 
1 15.090 15 0.445 for Ho 
FINE scenario 
Omitted chi2 Df Prob > chi2 Evidence 
2 15.961 15 0.385 for Ho 
3 9.027 15 0.876 for Ho 
1 7.371 15 0.947 for Ho 
Notes: The (suest-based) Hausman test for IIA tests the null hypothesis that the odds for each specific 
pair of outcomes are independent of other alternatives. A Prob > chi2 > 0.05 indicates that the null 



























Willingness to change effort in the BIN scenario  – Multinomial Logit Results (Full sample) 
Independent variables/effort Same effort  Increase effort  Decrease effort 
 M.E. β M.E. β M.E. 
Socio-economic demographic variables 








  (1.10) (-0.31) 
Female -0.049 0.235 0.039 0.442 0.009 
  (-1.60) (1.54) (1.25) (1.37) (0.92) 
Age -0.029 0.126 0.011 0.585 0.017 
  (-0.16) (0.14) (0.06) (0.47) (0.48) 
Age2 0.018 -0.094 -0.016 -0.123 -0.001 
  (0.46) (-0.45) (-0.41) (-0.46) (-0.26) 
Working student 0.014 -0.028 0.016 -1.433 -0.030** 
  (0.26) (-0.10) (0.29) (-1.33) (-2.36) 
Never married 0.015 -0.069 -0.006 -0.279 -0.009 
  (0.26) (-0.22) (-0.11) (-0.51) (-0.42) 
Financial satisfaction (log) -0.018 0.949 0.018 0.053 -0.000 
  (-0.57) (0.58) (0.59) (0.15) (-0.05) 
Importance of religion -0.016 0.081 0.015 0.085 0.000 
  (-1.38) (1.37) (1.28) (0.73) (0.25) 
European × Bath -0.113*** 0.647*** 0.143*** -0.423 -0.030*** 
  (-3.73) (3.86) (4.62) (-1.12) (-2.74) 
Psychologists 0.071** -0.385** -0.084** 0.058 0.012 
  (2.27) (-2.43) (-2.58) (0.17) (0.69) 
Attitudinal variables 
    
  
Risk aversion 0.022 -0.103 -0.014 -0.297 -0.007 
  (0.77) (-0.71) (-0.49) (-0.92) (0.76) 
Trust in government -0.048*** 0.261*** 0.056*** -0.045 -0.008 
  (-2.95) (3.11) (3.32) (-0.22) (-1.20) 
Social responsibility (log) -0.010 0.066 0.018 -0.170 -0.007 
  (-0.15) (0.18) (0.26) (-0.31) (-0.46) 
Altruism 0.023 -0.119 -0.023 -0.087 -0.000 
  (1.35) (-1.36) (-1.32) (-0.31) (-0.01) 
Ethics 
    
  
Environmental morale (log)  0.132* -0.585 -0.063 -2.309*** -0.068*** 
  (1.84) (-1.59) (-0.90) (-4.00) (-3.56) 
Sample size   1,160   1,160   




0.000   
Pseudo R2   0.058   0.058   
Notes: Multinomial logit regression analyses. Full model as in Table 4.4 (regression 3). The reference 
category is 1 (= same level of effort). M.E. represents marginal effects. (.) denotes z-score. In the BIN 
scenario the sample size = 1,160 (willingness to increase effort = 784, willingness to decrease effort = 








Willingness to change effort in the FINE scenario  – Multinomial Logit Results (Full sample) 
Independent variables/effort Same effort  Increase effort  Decrease effort 
 M.E. β M.E. β M.E. 
Socio-economic demographic variables 








  (3.38) (2.46) 
Female -0.032 0.185 0.055* 1.272*** -0.023** 
  (-1.01) (-1.27) (1.73) (-2.74) (-2.14) 
Age 0.112 -0.624 -0.180 4.763** 0.068** 
  (0.55) (-0.66) (-0.89) (2.30) (2.26) 
Age2 -0.006 0.053 0.021 -1.031* -0.014* 
  (-0.14) (0.24) (0.43) (-1.91) (-1.84) 
Working student 0.062 -0.292 -0.071 0.352 0.009 
  (0.98) (-1.07) (-1.13) (0.65) (0.87) 
Never married -0.115 0.484 0.104 1.810** 0.011*** 
  (-1.63) (1.66) (1.48) (2.03) (2.88) 
Financial satisfaction (log) -0.011 0.049 0.008 0.227 0.002 
  (-0.34) (0.32) (0.27) (0.45) (0.41) 
Importance of religion -0.025** 0.116** 0.024* 0.204 0.001 
  (-2.06) (2.02) (1.94) (1.37) (0.89) 
European × Bath -0.094*** 0.438*** 0.087*** 0.861** 0.007 
  (-2.94) (2.79) (2.67) (1.96) (1.16) 
Psychologists -0.023 0.099 0.016 0.620 0.007 
  (-0.74) (0.66) (0.49) (1.28) (1.07) 
Attitudinal variables 
    
  
Risk aversion 0.003 -0.007 0.003 -0.587 -0.007 
  (0.13) (-0.05) (0.10) (-1.21) (-1.34) 
Trust in government -0.021 0.115 0.032* -0.744*** -0.010*** 
  (-1.22) (1.43) (1.83) (-2.66) (-2.75) 
Social responsibility (log) 0.061 -0.248 -0.037 -1.942*** -0.023*** 
  (0.82) (-0.72) (-0.51) (-3.36) (-2.61) 
Altruism 0.025 -0.114 -0.021 -0.400* -0.004* 
  (1.47) (-1.40) (-1.23) (-1.89) (-1.70) 
Ethics 
    
  
Environmental morale (log)  0.306*** -1.392*** -0.283*** -2.635*** -0.022** 
  (4.18) (-4.05) (-3.89) (-3.31) (-2.33) 
Sample size   1,160   1,160   




0.000   
Pseudo R2   0.078   0.078   
Notes: Multinomial logit regression analyses. Full model as in Table 4.4 (regression 3). The reference 
category is 1 (= same level of effort). M.E. represents marginal effects. (.) denotes z-score. In the 
FINE scenario the sample size = 1,160 (willingness to increase effort = 753, willingness to decrease 
effort = 36). *,** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 




Table 4B. 4 
The effect of culture - Ordered Probit Results (European sample) 
Independent Variables Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 
  β M.E. β M.E. β M.E. 
Socio-economic demographic variables 
    
  
Female 0.235*** 0.029*** 0.200** 0.024** 0.154* 0.017** 
  (3.04) (3.08) (2.54) (2.58) (1.95) (1.97) 
Age 1.328** 0.175** 1.240** 0.158** 1.143* 0.136* 
  (2.33) (2.32) (2.19) (2.18) (1.91) (1.90) 
Age2 -0.307** -0.040** -0.297** -0.037** -0.292** -0.034** 
  (-2.16) (-2.15) (-2.10) (-2.10) (-1.98) (-1.96) 
Working student 0.219 0.033 0.195 0.028 0.184 0.024 
  (1.50) (1.31) (1.31) (1.16) (1.16) (1.02) 
Never married 0.111 0.013 0.047 0.005 -0.104 -0.013 
  (0.75) (0.81) (0.32) (0.33) (-0.67) (-0.62) 
Financial satisfaction (log) -0.0954 -0.012 -0.132 -0.016 -0.066 -0.007 
  (-1.19) (-1.17) (-1.65) (-1.62) (-0.82) (-0.81) 
Importance of religion 0.001 0.000 -0.027 -0.003 -0.008 -0.000 
  (0.05) (0.05) (-0.92) (-0.92) (-0.27) (-0.27) 
Italian 0.235* 0.030* 0.225 0.028 0.240* 0.028* 
  (1.67) (1.68) (1.61) (1.61) (1.73) (1.73) 
British -0.373*** -0.046*** -0.385*** -0.046*** -0.350** -0.039** 
  (-2.60) (-2.66) (-2.74) (-2.82) (-2.53) (-2.59) 
Psychologists 0.056 0.007 0.028 0.003 -0.090 -0.010 
 
(0.76) (0.76) (0.37) (0.37) (-1.15) (-1.16) 
Attitudinal variables 




0.053 0.006 0.448 0.005 
  
  
(0.75) (0.74) (0.63) (0.62) 
Trust in government 
  
0.088** 0.011** 0.092** 0.011** 
  
  
(2.01) (2.02) (2.04) (2.05) 
Social responsibility (log) 
  
0.402** 0.051** -0.090 -0.010 
  
  
(2.11) (2.10) (-0.45) (-0.45) 
Altruism 
  
0.154*** 0.019*** 0.089** 0.010** 
  
  
(3.56) (3.46) (2.05) (2.03) 
Ethics 
     
  
Environmental morale (log)  
    
1.305*** 0.156*** 
  
    
(-7.33) (7.00) 
Sample size 1,040   1,039   1,039   




0.000   




0.073   
Prob > chi2 Ramsey RESET Test 
    
0.101   
Prob > |z| Linktest (_hat) Test 
    
0.005   
Prob > |z| Link Test (_hatsq) Test         0.105   






DISCOUNTING THE ENVIRONMENT 
 
“Completely ignoring the side effects of the action would make it dishonest, but 
unlimited responsibility would make it impossible. It is indeed a sign of human 
limitations that the disparity between the desired effects and the innumerable 
consequences of the action is itself unmanageable, and calls upon the practical 
wisdom gained throughout the history of earlier trade-offs. A happy medium must be 
found between escaping from the responsibility for consequences and the inflation to 




The current debate is not only over which actions should be adopted to mitigate the 
impact of environmental damages, but also over how citizens evaluate the costs of 
mitigation and/or the environmental consequences today versus those of future 
generations. Human life is full of decisions involving a stream of outcomes that 
occur at different times in the future. People commonly trade off current sacrifices 
for a better future: they invest in their human capital, save money for their retirement 
and plan their own future and those of future generations to whom they want to 
provide bequests. The rate at which future outcomes are weighted is commonly 
known in the literature as the discount rate, “which can be interpreted as the 
minimum rate of return required from a safe investment project to make it socially 
desirable to implement” (Gollier, 2011 p. 6).  
 
Likewise other daily-life investments, investments in environmental projects 
today (e.g. those related to global warming and climate change prevention) need to 
be compared with future benefits. There are at least two interrelated reasons for 
doing so: sustainable development and intergenerational equity concerns113. The 
                                                 
113 The link between the two concepts has been analysed for example by Hartwick (1978), Solow 
(1986), Weiss (1992) and Arrow et al. (1996). 
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former, whose notion is widely discussed in Bruntland (1987), refers to the idea that 
economic development should guarantee the improvement of policies to maintain 
intact (or enhance) ‘natural’ capital (see Markandya and Pearce, 1991). Put in 
another way, the necessity to meet the needs of the present generation should not 
prevent future generations from meeting their own needs (see United Nations, 1987, 
cited by Koundouri, 2009). The latter advocates that policies and investments made 
in the present generation “should contribute to securing sustained increases in 
welfare for future generations” (see Atkinson et al., 1997, cited by Groom et al., 
2005, p. 447). As suggested by Beder (2000) equity relates to social justice and to the 
need for fairness (and not necessarily for equality) in the distribution of gains and 
losses. Equity should simply ensure to everyone an acceptable quality and standard 
of living. In particular, “…Equity means that there should be a minimum level of 
income and environmental quality below which nobody falls. Within a community it 
usually also means that everyone should have equal access to community resources 
and opportunities, and that no individuals or groups of people should be asked to 
carry a greater environmental burden than the rest of the community as a result of 
government actions…” (Beder, 2000, p. 228). Extended to the concept of 
intergenerational equity, the idea is that although future generations might gain from 
economic growth and progress, those gains should not be achieved at the expense of 
the environment. Most people advocate the existence of a moral obligation towards 
future generations driven by altruism, particularly because decisions taken today may 
affect the well-being of people living in the next generation, which will be inherited 
by the next-next generation, and so on. Intergenerational equity represents therefore a 
key concept for sustainable development as inequalities among different generations 
may be translated into environmental degradation. 
 
Discounting is at the heart of any intergenerational problems and has long been a 
contentious issue for the evaluation of public investments in cost-benefit analysis 
(CBA). Decades of debate over the choice of the social discount rate (SDR) – i.e., the 
rate at which society evaluates current versus future well-being – show how 
discounting is crucial for CBA and resource allocations. This has in fact important 
implications not only over the choice of a specific project (ex ante), but also over the 




Economists have proposed several alternative methods and rationales for the 
choice of the discount rate to be used in CBA. It can be argued that the contribution 
of behavioural economics here is certainly not negligible. Over time, laboratory 
experiments have provided different and conflicting psychological and sociological 
explanations for discounting. In general, empirical evidence suggests that when 
facing intertemporal choices individuals’ behaviour departs from that predicted by 
rational economic models and many other factors influence people’ evaluation of 
future outcomes, that is: a strong desire or present bias (Frederick et al., 2002) to 
receive gains immediately which leads to greater discount rates (per unit of time) for 
short delays (also known as hyperbolic discounting) rather than long ones; the 
magnitude effect for which individuals discount less large magnitude outcomes (see 
for example Thaler, 1981, and Chapman and Elstein, 1995); the sign effect that 
implies people discount losses less than gains (see Thaler, 1981); and the delay effect 
for which people discount more when they have to receive something immediately 
and discount less the same things when they have to get them later. This not only has 
suggested departures from orthodox theoretical arguments, but it has also 
incentivized economists to (re) model their analyses according to the above-
described behavioural anomalies.  
 
Despite the differences among these approaches, in the past it was possible to 
achieve temporary consensuses over the variety of values and methods to obtain 
appropriate discount rates. However, the recent Stern Review (Stern, 2007) has 
added new impetus to this debate. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a survey 
of the vast existing literature on intergenerational equity and discounting and to link 
this to behavioural economics and environmental morale. In particular, the rest of the 
chapter attempts to provide answers to the following questions114:  
                                                 
114 There have been many surveys in the literature on these topics. However, not many look at all 
these aspects simultaneously. Zhuang et al. (2007), e.g, provide a survey on different approaches to 
the choice of the social discount rate. Tóth (2000) and Scarborough (2011) analyze aspects related to 
intergenerational equity and discounting. Finally, Brekke and Johansson-Stenman (2008) show the 
potential and current contributions of behavioural economics to environmental economics, while 
Frederick et al. (2002) critically evaluate behavioural anomalies on intertemporal choices emerging 
from the laboratory.  
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1) What are the arguments in support of the different analytical approach to obtain an 
appropriate (social) discount rate? 
2) How intergenerational equity problems can be modelled in CBA? 
3) What are the contributions of behavioural economics in this area of research?  
4) Can environmental morale play a role in discounting? 
 
To this end, Section 5.2 briefly describes a basic framework of cost-benefit 
analysis showing the relevance of discounting for project evaluation. Section 5.3 
provides a detailed overview of the origin of the discounting dilemma. Section 5.4 
and 5.5 critically evaluate the different approaches used in the literature to choose 
‘suitable’ and/or ‘correct’ social discount rates aimed at intergenerational equity and 
sustainable development goals. Section 5.6 addresses the relevance of discounting 
for modelling intertemporal problems and provides a review of advantages and 
disadvantages of using infinite-lived agents (ILA) versus overlapping generations 
(OLG) models. Finally, Section 5.7 analyses recent contributions of behavioural 
economics to understanding individuals’ time preference over different intertemporal 
choices and commodities. Overall remarks are reported in section 5.8. 
 
5.2 CBA AND DISCOUNTING:  A BASIC FRAMEWORK 
 
Among other methodologies (e.g. contingent valuation, CV), cost-benefit analysis 
(CBA) represents a way to integrate environmental costs and benefits into 
development decisions. CBA is generally considered as an abstraction of the 
discounted-utility model formalized by Paul Samuelson (Samuelson, 1937) and 
pioneered by Ramsey (1928) in his seminal paper ‘A mathematical theory of 
savings’115. This approach is based on the idea that future costs and benefits of a 
particular project need to be discounted to the present. If the resulting net present 
value (NPV) of the project is greater than (or at least equal to) zero, the CBA 
suggests implementing the project. Formally, the net present value can be calculated 
as follows: 
                                                 
115 It is generally agreed in the literature that Samuelson (1937) provided the first contribution to the 
theory of discounted-utility (DU) models. However, it has to be noted that preliminary insights into 

















,                            (5.1) 
 
where  tt CB   represents net benefits (i.e. benefits net of costs) at time t,   
t
r11  
is the discount factor with r equals to the discount rate (expressed in real terms), and 
t is the time index. Equation (5.1) shows that the efficiency116 of CBA strongly 
depends on the level of the discount rate (and the calculation and inclusion of all 
tangible /monetary and intangible/non-monetary costs and benefits into the 
analysis)117. In particular, a high discount rate might preclude many desirable 
projects to be undertaken. By contrast, a very low discount rate can lead inefficient 
projects to pass the CBA test.   
 
In general, an effective social discount rate should be able to reflect how people 
substitute consumption in the current period with consumption in the following 
periods, and it should be able to deal with the allocation of resources between private 
and public sectors118. The first argument is based on the idea that individuals (i.e., 
savers) are willing to trade off current with future consumption if current sacrifices 
(or saving) are compensated more than proportionally in future times. This is because 
assuming consumption increases over time, individuals’ marginal utility of future 
consumption decreases. Furthermore, many economists have made the assumption 
that individuals have a positive pure rate of time preference, that is, an immediate 
pleasure is always preferred to one experienced in the future. There are at least two 
psychological aspects to justify the pure time preference assumption: one is 
individuals’ impatience (or myopia), the second one is related to individuals’ fear of 
not being alive in the far distant future119. This gives rise to what is generally known 
in the literature as the social rate of time preference (SRTP) – i.e., the rate at which 
individuals are willing to trade a unit of current consumption with more than a unit of 
                                                 
116 Economic efficiency requires that the social discount rate is equivalent to the marginal social 
opportunity cost of funds allocated to public investments. See Portney and Weyant (1999) for a 
discussion on differences between equity and efficiency.  
117 For the purpose of this analysis only the problems related to the level of the social discount rate 
(SDR) and intergenerational equity will be discussed. For a discussion about the evaluation of 
tangible/intangible costs and benefits in environmental contexts, see for example Goodin (1982), 
Markandya and Pearce (1991).  
118 For a detailed discussion on these topics, see Zhuang et al. (2007) and Cullis and Jones (2009). 
119 For society this risk can be associated to an exogenous risk of calamity eliminating society (see for 
example Dasgupta and Heal, 1980, Rees, 2003).  
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future consumption. In general, the rate of return on investments is considered as a 
maximum value for the social rate of time preference (see Lind, 1982, Arrow et al., 
1996, and Pannell and Schilizzi, 2006). 
 
 The second argument is based on the assumption that in order to persuade a 
producer (i.e., investor) to invest in a public project, the amount the project must 
make should be at least as high as the opportunity cost of funding – i.e., the choice of 
a public project is justified if and only if there are no alternative investments in the 
private sector that would have led to a greater rate of return. According to these lines 
of reasoning, the rate of return an investor should use in discounting benefits and 
costs of a project should equal the social opportunity cost rate of discounting (SOC), 
which can provide an index of the value of the investment in its best alternative use. 
In general, the market interest rate represents the minimum rate required to obtain a 
safe investment120. The idea is that, likewise in the financial market, if individuals 
want to maximize their benefits (for the future), they chose a safe investment if and 
only if the interest rate generated by the project is greater than the internal rate of 
return of the project. A lower discount rate than that used in the financial market 
would be against the interest of future generations since it would deviate capital from 
higher to lower return investments (based on the arbitrage argument). 
 
The SRTP and the SOC represent respectively the supply and demand prices in a 
standard model of investible funds. It is commonly agreed in the literature that in an 
ideal world without distortions (e.g. externalities, unemployment, and suboptimal 
taxation) the market clears at an interest rate that equals the social rate of time 
preference and the social opportunity cost to the rate of return on capital. In other 
words, all conditions for an ‘optimal’ social discount rate are satisfied. However, in 
reality, markets are not perfectly competitive and distortions impose a wedge 
between the SRTP and SOC, with the social rate of time preference being usually 
lower than that of the SOC. Under these circumstances, costs and benefits with 
different time profiles cannot be compared. In addition, given that a single rate of 
return does not satisfy both requirements, this raises the question of which is the best 
discount rate to be used for CBA. A general accepted rule of thumb is to use a lower 
                                                 
120 For a discussion see Gollier (2011).    
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discount rate than that observed in the market if emphasis is laid on the allocation of 
resources through time. The opposite is true for those who put emphasis on current 
allocation of resources in the public and private sector.  
 
The following sections provide a review of different approaches suggested in the 
literature in order to obtain efficient evaluations for long-term projects. Issues related 
to intergenerational equity will be addressed and introduced into the analysis.  
 
5.3 DISCOUNTING ENVIRONMENTAL ASSETS: 
INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY AND SUSTAINABILITY 
 
5.3.1 SOC versus SRTP 
 
Attention to discounting started during the 90s when public policy debates raised the 
question of what kind of discount rate had to be used to calculate the NPV of costs 
and benefits of specific investment projects. The origins of the debate can be traced 
to Eckstein (1958) who devoted his book to the development of cost-benefit analyses 
for the water sector in the United States. However, other events such as the great oil 
crisis in 1973 forced the United States and other countries in the world to consider 
other sources of energy supply, which entailed the evaluation of a number of upfront 
investments. In 1977 many economists and politicians with the support of the 
Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), Resources for the Future (RFF) convened 
a conference to discuss the discount rate at which these investments had to be 
evaluated. A few years later these contributions where collected together and revised 
to provide a published book by Lind (1982). The main issue discussed on that 
occasion relates to the numeraires used for discounting in cost-benefit analysis. The 
dispute was mainly focussed on the employment of the opportunity cost of capital 
(which reflects the private marginal productivity of capital), or the consumption rate 
of interest (which provides a measure of the individuals’ rate of time preference) as 
possible candidates to obtaining ‘suitable’ and/or ‘correct’ social discount rates.  
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The former is generally identified with the real risk-free market interest rate (i.e. 
market-based discount rate)121. Among the reasons supporting the adoption of the 
social opportunity cost of capital as a numeraire for the social discount rate, many 
authors suggest that resources are scarce, and that public investments displace private 
investments, which can provide a better alternative use of the same funds (examples 
are Baumol, 1968, and Diamond and Mirrlees, 1971).  This justifies the assumption 
that ‘public investments should yield at least the same return as private investment. If 
not, social welfare can be increased by reallocating resources to the private sector’ 
where it would be possible to obtain higher returns (see Zhuang et al., 2007, p. 9). 
However, there are many arguments against the employment of the SOC as the 
appropriate social discount rate. Dasgupta et al. (1972), for example, suggest that the 
opportunity cost of capital can only be applicable when considering fixed capital 
(irrespective of the project choice – i.e., public versus private) in a two-period model. 
When one of these assumptions is relaxed, the rate of return on investments no 
longer represents an adequate measure of the social discount rate. Assuming 
individuals postpone their current consumption (i.e. save more) when public projects 
are financed, in fact, the return required by consumers will be lower than that 
suggested by the SOC.   
  
Some authors also argue that given market imperfections (i.e. market 
externalities), market prices do not reflect the true opportunity cost (i.e. shadow 
price) of resources invested today (see for example Drèze and Stern, 1990, Broome, 
1992, and Hepburn and Koundouri, 2007). In addition, Hepburn (2006) suggests at 
least three other  arguments for the inappropriateness of simply using the SOC 
discount rate: the super-responsibility of governments (based on the idea that market 
prices might reveal only preferences of the current generation, therefore governments 
– being  liable for both the current and the future generations – should not rely only 
on market information); the dual-role of politicians (politicians might be more 
concerned about future generations with respect of what current activities in current 
market would reveal); and the isolation argument (individuals may be more willing 
to save in a collective contract than in isolation). Finally, other scholars question the 
validity of the social opportunity cost discount rate given the difficulty in weighting 
                                                 
121 The use of the risk free rate of return has been supported by Samuelson (1965), and Arrow (1966) 
among others.  
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different sources of capital, which would lead the true opportunity cost of capital to 
vary across a variety of sectors (see e.g. Henderson and Bateman, 1995, 
Scarborough, 2011).  
 
The consumption rate of interest, which is also known in the literature as the 
social rate of time preference (SRTP), relates to the rate at which the society is 
willing to trade current consumption with future consumption. Generally the SRTP is 
represented by the following relation, noted in (Gollier, 2011) – i.e., Ramsey 
equation (Ramsey, 1928): 
 
gr   ,                                                                                                               (5.2) 
 
where   is the pure rate of time preference (or utility discount rate), g  is the 
annual growth rate of per capita consumption and   represents the elasticity of the 
marginal utility of consumption. The first term of the right hand side reflects the rate 
of impatience – i.e., the rate at which individuals prefer present consumption to 
future consumption (accounting for impatience and exogenous risks of natural 
calamities)122. The second term of the right hand side represents the ‘wealth-effect’ 
and reflects the decreasing marginal utility principle. In other words, the component 
g  reveals that since it is likely that future generations will be richer (assuming the 
economy growths at a certain rate g ), less weight need to be attached to them. 
Although it is important to acknowledge that both the utility discount rate and the 
elasticity of marginal utility of consumption are difficult to estimate (see 
Scarborough, 2011), the social rate of time preference seems to be more appropriate 
to directly take into account intergenerational equity problems. First, the pure rate of 
time preference offers a direct measure of how people trade off current versus future 
consumption. Second, as suggested by Garnaut (2008, cited by Scarborough, 2011, p. 
148) the marginal utility of consumption represents a measure of “society concern 
for equity in income distribution”.      
                                                 
122 In its original formulation Ramsey (1928) argued that the appropriate value of pure time preference 
should be equal to zero, based on the assumption that all individuals, including those living in future 
generations, should be treated equal. However, other economists proposed a positive rate of pure time 
preference given that assuming it is equal to zero would generate many sacrifices to the current 
generation for the sake of future ones (for a detailed discussion see Koopmans, 1960, Olson and 
Bailey, 1981, Cline, 1992, Arrow et al., 1996). 
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However, as stated by many authors (see for example Hepburn, 2006, Hepburn 
and Koundouri, 2007, Scarborough, 2011) this does not mean that the private interest 
rates are completely irrelevant. One of the major criticisms on using the SRTP as the 
social discount rate is in fact that (as a measure of the social opportunity cost of the 
forgone consumption) it completely ignores the idea that public investments displace 
private investments when the market interest rate rises (see Zhuang et al., 2007 for a 
discussion). However, if this is the case, the market interest rate will be the 
opportunity cost of those investments. Furthermore, as mentioned above, others point 
out that since the SRTP is lower than then the SOC, this raises the problem that many 
low-return investments would be undertaken at the expense of more profitable 
private ones. 
 
There have been many attempts in the literature to reconcile the SRTP and SOC 
approaches123. Among them, Lind (1982) developed a framework that during the 
1980s became the dominant discounting technique for CBA. His model is based on 
the concept of the shadow price of capital (SPC)124. This approach recognizes that 
while the costs of a public investment may crowd out private investments, its 
benefits can be reinvested into the private sector. In order to take into account the 
effect of public investments on private capital formation, Lind (1982, p.39) 
suggested to convert all costs and benefits that either displace or generate private 
investment into consumption equivalents by multiplying them by the shadow price of 
capital (i.e., “the present value of the future stream of consumption benefits 
associated with 1$ of private investment discounted at the social rate of time 
preference” – with  a positive pure rate of time preference).  
 
5.3.2 Lower discount rates for long-run projects  
 
Despite the Lind’s approach for fifteen years was able to create agreements on the 
dispute about the rate of discounting to be used for CBA, many authors (Lyon, 1990,  
                                                 
123 Haveman (1969), among others (see e.g. Harberger, 1972; and Burgess, 1988), suggested for 
example to employ a weighted average approach (WA) – i.e., using a mixture of both discount rates 
by weighting them according to the proportion in which each components (i.e. consumption and 
private investment) finance the investment. See Zhuang et al. (2007) for a detailed discussion on this 
approach.  




Nordhaus, 1994, and Jenkins et al., 1997) criticized this approach given the 
difficulties related to its implementation. Practical obstacles arise, in fact, from the 
need to incorporate into the calculation of the social discount rate information about 
several parameters (i.e. SOC, SRTP, rates of depreciation and reinvestment, marginal 
rate of taxation on capital income and the marginal propensity to save) to which the 
SPC is very sensitive. In addition, the growing concern for global warming and 
climate change (as well as other environmental problems e.g. the preservation of 
biodiversity) led many scientists, environmentalists, and politicians to question the 
validity of CBA for the evaluation of long-term projects and opened a new debate 
about the numerical value to attach to the discount rate. The CBA technique, in fact, 
tends to reduce the values of costs and benefits in the distant future, thus ‘playing 
against’ future generations. A simple example might help to clarify the problem at 
hand. Assuming a constant discount rate over time, if the discount rate is equal to 
3%, the present value of 100 pounds one year from now will be approximately 97.1 
pounds. However, the net present value of 100 pounds in 200 years will be 0.27 
pence, which becomes a negligible amount of money when considering a time span 
of 500 years. Therefore, specific effects (e.g. distributional effect) of a project can be 
ignored when considering long-run projects.  
 
In general, it is common practice for economists to separate efficiency from 
equity considerations when evaluating a particular policy125. As suggested by 
Hepburn (2006), in fact, the government can use the tax system to redistribute 
income across agents. However, for climate policy, distributional considerations are 
crucial as there is not an intergenerational tax system for wealth redistribution. Thus, 
“a policy action may be unattractive on distributional ground even if it passes the 
efficiency test” (Portney and Weyant, 1999, p. 6)126. As a matter of fact, in a few 
years the existing debate about the ‘correct’ foundation of the social discount rate 
was replaced by the controversy about intergenerational equity.  
                                                 
125 Efficiency evaluation is based on the Kaldor-Hicks criterion – i.e., an efficient project is one that 
when undertaken guarantees to the beneficiaries of the projects to gain more than the losers will lose 
due to the forgone consumption of the involved resources.  
126 Possible other limitations of CBA in the context of climate change are the lack of consideration of 
‘ethical’ aspects into projects’ evaluation (e.g. liberty and rights) and its inappropriateness to analyse 
large scale changes in climate policy. For a discussion see Hepburn (2006). 
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These issues were initially discussed during the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) in 1995 and once again collected in a report (IPCC, 1996). 
Arrow et al. (1996) devoted a chapter of the report to discounting and 
intergenerational equity and recognized the existence of two different schools of 
thought about discounting: one following a prescriptive approach, the other one 
based on a descriptive approach. The former advocates the use of a constant discount 
rate evaluated according to the Ramsey rule and lower than that observed in the 
financial market. In particular, given ‘ethical’ concerns it assumes that discounting 
should take into account the well-being of future generations. The latter predicts that 
the discount rate should be set to the rate of return on capital computed in a variety of 
alternative assets (i.e., marked-based rate).  
 
Given these considerations it seems not surprising that, by the end of the nineties, 
the apparent consensus on discounting was no longer held and different approaches 
proposed different discount rates for CBA. Under these circumstances, the RFF 
organized a new conference where the focus and motivation of the discussion were 
the implications of climate change on future generations. The main conclusions were 
collected and published by Portney and Weyant (1999) and were generalized to all 
intergenerational policy decisions127. Almost all participants suggested (with one 
exception)128 adopting a descriptive approach for short to mid-term projects (40 years 
or less). However, no consensus was reached about how to discount projects under 
longer time horizons. A possible solution supported by a minority of participants was 
in favour of the prescriptive approach, thus suggesting choosing a lower discount 
rate than that reflecting the opportunity cost of capital129. The rationale for this was 
to avoid the so-called ‘tyranny of the present’ (see Koundouri, 2009, for a 
discussion)130, which, according to cost-benefit analyses, would assign higher 
priority to programs yielding immediate benefits (or distant costs) if compared to 
those that may arise a century hence (or immediately).  
                                                 
127 For an overview of the contributions to the workshop see Tόth (2000). 
128 For a detailed discussion see Dasgupta et al. (1999) who envision a zero discount rate or even a 
negative one.  
129 See for example Cline (1999) and Nordhaus  (1999). 
130 The term was coined in the Copenhagen Consensus in 2004 (for a report on its conclusions see 
Lomborg, 2004).  
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Despite these considerations, the application of a constant reduced discount rate 
for long-term projects was also not immune from criticisms (see for example Lind, 
1997, Neumayer, 1999, Padilla, 2002). Philibert (1999) for example mentions several 
reasons why a lower discount rate cannot be suitable for future generations’ well-
being131. Among them, the major concern regards the idea that modifying the 
standard discount rate can equivalently be translated as asking for more sacrifices to 
the current generation, which should consume less and save more for future 
generations (presumably richer than the present one).  
 
Padilla (2002, p. 70) states that “there is not a unique relationship between 
discounting and environmental degradation”. Following Pearce and Turner’s (1990) 
point of view, the author points out that the risk related to a low environmental 
discount rate is that if this is spread out on global investments, it could be translated 
into an increase of capital investments. Therefore, in the long run this will reduce the 
level of natural resources and will increase environmental degradation, albeit future 
generations would inherit higher capital endowments. Further concerns are also 
related to the arbitrary choice of a low discount rate that can remove efficiency and 
adjust the rate of discounting to what has been previously decided without any 
scientific rigour (Padilla, 2002). In addition, an arbitrary extension of time 
preferences of current generations beyond their life span lead to inequity 
considerations, especially if the choice of the discount rate is based on future 
generations’ prosperity. Indeed, this is translated to assigning a very low weight to 
future generations (i.e., optimistic paradox). Finally, the author questions the 
assumption that altruistic preferences guarantee that the interests of future 
descendants are appropriately considered, given that “the unborn have neither 
political power nor representatives” (ibid, p. 70).  
 
By contrast, Sáez and Requena (2007, p. 716) believe that “a rational planning of 
the future cannot be based on the application of discount rates that govern all 
                                                 
131 The author provides arguments against the general reasons in support of a low discount rate. In 
particular, he confutes the hypothesis that the social rate of time preference dominates the marginal 
rate of return on private investments given that they are interdependent. The ‘isolation paradox’ (for a 
detailed discussion see Philibert, 1998) supports the conclusion that even if individuals cannot express 
their real preferences regarding future generations (because they are isolated by markets), this does 
not necessarily mean that we should consider choosing a low rate of discounting. Finally, arguments 
favouring a non-zero pure rate of time preference are provided.  
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activities, project and resources”. However, ad hoc adjustments – e.g., for forestry 
projects – may be a “rational variant within an irrational procedure” (ibid). 
  
5.4 EARLY RESOLUTIONS TO THE DISCOUNTING DILEMMA 
 
5.4.1 Abandoning discounting 
 
Early resolutions to the discounting dilemma involved four different views about 
discounting and long-term intergenerational trade-offs. The first view suggests 
abandoning discounting, thus providing different approaches to evaluate the future. 
Schelling (1995), for example, proposes a ‘utility function approach’ where policy 
makers critically evaluate a menu of climate change mitigation projects by 
calculating the utility increase in different region at different time. This approach has 
the appeal of posing importance on weights of consumption flows (and not on 
discounting) in different periods of time. Kopp and Portney (1999) introduce voting 
mechanisms. In this context, a random sample of the population is presented with 
different policy effects across time and space. Respondents would then vote for or 
against the policy being implemented. Their answers can then be used to estimate 
respondents’ willingness to pay for the policy. This approach has the merit of valuing 
the future by asking citizens directly to state their actual discount rate, rather than 
trying to infer it by evaluating their attitudes and behaviours. Indeed, there have been 
many attempts in the literature to infer how people trade-off current vs. future well-
being and/or consumption. In several surveys and laboratory experiments, 
individuals, in fact, have been asked to state their opinion regarding a change 
applying in the future (for a survey see Frederick et al., 2002). However, given that 
the majority of them consider a short time horizon, it is not possible to make any 
conclusions at intergenerational scale. However, it has to be noted that the most 
critical aspect of voting-mechanisms is that they rely on stated preferences and they 
are therefore subject to possible biases related to this methodology (e.g. hypothetical 






5.4.2 Intergenerational CBA 
 
Other approaches advocate the inclusion of intergenerational equity considerations 
into the analysis (i.e., intergenerational CBA). This methodology, pioneered by Kula 
(1988) who first introduced the idea132, suggests the application of intergenerational 
distributional weights in CBA as a measure of an individual level of distributional 
preferences. Recent contributions to this area of research have been provided by 
Padilla (2001) and Padilla and Pascual (2002) who introduced the concept of 
‘Multigenerational Net Present Value’ (MNPV), based on the inclusion of 
individuals’ level of ‘altruism’ into social intergenerational weighting133.  Looking at 
















 ,                 (5.3)                                                 
                     
where   represents the distributional weight that needs to be attached to different 
generations. From a theoretical point of view this approach has been considered very 
attractive. However, controversies arise from the assignments of the ‘correct’ 
weights (based on subjective judgement) that represent the preferences upon 
intergenerational altruism of society towards future generations. In this context, 
recent contributions have been provided by Scarborough (2011) who, as an example, 
illustrates feasible (but not definitive) equity-adjusted discount rates based on 
community distributional preferences elicited in Scarborough and Bennet (2008). 
The estimated intergenerational weights that emerge from the study are 1.4 and 1.6 
over the same generation (depending on age differences), and 2.2 over two 
generations134.  
 
                                                 
132 The modified discount method introduced by Kula (1988) first considers discounting each 
generation’s consumption flows at the social rate of time preference and then obtains the net present 
value of the project by adding them. However, this approach assigns each generation the same weight, 
which implies ignoring differences in preferences for the components of current society (for a 
discussion see Padilla, 2002).  
133 With a similar rationale Sumaila and Walters (2005) introduce the concept of ‘Intergenerational 
Discount Factor’.  
134 A generation is defined over 25 years. 
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Intergenerational CBA is certainly an interesting line of research for long-term 
projects’ evaluation. A possible advantage of adjusting for intergenerational equity 
weights is that it can help solve the dispute on the ‘correct’ social discount rate 
needed for cost benefit analysis (i.e., SRTP vs. SOC). If this approach is adopted, in 
fact, it seems reasonable to employ the social opportunity cost of capital method to 
estimate the SDR (for a discussion see Randall, 2006, and Scarborough, 2011). As 
suggested by Scarborough (2011, p. 155), this can “circumvent possible double 
counting of time preferences and intertemporal marginal utility associated with 
incorporating intergenerational equity adjustments to a consumption-based social 
discount rate”. However, in this area further research is needed to analyse 
individuals’ preferences towards intergenerational distributional weights and their 
interaction with the social discount rate. 
   
5.4.3 The K-F approach 
 
A third view suggests to employ the traditional social discount rate, but to increase 
the value of the environmental assets over time. This is known in the literature as the 
Krutilla and Fisher (see Krutilla and Fisher, 1975, and Fisher and Krutilla, 1985) 
approach (i.e., K-F approach). The rationale behind this methodology is that as 
natural resources are likely to decrease over time, individuals’ willingness to pay 
both for the benefits and costs – of goods’ protection and extinction, respectively – 
increases, thus leading the value of environmental goods to be incredibly expensive 











































,              (5.4) 
                    
where equation (5.4) differs from equation (5.1) in that it includes the value of the 
environmental good, which increases at different points in time.  
 
The K-F approach advises the use of a ‘net discount rate’ lower than that 
reflecting the opportunity cost of capital to discount environmental costs and 
                                                 
135 For similar arguments see for example Tol (1994), Arrow et al. (1996), Hasselmann (1999), 
Philibert (1999), and Horowitz (2002). 
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benefits. This net rate is constant over time and captures the expected variation of the 
values of the environmental good (i.e. the individuals’ willingness to pay for benefits 
and costs at time t), as a result of its decreasing supply136. For this reason the K-F 
approach has been sometimes misinterpreted as if it would apply ‘dual-discount 
rates’ (as argued Padilla, 2001, Sáez and Requena, 2007,  and Almansa and 
Martínez-Paz, 2011)137, which will be discussed further below. Although the K-F 
approach has been criticized on a number of grounds (for a detailed discussion, see 
Groom et al., 2005), according to Horowitz (2002) the real problem here is 
determining individuals’ future willingness to pay for environmental goods. 
 
5.4.4 Declining Discount Rate (DDR)  
 
The most convincing approach emerging from earlier literature is the adoption of a 
declining discount rate (DDR) over time. So far, irrespective of the level of the 
discount rate, a common denominator for all eligible candidates as discount rates was 
that, across the time horizon, all adjacent time periods had to be weighted at a 
constant rate, i.e. all investments need to be discounted exponentially. However, over 
the last couple of decades, economists recognized the importance of declining 
discount rate for intergenerational equity and efficiency (see Hepburn, 2006). In 
general declining discount rates seem to reflect preferences for intertemporal choices, 
pessimistic views about the future, concerns on future uncertainty and 
intergenerational equity. Each of these aspects is briefly discussed below. 
 
5.4.4.1 Intertemporal choices 
 
There is large evidence in the behavioural economic literature of humans’ use of 
declining discount rates for intertemporal choices. Researchers usually ask 
individuals to choose between a set of different delayed outcomes (e.g. money, 
durable goods, and number of lives saved by particular projects) in order to construct 
the implicit functional form for their responses. In general, results show that subjects 
discount at higher rates present rewards and tend to trade-off future outcomes at a 
                                                 
136 In particular, the willingness to pay increases at a pre-determined rate to which the conventional 
social discount rate (i.e. the market-based interest rate) is reduced. 
137 See for example Groom et al. (2005). 
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lower discount rate. Although there have been different functional proposals for 
declining discount rates138, much of the evidence and theoretical studies provided in 
the literature supports a hyperbolic functional form139. This might explain why 
declining discount rates are commonly referred in the literature as hyperbolic 
discounting140, thus creating some confusion about the adoption of the two terms141. 
 
5.4.4.2 Pessimism about the future  
 
As suggested by many authors, pessimism about the future can lead to the 
employment of a declining discount rate (see for example Dasgupta, 2001, Groom et 
al. 2005, and Hepburn, 2006). As stated above, in a deterministic world without 
distortions the SRTP is equal to the private and social rate of return on capital. 
However, as shown in equation (5.2), the social discount rate is a function of 
consumption growth. Therefore, other things being equal (i.e. assuming the utility 
discount rate and the elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption as constants), if 
the consumption growth rate declines over time, it follows from (5.2) that the SDR 
also declines through time. 
 
In general, in an optimal growth model with productive capital, declines in 
consumption rates seem to be impossible. However, Weitzman (1994) provides a 
theoretical explanation for declining discount rates. The author points out that the 
                                                 
138 Weitzman (2001), for example, introduces the concept of ‘gamma discounting’ as a result of a 
survey based on economists’ opinion into the current debate about global warming. The author 
concludes that society should employ a discount rate declining over time (following a gamma 
distribution) from an average rate of 4 per cent in the immediate future (i.e. 1-5 years) to zero per cent 
for the far distant future (i.e. more than 300 years). Alternatively, Springmann (2010) suggests a 
sinusoidal discount function that expresses the discount rate as a harmonic function (i.e. cosine 
function). This approach is characterized by a standard discount schedule in the short run (i.e. 30-40 
years), and a peak in the long run (where the peak is interpreted as a period of no returns or 
investments). The novel approach is used then as a comparison with the current European 
Commission schedule and the stepwise declining discount rates adopted by the UK government to 
analyse the impact of a forest conservation project and a nuclear power project. The author concludes 
that in both cases the adoption of a sinusoidal discount rate better captures concerns for sustainability, 
intergenerational equity and risk and uncertainty related to far distant future problems.    
139 See for example Thaler (1981), Cropper at al. (1994), Kirby (1997), Henderson and Bateman 
(1995), and Harris and Laibson (2001). For a review see also Ainslie (1992), Frederick et al. (2002) 
and Loewenstein et al. (2003). 
140 The discount factor, DF, for hyperbolic discounting can be generally expressed as   atDF  11 , 
where a represents the applied discount rate and t is the size of delay (typically in years).     
141 On these grounds, Rasmusen (2008) offers clarifications over the meaning of ‘hyperbolic 
discounting’ and declining discount rates.   
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existence of consumption goods externalities tend to create a tension between private 
and public investments if individuals valuate environmental resources positively. 
This tension generates a wedge between the private and social rate of return, thus 
suggesting choosing a SDR lower than that of the private sector. However, if the 
proportion of income spent on environmental goods is increasing over time142, the 
efficient rate of discounting should be declining over time (see Groome et al, 2005). 
In a similar way, Azar and Sterner (1996), analysing the relationship between 
discounting and global warming, suggest abandoning exponential discounting to use 




According to Weitzman (1998) near and far distant future should be treated 
differently given the uncertainty involved in economic evaluation several decades 
into the future.  Weitzman (1999, p. 29) writes “While there is uncertainty about 
almost everything in the deep future, perhaps the most fundamental uncertainty of all 
concerns the discount rate itself. As seen from today, the deep-future interest rate is a 
true random variable for all of the reasons that make the far-distant productivity of 
capital uncertain”. Given the variety of possible discount rates that can be used to 
evaluate the far distant future and the lack of certainty about the values to be attached 
to the discount rates (i.e. rate of return on capital), the author develops the notion of 
‘certain-equivalent discount rates’ as a possible solution to this dilemma. Rather than 
averaging the discount rates, according to Weitzman (1998, 1999), what should be 
averaged is the probabilistic discount factor. The certain-equivalent discount rate is 
then derived from the weighted average of all feasible discount factors.143 In the 
long-run, this leads to the adoption of the lowest available rate having any positive 
probability of occurrence. The key assumptions behind the Weitzman-model are that 
the discount rates are uncertain and interrelated from one period to another. If these 
assumptions hold, intergenerational efficiency requires declining discount rates.  
 
                                                 
142 This conclusion comes from the idea that environmental damages must be maintained at some 
initial standard. This can only be guaranteed by a marginal increase of environmental expenditures, 
diverted from each unit increase of output. 
143 This is because according to Weitzman (1998, 1999) the discount rate should not be considered as 
a time-independent constant.  
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Gollier (2002a, 2002b) provides a more solid justification for a declining discount 
rate (under uncertainty) by analysing a specific optimal growth model and 
characterizing certain types of utility functions, which allow specifying the term 
structure of the socially efficient discount rates. Gollier (2002a, 2002b) concludes 
that declining discount rates can be justified by the prudence effect (see Kimball, 
1990), which leads to a negative precautionary effect – i.e., given uncertainty about 
future consumption, individuals tend to save more for the future, thus reducing the 
discount rate144. Therefore, declining discounting occurs either if the wealth effect 
decreases more than proportionally, or if the precautionary effect increases more than 
proportionally over time.      
 
In a series of papers, Gollier (2004, 2009a, 2009b) criticises the Weitzman-
approach, leading to what is known in the literature as the Weitzmann-Gollier 
puzzle145. The author questions the validity of the assumptions of the Weitzman-
approach, and starting from the same initial conditions reaches different conclusions 
– i.e., the term structure of the social efficient discount rate can either increase over 
time to its largest value, or can be flat. This is mainly due to the fact that the 
Weitzman’s results strongly rely on the assumption that shocks on the rate of return 
on capital are permanent. However, in a recent contribution, the puzzle is resolved. 
Considering an optimal consumption path model, Gollier and Weitzman (2010) 
show, in fact, that the efficient discount rate obtained by solving the maximization 
problem at hand resembles closely that suggested by Weitzman. The only difference 
lies on the replacement of the unadjusted probabilities with the ‘Weitzman-adjusted’ 
ones (developed in the model)146. Under these conditions, declining discounting still 
                                                 
144 Formally, the social discount rate in equation (5.2) needs to be modified to account for the 
prudence effect – i.e.,  gPgr var21   , where P measures the prudence effect, and var(g) is 
the variance of consumption growth.   
145 For a discussion see also Buchholz and Schumacher (2008), and Freeman (2009).  
146 In the model, Gollier and Weitzman (2010) state that critical aspects of their analysis are the timing 
sequence of information availability, and that of making decisions. Solving a maximization problem, 
the authors show that the obtained optimal discount rate is similar to one previously defined in the 
literature (i.e., Weitzman, 1998, and Gollier 2004, 2009a, 2009b) up to a risk adjustment of 
probabilities (over the realization of an uncertain future discount rate). On the one hand, Weitzman 
converts cash flows into consumption and adjusts the NPVs with units of marginal utility at time 0. 
On the other hand, Gollier makes these adjustments at time t. However, under the first-order condition 
developed in the model, the authors show that the two approaches coincide. Therefore, they conclude 




holds when future discount rates are uncertain and shocks on capital productivity 
(and risk on consumption growth) are permanent.  
 
5.4.4.4 Intergenerational equity 
 
The importance of declining discounting has also been strengthened for 
intergenerational equity considerations. Chichilnisky (1996, 1997) first introduces 
two axioms for sustainable development and shows that declining discounting is 
consistent with the ‘non-dictatorship’ of one generation over another147. These 
axioms require that the ranking of alternative consumption paths is sensitive both to 
what happens in the present and immediate future, and in the very long run. 
Sensitivity to the present means that there is no date before which events are 
assigned zero weights. Sensitivity to the future means that there is no date after 
which changes (in consumption) do not matter for the ranking148. In a recent work 
Chichilnisky (2009) shows that these axioms are equivalent to awareness of 
extinction problems in the long-run future. In particular, the author proves that 
maximizing a DU model with a long-run survival constraint is equivalent to 
maximizing utilities where the present and the future are equally treated. The equal 
treatment axioms can guarantee therefore sustainable development.   
 
Li and Löfgren (2000) provide also similar conclusions. They analyse a model 
where society consists of two individuals: one is conservationist and the other one is 
utilitarian. Individuals have the same utility function but employ different discount 
rates – i.e. the utilitarian has a rate of time preference positive and constant over 
time, while the conservationist has a rate of time preference equal to zero. The 
objective of the policy maker is to maximize a weighted sum of the well-being of 
both individuals. The authors conclude that within this framework the conservationist 
dominates the far distant future and suggest the adoption of a discount rate declining 




                                                 
147 Heal (2003) shows that the Chichilnisky criterion has no resolution under exponential discounting. 
148 For a discussion see also Groom et al. (2005), and Rambaud and Torrecillas (2006). 
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5.4.4.5 Limitations to the DDR approach 
 
As with other approaches declining discounting has been criticized on several 
grounds. As suggested by Groom et al. (2005) and Hepburn (2006), some authors 
provide different interpretations for laboratory evidence. Read (2001) argues for 
example that the so-called evidence for hyperbolic discounting is in fact evidence for 
sub-additive discounting – i.e., given that discounting depends on the size of the time 
delay, discounting is greater when the delay is divided in subintervals. In other 
words, the discount rate of an outcome to be received in a century tends to be smaller 
than the total discount rate obtained by adding the separate discount rates of a 
century divided into decades or years. This has important implications for theories of 
intertemporal choice. Supporters of hyperbolic discounting, in fact, attribute 
individuals’ declining impatience to delay, thus confounding delay “(the period 
between the present and when an outcome occurs) with the interval between two 
outcomes” (ibid, p.6). However, sub-additive discounting relates it to the inter-
outcome intervals149.  
 
In the same vein, Rubinstein (2003) questions the interpretation of laboratory 
experiments on hyperbolic discounting and explains that his own reading of the 
experimental results is consistent with similarity relations (as described in 
Rubinstein, 1988) – i.e., when making their decisions, individuals ignore small 
differences but relates on big ones150. To give an example, when comparing the 
alternative (£250, now) with the alternative (£300, 1 month), the money dimension is 
the decisive one (given that the difference in time is relatively small in this example). 
In the context of intergenerational choice people rely on two different dimensions: 
one is the outcome (e.g. money, number of life saved by a program, and reduction of 
CO2 emissions), and the other one is the time horizons considered for the outcome to 
be realized.  In general, if individuals find similarities only in one dimension, their 
choice would be dependent on the dimension for which there are no similarities. This 
                                                 
149 In his paper, Read (2001) performs three different experiments. Results support the hypothesis of 
sub-additive discounting. However, none of them provide evidence for declining impatience.  
150 Based on this assumption and using some experimental results, Rubenstein (2003) shows that the 




reasoning seems to be consistent with some of the results in support of hyperbolic 
discounting.     
 
Another critical aspect regards time inconsistency – i.e., the idea that, assuming a 
chain of reasoning, plans made at one point in time can be contradicted by later 
behaviour151. As suggested by Hepburn (2003) time inconsistency seems to be a 
matter of concern. The author formally proves that a government that acts naively 
employing hyperbolic discounting can push renewable resources towards extinction. 
However, from a social choice perspective many authors argue that the assumption 
of time consistency is unnatural as time moves on and individuals and governments 
are legitimated to re-evaluate and revise plans rather than being committed to one 
policy rule (see for example Henderson and Bateman, 1995, and Heal, 1998). In this 
vein, Philibert (2006) argues, for example, that behaviour that would be time 
inconsistent in a deterministic world can be legitimated in an uncertain world.  
 
Groom et al. (2005) analysing the implication of the use of declining discount 
rates also suggest that this can potentially place more weight on the richer individuals 
in the future than on the poorer in the present. Finally, some other authors are 
sceptics about the employment of declining discounting given its causal relationship 
with procrastination, drug addiction, undersaving, and organizational failure (see 
Pearce at al., 2003, and Hepburn, 2003). Therefore, governments should be cautious 
in adopting a schedule of discount rates that justifies these kinds of phenomena (and 
perhaps collapses in renewable resource stocks).       
 
Despite these criticisms, to date there is no easy resolution to these problems. 
From a practical point of view, declining discounting and its consequences seem to 
be no more troubling than other problems – i.e., policy inconsistencies and changes 
due to external shocks or political shifts (see Groom et al., 2005). As concluded by 
Pearce et al. (2003, p. 139) “there is – also – a ‘political’ argument in favour of the 
acceptance of time-varying discount rates: in one swoop they help to resolve the long 
standing tension between those who believe the distant future matters and those who 
want to continue discounting the future in the traditional way”. Returning to the 
                                                 
151 The identification of this problem is commonly credited to Strotz (1956). 
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quotation with which this chapter begins, DDR seems to provide a valid compromise 
into the assignment of responsibility among generations. In this line, Philibert (2006) 
states that ‘slow effective discounting’ guarantees avoiding the current generation to 
bear an unlimited responsibility with respect to future generations, as supporters of 
strong sustainability would predict. Although declining discounting relates to the 
concept of weak sustainability152, the practice of reducing discounting over time 
would ensure that damages to the environment would not be negligible even when 
occurring only in a far distant future. This “makes the weak sustainability paradigm 
stronger – its exact strength depending on how much the environment assets are 
valued today” (ibid, p.10). Therefore, since the published paper by Henderson and 
Bateman (1995), who specifically recommend using hyperbolic discount rates for 
intergenerational cost-benefit analysis153, there has been a large consensus in the 
literature for the adoption of time-varying discount rates.  
The fact that declining discount rates seem to respond both to the requirement of 
intergenerational equity and efficiency for project’s evaluation can be considered the 
most convincing aspects leading the UK government to incorporate declining 
discount rates (varying over time from a maximum of 3.5% over a period of 30 
years, to a minimum of 1% for long-term projects over 300 years) into the recent HM 





                                                 
152 Weak sustainability also known in the literature as ‘neoclassical sustainability’ refers to the idea 
that environmental capital is perfectly substitutable with other types of capital. Vice versa, strong 
sustainability predicts that natural capital should be kept intact given that most of the decisions 
affecting the environment are irreversible. Weak sustainability has been a key issue for criticisms 
towards CBA analysis and discounting. As stated by Neumayer (1999), in fact, when considering 
problems with intergenerational consequences such as the environment, the issue is not discounting, 
but substitutability. For a detailed discussion on the difference between weak and strong sustainability 
and its implications for environmental project appraisal, see for example Sáez and Requena (2007).      
153 The authors conclude “For intergenerational cost-benefit analysis we suggest adding hyperbolic 
discount rate results to the normal framework of a classical exponential discount rate sensitivity 
analysis, such that…cross-project comparability would not be impaired” (Henderson and Bateman, 
1995, p. 420). 
154 The UK government advices using a discount rate of: 3.5% for the first 30 years; 3% from 31 to 75 
years; 2.5% from 76 to 125 years; 2% from 126 to 200 years; 1.5% from 201 to 300 years; and 1% 
over 300 years. 
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5.5 RECENT RESOLUTIONS TO THE DISCOUNTING 
DILEMMA 
 
5.5.1 The Stern Review and its critics 
 
Despite decades of debates, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, economists 
agreed on the adoption of a SRTP (regardless of its declining nature) for 
intergenerational policy appraisal. However, the recent Stern Review (Stern, 2007), 
released in late 2006, addressed a new stimulus to this debate. The Stern Review 
expresses alarm for the impending risks associated to global warming within the next 
two decades and calls for urgent and vigorous actions by governments. This has 
generated numerous reactions among practioners especially because of the policy 
implications of the report, which strayed so far from the majority of economic 
analyses that used the same basic data and analytical framework. Criticisms are 
particularly focused on the fearsome conclusion that failing to invest 1% of GDP per 
annum to reduce CO2 emissions (of 30-50 per cent by 2050), might generate a 
reduction of future global GDP of more than 20% (adjusting also for equity 
weighting). This result is mainly due to the employment of a very low social discount 
rate (SDR) used for the evaluation of costs of abatement and prices of greenhouse 
gases (GHGs).  
 
As in the HM Treasury Green Book (2003), the discount rate in the Stern Review 
is derived from the Ramsey formula (see equation 5.2 above). The parameters used 
in the Green Book were: 1.5% for the pure rate of time preference (where 1% is 
assigned to a catastrophic risk element, and 0.5% represents individuals’ preferences 
over present vs. future consumption); 1% for the elasticity of the marginal utility of 
consumption (i.e. how much economic growth affects the discount rate); and 2% for 
the rate of consumption growth. Adding all these terms in equation (5.2) leads to a 
social discount rate of 3.5%, which is assumed to decline over time towards 1% for 
long-run projects (i.e. 300 years hence). Stern (2007), accepting the philosophical 
argument that all generations need to be treated equally, assumes: a pure rate of time 
preference equal to 0.1% (which is justified by a small probability of catastrophic 
destruction of humanity and a zero pure rate of time preference); an elasticity of the 
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marginal utility of consumption being equal to 1%; and a rate of consumption growth 
set to 1.3%. All these terms lead to a social discount rate of 1.4%. 
 
According to Nordhaus (2007) and Dasgupta (2007), in the Stern Review the 
estimated costs of failing intervening can considerably be reduced using higher 
discount rates. The former questions the adoption of a near-zero rate of pure time 
preference, while the latter suggests the employment of a higher elasticity of 
marginal utility of consumption. In a brief comment to the Stern Review, Arrow 
(2007) supports Stern’s cost-benefit analysis. However, the author questions the low 
level of the discount rate. Arrow (ibid) argues that even with higher discount rates 
(commonly favoured by economists) the Stern Review’s estimations pass the cost-
benefit analysis – i.e., the conclusion that mitigation benefits exceeds their costs still 
holds with higher discount rates. Weitzman (2007), on the other hand, in line with his 
previous works (see e.g. Weitzman, 2001), in his critique of the Stern Review 
advises the adoption of a declining discount rate approaching the Stern level as time 
goes on.  
 
The Stern Review has also been criticised for the treatment of risk and 
uncertainty connected to climate change and the evaluation of costs and benefits of 
climate mitigation. Most of the authors who provided comments on the report 
suggest Stern’s conclusions are inappropriate and express doubts about the validity 
of its recommendations given that costs of climate mitigation seem to be much 
smaller than the estimated benefits155. Despite the scepticism over the report’s 
implications, many authors supports the Review (see for example Quiggin, 2008), 
and in his review of criticism to the report, Ackerman (2007, p. 24) states: “The 
Stern Review is far from being the last word on every aspect of the economics of 
climate change – but it is much less wrong than the analyses that preceded it. It has 
decisively laid to rest the notion that standard economic methods somehow counsel 




                                                 
155 For a comprehensive review of the Stern Review and its critics, see Ackerman (2007). 
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5.5.2 Dual-rate discounting  
 
While disputes about the implications of the Stern Review continue, a relatively 
recent strand of literature on the cost-benefit analysis of climate change is focused on 
dual-rate discounting. In line with the Stern Review, the motivation for dual 
discounting is to justify an immediate reduction of global emissions. Specifically, the 
novel approach advises the employment of different discount rates for environmental 
and consumption goods, with the former rate being lower than that used to discount 
streams of consumption over time. 













































,              (5.5) 
 
where r and er represent respectively the social rate of time preference and the 
environmental discount rate, while the numerators of the two terms on the right hand 
side represents respectively the net tangible benefits (i.e. the net shadow price of 
tangible effects) of consumption streams, and the net intangible benefits (i.e. the net 
shadow price of intangible effects) of environmental goods156.  
 
Yang (2003) first introduces the notion of dual-rate discounting in a utility model 
where consumption goods and environmental amenities are discounted at different 
rates157. The author provides in this way an alternative justification for the mitigation 
costs of the Kyoto Protocol, which are generally unaccepted from an economic point 
of view. The main reason for this reluctance lies on the idea that costs of emission 
                                                 
156 Note that this is what distinguishes the dual-rate discounting approach from the K-F approach (see 
Krutilla and Fisher, 1975). In the latter, in fact, the rate of discounting is equal to the SRTP either for 
discounting streams of consumption or for environmental assets, and what changes is the value of 
environmental goods that are supposed to increase over time. In the former, the value of 
environmental goods stays the same over time, and what changes is the level of discount rate that is 
assumed to be lower than that used for discounting consumption streams.   
157 Yang (2003) proposes a similar approach to that shown in equation (5.5). However, rather than 
evaluating environmental goods or costs in current cash terms, the model considers an increasing 
value of the annual environmental costs and benefits. As suggested by Sáez and Requena (2007, p. 
718), this not only would be difficult to implement, but also it results in double accounting “since the 
rationale for a lower environmental discount rate already includes the hypothesis of a declining 
consumption of marginal utility for environmental goods”.    
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reductions are to be paid immediately and mitigation damages only occurs in the far-
distant future. That is to say, discounting represents the problem. Using a RICE 
(multi-region dynamic general equilibrium model of economic growth and climate 
change) model à la Nordhaus and Yang (1996) and Nordhaus and Boyer (2000), 
Yang (2003) proves that dual discount rates can justify the Kyoto commitments158. 
 
Later works in this area have critically analyzed the validity of dual-rate 
discounting. Tol (2004) questions the Yang-approach on the grounds that dual 
discount rates are not derived endogenously in the model and provides an alternative 
approach. In his model, the difference between the rates of discounting is determined 
endogenously by the marginal willingness to pay for environmental quality (which 
increases with income). Tol (ibid) recommends the use of this approach when the 
marginal willingness to pay is known, and suggests the adoption of the Yang (2003) 
model when this information is not available. In a recent contribution, Weikard and 
Zhu (2005) suggest dual-rate discounting can only be justified when future prices of 
environmental goods are not available, or when consumption goods and 
environmental goods are not substitutable. The authors show that in the first case 
dual-rate discounting is equivalent to the case of uniform discounting when 
accounting for correct prices, while in the second scenario their conclusions hold 
only if the relative prices of the two goods are not defined. In the same line, Kögel 
(2009) formally proves that substitutability and discounting are two issues closely 
related to each other. The author concludes that the difference between 
environmental and consumption goods discount rates is larger, the lower the 
intratemporal rate of substitutability between environment and consumption goods 
within a period.  
 
Dual-rate discounting seems to reconcile efficiency and sustainability issues into 
what is generally known as the Extended or Environmental Cost-Benefit Analysis 
(ECBA)159. Analyzing the effects of dual discounting for different afforestation 
schemes in the UK, Kula and Evans (2011) conclude, for example, that dual-rate 
                                                 
158 The Stern Review certainly represents another attempt to provide a solution to this dilemma. 
However, as discussed above, the adoption of a very low discount rate based on ethical considerations 
has been disproved on several grounds. 
159 This term is commonly associated in the literature with that part of cost-benefit analysis that tries 
to adapt the analytical framework to the demand for sustainability. 
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discounting provides more information about environmental impacts of different 
projects, thus helping policy makers to select more efficient and sustainable 
investments. 
 
However, what value should the environmental discount rate take on? Published 
works in this area of research usually suggest an environmental discount rate (also 
called ‘ecological discount rate’) on average 2% lower than that used for financial 
evaluation.160 Although there is not a unique answer to this question, and probably – 
as suggested by Almansa and Martínez-Paz (2011) – it will never be possible to find 
one, economists recognize the importance of dual discounting and express 
enthusiasm over the novel approach especially for intergenerational problems. 
Nevertheless, further research is needed to strength these conclusions and to 
understand which are the most suitable areas of application of differential 
discounting.  
 
Table 5.1 summarizes selected alternative approaches (and their relative 
criticisms) to the choice of the social discount rate for long-run projects’ evaluation 
in environmental contexts.  
 
5.6 MODELLING INTERTEMPORAL PROBLEMS: ILA VERSUS 
OLG MODELS 
 
As with the choice of the functional form and the value of the discount rate, 
problems arise also over the choice of models that deal with intergenerational 
problems. In general, the literature is divided between two different schools of 
thought. The first one supports models related to the Ramsey formula and assumes 
an infinite-lived agent (ILA models) acting through his/her saving/investment 
decisions as a trustee on behalf of both the current and future generations. The 
second one proposes an approach with finite-lived agents who maximize their own 
utility simultaneously in different segments of their life cycle, i.e. overlapping 
generations (OLG) models.   
 
                                                 
160 See Almansa and Martínez-Paz (2011) for a review of specific environmental discount rate values 





Alternative approaches to the choice of SDR (selected studies) in environmental contexts 
Proposed resolution Author/s Major Criticisms 
Early resolutions 
Constant reduced discount rate 




A lower discount rate for long-
run projects:  
 
- asks for more sacrifices to 
current generations 
 
- might generate an increase on 
global investments, thus 




- does not necessarily guarantee 
equity among generations given 
that future generations have 
neither political power nor 
representatives 
 
Determining the value attached 
to the SRTP could be difficult 
and might result in arbitrary 
choices 
Intergenerational CBA (i.e. 
intergenerational distributional 
weights in CBA + constant 
SRTP to compute the NPV) 
Kula (1988) 
Padilla (2001) 
Padilla and Pascual (2002) 
Practical problems arise from 
the calculation of weights to be 
assigned to different 
generations 
K-F approach (i.e. increasing 
value of environmental assets + 
constant SRTP to compute the 
NPV) 
Krutilla and Fisher (1975) 
Fisher and Kreutilla (1985) 
Hasselman (1999) 
 
The assumption of an 
increasing willingness to pay 
(WTP) for environmental 
goods over time pose a 
practical problem of 
determining the WTP for future 
environmental assets 
Declining Discount Rate 
(DDR) 
Weitzman (1994, 1998, 1999, 
2001, 2007) 
Gollier (2002a, 2002b, 2004, 
2009a, 2009b) 
Gollier and Weitzman (2010) 
Chichilinsky (1996, 1997, 2009) 





The assumption of a chain of 
reasoning behind declining 
discount rates might generate 
problems of time inconsistency 
– i.e. plans made at one point in 
time can be contradicted by 
future behaviour 
 
DDRs explain problems such 
as procrastination, undersaving, 
and drug addiction, thus 
government should be cautious 
in adopting this schedule of 







Table 5.1 Continued 
Proposed resolution Author/s Major Criticisms 
Recent resolutions 
Very low SRTP (= 1.4%) for 
climate change policy 
appraisal 
Stern (2007) The low rate of discount 
generates high estimated costs 
of failing intervening to 
immediately reduce GHGs 
emissions. However, these 
costs could be lower by using 




Dual-Rate Discounting (i.e. 
for NPV’s calculation this 
approach assumes a SRTP for 
consumption goods and an 
Environmental Discount Rate 
–EDR – for environmental 
goods that are evaluated at 
current time)   
Yang (2003) 
Tol (2004) 
Weikard and Zhu (2005) 
Kögel (2009) 
Kula and Evans (2011) 
Almansa and Martínez-Paz 
(2011) 
 
Determining the value 
attached to the SRTP could be 
difficult and might result in 
arbitrary choices 
 
These models have two different views on intergenerational equity. In ILA 
models there is a representative ‘immortal’ agent that optimizes the sum of 
discounted utilities of present and future generations and intergenerational equity is 
guaranteed by his/her altruistic preferences towards descendants – i.e., the so called 
‘bequest motive’. By contrast, in OLG models altruistic considerations are generally 
absent. The literature has mainly used the ILA approach for evaluating climate 
change policies that aim at reducing CO2 emissions (see for example, Peck and 
Teisberg, 1992, Nordhaus, 1994, Manne et al., 1995, Nordhaus and Yang, 1996, and 
Manne, 1999). Is this because ILA models provide more pleasing results than OLG 
models? Not surprisingly, also in this case opinions differ widely.  
 
In many respect, the ILA approach seems to be adequate to analyse the allocation 
of assets and resources across generations. Equity between generations is achieved 
by adding up each generation’s utility level, where utilities depend only on 
consumption and they are properly discounted providing a measure of social 
performance (see Solow, 1986). However, there are also good reasons to consider the 




On the one hand, in OLG models altruism and ethical considerations are not a 
matter of concern161 as agents save during their working time and spend all their 
savings when they retire. This framework according to many authors (see e.g. Marini 
and Scaramozzino, 1995, Schelling, 1995, and Azar and Sterner, 1996) seems to be 
more realistic since it assumes a finite time span of human’s life and provides a 
closer representation of the demographic structure of societies especially in times 
with demographic shocks such as the 21st century. On the other hand, some authors 
point out that the ILA approach is unrealistic because it considers an exogenous 
discount rate, while a ‘correct’ weight of future generations well-being would call for 
an endogenous rate of discounting depending on several variables and phenomena 
(see e.g. Howarth and Norgaard, 1992, and Gerlagh and van der Zwaan, 1999) – i.e., 
demographic composition and distribution of resources and assets across generations. 
These aspects seem to play a major role when considering intergenerational problems 
such as climate change and protection of global environment (sees e.g. Gerlagh and 
van der Zwaan, 2000).     
 
Given that the importance of altruism on intergenerational environmental issues 
has been suggested by many authors (see for example Löfgren, 1991; and Hultkrantz, 
1992), there have been some attempts in the literature to construct OLG models 
where saving decisions are driven by individuals’ altruistic preferences (as in Barro, 
1974, and Weil, 1987), rather than concerns for their own retirement. The rationale 
behind this framework is to overcome the criticism that in OLG models savings 
decisions disregards future generations’ well-being. Jouvet et al. (2000), for example, 
analyse an OLG model of pollution where individuals are altruistically related to 
their offspring162. The authors show that the trade-off between intergenerational 
altruism and consumption of private goods drives preferences towards a cleaner 
environment. The more a society cares about their offspring’s welfare, the less it 
consumes and pollutes. However, from a social optimum perspective, despite 
altruistic preferences, the model suggests public interventions as social optimum 
differs from its private value. This is mainly due to two externalities prevailing in the 
                                                 
161 Rather than relying on altruistic preferences, Howarth and Norgaard (1995) e.g. advice using 
public interventions. This is because individuals do not internalize all externalities, thus leading to 
suboptimal outcomes. 
162 Other studies using this framework for natural resources are those provided by e.g. John et al. 
(1995) and Marini and Scaramozzino (1995).   
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model: one, which is well known in public economics, derives from the fact that 
individuals under-contribute to pollution abatement; the other one regards the 
overaccumulation of pollution capital as private individuals do not take into account 
the effect of production on pollution. Jouvet et al. (ibid) show that the social 
optimum can be decentralized by means of a subsidy on voluntary contribution to 
pollution abatements (to avoid free riding), and by using a tax on capital 
accumulation so that the economy accumulates the optimal capital stock (to achieve 
the so called modified golden rule).   
 
Although these models seem to be attractive from a theoretical point of view, 
some authors (see e.g. Gerlagh and van der Zwaan, 2000) point out that they are 
similar to an ILA approach in its treatment of discounting as the social discount rate 
is commonly set equal to the private degree of intergenerational altruism, which is 
exogenously determined in the models. In addition, recent empirical evidence 
suggests that the altruistic bequest motive is rather weak (see e.g. Kopczuk and 
Lupton, 2007).  
 
Comparing ILA and OLG models many authors conclude that the two approaches 
do not significantly differ in terms of policy implications for climate change and 
greenhouse gas abatement (see for example Stephan et al., 1997; and Manne, 1999). 
Therefore, they recommend them as complementary models to the economic analysis 
of climate change. However, others (see for example Howarth, 1996, 1998) find 
substantial differences between results obtained with OLG and ILA models. 
Following the assumptions in Nordhaus’s (1994) Dynamic Integrated Model of 
Climate and the Economy (DICE)163, Howarth (1998), for example, analyses a two-
period OLG model of climate change and finds that in contrast to models based on 
transfers of wealth from present to future generations, a utilitarian OLG framework 
suggests quite aggressive greenhouse gas emissions abatement justified in terms of 
economic efficiency. Furthermore, Howard (ibid) explicitly proves that ILA models 
can be considered as a reduced form of OLG models where important features of the 
demographic distribution are qualitatively omitted. Later, Gerlagh and van der 
Zwaan (2000) reach even stronger conclusions and question the adoption of ILA 
                                                 
163 In his model, Nordhaus (1994) adopts a utility function that is logarithmic in consumption and 
discounts future welfare at a constant 3% discount rate.  
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models for climate change policy measures. They attribute the differences between 
their results and those obtained by Stephan et al. (1997) and Manne (1999) explicitly 
to a predicted longer life expectancy and to a more realistic adoption of a three-time 
period OLG model.  
 
The debate between proponents of the two approaches continues. In a very recent 
contribution, Schneider et al. (2012), for example, showing to what extent ILA 
models can be compared to OLG approaches, point out further shortcomings of using 
ILA models, that is:  
 
- ILA models implicitly assume that social planners adopt a higher rate of pure 
time preference than that used in an equivalent OLG model;  
 
- ILA models do not capture intragenerational problems.  This is because using 
an utilitarian OLG model the authors find out that an equal treatment of 
present and future generations is reached at the expense of an equivalent 
unequal treatment of generations alive at a given point in time;  
 
- Finally, in contrast with ILA models, a utilitarian OLG economy can deal 
with problems occurring if the intergenerational social discount rate does not 
coincide with that of individual households, which would suggest 
implementing different age-discriminating tax schemes to guarantee 
redistribution among generations at each point in time.  
 
Therefore, although for many years infinitely-lived agent models offered a very 
convenient framework for long-term analysis, in contrast with Tóth’s (2000) 
conclusions164 and according with recent contributions to the literature, results from 
the two approaches might be significantly different from each other when they come 
to environmental problems occurring decades ahead from now. However, at this 
point, it seems that an overall assessment of which model fits better to the problems 
of climate change and its consequences across generations cannot be made. 
                                                 
164 Describing models for intergenerational problems, Tóth (2000, p. 132) argues “At this point, it 
seems that ILA as an abstraction offers a very convenient framework for long-term analysis without 




5.7 SHOULD WE DISCOUNT ALL GOODS THE SAME?  
 
5.7.1 Tradable versus non-tradable goods  
 
While there are still many difficult questions to be resolved in choosing the rate of 
discounting, its functional form and related models to deal with long-term project 
evaluation, there is a strand of literature that questions the practice of discounting in 
the public sector and, when admitting there exists some justifications for time-
discounting, questions the idea of discounting all goods at the same rate.  
 
Henderson and Bateman (1995, p. 414) describing the SRTP-SOC dilemma 
argues: “Even when one has chosen either the opportunity cost of capital or the 
consumption rate of interest (or, in more sophisticated models, some combination of 
the two…) as the appropriate reference point from which to derive a discounting 
numeraire, the calculation of a single ‘correct’ discount rate for all possible projects 
is not uniquely possible. This is not a recent conclusion…but one that has become 
increasingly accepted”. In particular, according to Schimd (1989) and Luckert and 
Adamowicz (1993), Henderson and Bateman (1995, p. 414) conclude that “society 
may reasonably be expected to have different discounting preferences for differing 
commodities”.  
 
It is common practice in economics to convert all goods to common monetary 
equivalents. The rationale behind this conventional practice lies on the assumption 
that all goods and services are potentially tradable with money. However, according 
to Goodin (1982) there are particular types of commodities that fall into the category 
of ‘non-tradable’ goods (such as the environment and heath) for which the above 
considerations might no longer hold. Specifically, non-tradable goods do not admit 
ex ante monetary compensations unless non-tradables can be sacrificed with 
equivalent goods – i.e., a tree life for tree lives – according to the restricted 
opportunity cost argument. However, there are some limitations to this approach (see 
Goodin, ibid). First, when the stock of non-tradables is deteriorating over time (rather 
than increasing), the opportunity cost argument can lead to negative discount rates 
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accounting for higher weights to future enjoyment of the goods. Secondly, the 
opportunity cost argument cannot tell us if consumption of non-tradables is preferred 
now rather than later. Finally, the most interesting aspect behind the restricted 
opportunity cost discounting is that it gives rise to the question of whether decision 
makers should treat all goods similarly or should instead use different discount rates 
and functional forms for different commodities. 
 
On these grounds, during the last decade laboratory experiments have examined 
temporal discounting for outcomes other than monetary-related ones (e.g., monetary 
versus heath/environmental domains). Before proceeding with the description of 
some empirical evidence in this area of research, the next section provides a brief 
overview of available methods to measure discount rates.  
 
5.7.2 Modelling the discount rate 
 
The literature offers a wide variety of procedures to estimate individuals’ time 
preference. Broadly, these methods can be divided into the following categories: 
field studies, where discount rates are inferred from actual behaviour of individuals’ 
daily life; and experimental studies, where individuals take part of surveys in which 
they face real or hypothetical intertemporal trade-offs (see Frederick et al., 2002). In 
this chapter and for the purpose of this analysis only experimental studies will be 
analysed.  
 
The most commonly used elicitation procedures are choice tasks and matching 
tasks. In the first approach, respondents typically face the choice of getting (or 
losing) a particular outcome immediately or later in the future. Rather than using a 
single choice scenario, however, individuals are presented with a series of 
alternatives (e.g. titration procedure). This helps to provide a more accurate 
estimation of the discount rate and avoid restricting respondents’ choice to a lower or 
upper bound of discounting rates. In matching tasks respondents ‘fill in the blank’ to 
compare intertemporal alternatives – i.e. £100 now equals ___ 100 years from now. 
Some other studies, although a minority, use a rating task approach (where 
respondents evaluate the attractiveness or averseness of outcomes occurring at 
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different times), or pricing tasks (where individuals express their willingness to pay 
to obtain – or avoid – specific outcomes over time). Alternatively, relative recent 
experimental methods are: sequence tasks, where respondents are asked to state their 
preferences over programs with ‘sequence’ of outcomes occurring over time; and 
equity tasks, where people choose between receiving (losing) an outcome evenly 
distributed over a certain period of time, and receiving the same outcome only in one 
period.  
 
From all these methods an implicit discount rate is derived using the NPV 
calculation. To give an example, in choice tasks for monetary domains, if a person 
shows indifference between receiving £100 now or £150 1 year from now, the 
resulting discount rate would be 50%, because this value satisfies the equation
   150*11100 r . 
 
Like all elicitation procedures it is quite difficult to assess which method is 
preferable to the others, given that all of them show possible drawbacks. According 
to Frederick et al. (2002), e.g. choice tasks can be linked to anchoring effects165, 
while elicitation methods based on matching tasks may not reveal true time 
preferences, but could be based instead on other simple reasoning processes.  
 
In general, evidence obtained from experimental analyses shows that individuals 
tend to value more (i.e. discount more) immediate gains (both in terms of life and 
monetary gains), than that occurring in the distant future. However, the short time 
range (i.e. few years or even months) applied in these studies might bias results, 
which generally offer very high discount rates166. Furthermore, results differ among 
the various procedures adopted in the experiments, which prevents us to make 
general conclusions about individuals’ time preference especially for long-run 
project evaluation. In this vein, Frederick (2003), for example, using a large variety 
of the above-described elicitation procedures cast doubt on previous claims that the 
                                                 
165 Anchoring effects rely on the idea that individuals might be influenced too heavily by the first 
piece of information (i.e., the anchor) offered in the choice task.   
166 In Frederick et al.’s (2002) review of 34 studies attempting to infer empirically discount rate 
values, only the study provided by Johanneson and Johansson (1997) encompass an intergenerational 
timeframe extending their analysis from 6 years to 57 years with a resulting discount rate ranging 
from 0% to 3%.   
 158 
 
public values future lives much less than present lives (as suggested e.g. by Cropper 
et al. 1994, and Johanneson and Johansson, 1997, among others).  
 
5.7.3 Experimental evidence for different discount rates  
 
Irrespective of these considerations, the most widely cited studies among those who 
analyse differences in discounting across domains are those provided by Chapman 
and Elstein (1995), and Chapman (1996a, 1996b), where financial vs. health 
scenarios are compared. Using different elicitation methods (i.e. matching and choice 
tasks), these studies show a very low correlation in discount rates between domains 
and, by contrast, higher correlation within domains. It turns out that policy makers 
should use different discount rate for different domains.  
 
Recent theoretical research (e.g. dual-rate discounting) is also suggesting 
adopting different discount rates in different contexts – i.e., financial vs. social vs. 
environmental scenarios (see also Krantz and Kunreuther, 2007). However, only a 
few studies examine and compare discounting between environmental outcomes and 
financial and/or health goods. Discounting seems also to be generally less 
pronounced for environmental scenarios. In their literature review about 
environmental risk perception, Gattig and Hendrickx (2007) for example state that 
almost 30-50 per cent of respondents do not discount environmental outcomes. 
However, the studies they consider do not compare different scenarios and domains. 
 
To the best knowledge of the author there are only three studies that analyse the 
differences between environmental and other domains. Guyse et al. (2002) compare 
environmental outcomes (i.e. water and air quality) with preferences for sequences of 
health and monetary outcomes in short (5-years) and long (50 years) time horizons. 
They found that participants prefer constant or increasing sequences for water and air 
quality improvement (as well as health outcomes), and decreasing sequences for 
monetary gains, suggesting higher discounting for monetary payoffs. However, 
likewise Böhm and Pfister’s research (2005), Guyse et al. (2002) do not control for 
other confounding factors, such as the valence of the outcomes that can generate 
possible gain/loss asymmetries observed in the monetary domain. In addition Bhom 
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and Pfister’s study presents scenarios referred to losses imposed to others, which 
may bias respondents’ perception of tasks and therefore their conclusions.  
 
These problems have recently been overcome by Hardisty and Weber (2009) who 
investigate possible domain differences in time preferences using different gain/loss 
scenarios for environmental, health and monetary domains. In three different studies, 
the authors compare individuals’ choices between hypothetical financial, 
environmental and health gains and losses, occurring immediately or with a delay of 
10 years. In contrast with previous research on discount rates in monetary and 
nonmonetary domains (e.g. health) (see for example Chapman, 2003), the authors 
conclude that there is no significant difference between discount rates in different 
domains. In addition, correlation within valence (across domain) seems to be 
stronger than that within domain (across valence). Thus, discount rates are more 
contexts related than domain dependent, i.e. in order to predict how much someone 
discounts health gains it is more useful to know how much they discount monetary 
and environmental gains than knowing how much they discount health losses. It 
turns out that, discount rates assessed in laboratory for one domain can be also 
applicable to other contexts. This is an unexpected result, which however represents 
good news for researchers and politicians who generally attempt to set a unique 
official discount rate for judging long-term projects and investments (see Hardisty 
and Weber, 2009). 
 
However, although these studies represent a first step towards a possible 
explanation for discount rates differences (if any) in environmental domains, none of 
them directly control for attitudes to risk. In particular there may be a difference in 
sensitiveness to risk in different domains (e.g., a person may be more risk averse in a 
health context than a money one). According to Loewenstein et al. (2001) in fact 
people are driven by two different mechanisms when judging risk situations: one is a 
cognitive evaluation mechanism (i.e., ‘consequentialist’), where individuals base 
their decisions according to rational severity and likelihood of outcomes; the other 
one is an emotional evaluation mechanism where subjects are driven by (negative) 
emotions such as fear, anxiety and worry167. Thus, individuals’ risk judgements, 
                                                 
167 A similar approach is provided also by Slovic et al. (2004, 2007). 
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risky decisions and behaviours might be influenced by emotion-based reactions in 
situations where affective responses to risk are more prominent.  
 
A further distinction is provided by Böhm and Pfister (2000, 2005), who separate 
the nature of emotions generated by consequentialist and ethical concerns. The 
former evaluations (i.e., loss-related concerned) comprise the seriousness and 
probability of potential consequences caused by possible losses. The latter (i.e. 
ethical concerns) regards the causal attribution of the risk (e.g. natural or human 
agents) and becomes stronger when actions or events violate ethical principles or 
norms. Thus, loss-related concerns generate feelings of fear and sadness, whilst 
ethical concerns give rise to feelings of anger or guilt. Böhm and Pfister (2005) 
highlight that consequence-based emotions lead individuals to prevent, avoid, and 
alleviate consequences. By contrast, ethical emotions generate feelings of 
punishment and retaliation. Therefore, it is more likely that temporal discounting 
occurs when risk is influenced by consequence-based emotions. On the other hand, 
where ethical considerations (such as social justice, equitableness of outcomes, and 
responsibilities towards future generations) prevail, temporal discounting is less 




This chapter critically evaluates the relevance of discounting for intergenerational 
problems such as climate change and environmental protection. From the discussion 
outlined above, it is evident that the choice of the discount rate plays a crucial role 
for ex ante/ex post project evaluation. The literature has provided a myriad of 
methods and arguments to support/discredit possible candidates as social discount 
rates in CBA. The difference among various approaches depends mainly on different 
views on: whether or not public investments affect private ones (i.e. SOC vs. SRTP), 
whether or not intergenerational equity considerations are taken into account (which 
predicts the adoption of e.g. a lower rate of discounting for long-run projects or 
discounting in the form of a hyperbolic function), and whether or not different goods 
should be evaluated in different manners (i.e. dual-rate discounting approach). Other 
methods suggest abandoning discounting or employing a ‘modified CBA’ to take 
 161 
 
into account intertemporal distributional problems (i.e. Intergenerational CBA or K-F 
approach). 
 
The choice of the social discount rate seems also to play a role for modelling 
intertemporal problems. The current debate over the adoption of ILA versus OLG 
models for ‘correct’ estimates of emission abatement costs and benefits, in fact, 
poses additional emphasis to the problem – i.e. with the former strengthening the 
employment of an exogenous discount rate, while the latter suggesting a more 
‘correct’ endogenous rate of discounting. Recent contributions to the literature 
underline the weaknesses of the two approaches and provide evidence for 
significantly different policy implications.  
 
In line with recent theoretical models, behavioural economics also seems to 
suggest that individuals’ time preferences for intertemporal problems change 
according to the nature of the goods. However, although these results are well 
established in the health/monetary experimental literature, the scarce contributions 
analysing the differences among monetary, and/or health/environmental domains 
provide controversial evidence. This may be due to deficiencies in taking into 
account the different factors that affect discounting preferences for different 
commodities, thus raising the following questions: how do people form beliefs over 
environmental outcomes? And how are these beliefs influenced by ethical 
considerations (i.e., intergenerational equity concerns and environmental morale)? 
To date these remain unexplored questions in the literature. Understanding actual 
individuals’ perceptions of intertemporal choices in light of their ethical attitudes 
might be of fundamental importance for policy implications and more importantly 
for sustainable development and welfare considerations. On the one hand, ethical 
concerns playing a role would suggest governmental interventions to sensitize 
individuals towards more eco-conscious behaviours. On the other hand, results might 
provide further evidence for dual-rate discounting in environmental contexts. These 













The survey outlined in the previous chapter suggests that understanding the factors 
that affect discounting is of crucial importance in determining decisions involving 
trade-offs between outcomes in this generation and in future generations. The 
behavioural literature has been mainly focused on which discount rate and functional 
form should be used for discounting. There are few contributions attempting to 
analyse actual individuals’ perception of intertemporal choices among different 
domains, and the available studies provide controversial results. As discussed in the 
previous chapter, in fact, some analyses support the adoption of different discount 
rates for different commodities (see e.g. Böhm and Pfister, 2005, and Gattig and 
Hendrickx, 2007) – i.e., discounting is domain specific. Alternatively, some others 
suggest to use a single discount rate for all goods (see e.g. Hardisty and Weber, 
2009) as differences are context (or valence) and not domain dependent.  
 
However, despite the emphasis ethical considerations have received in the 
theoretical literature of discounting, none of these studies directly analyses the 
impact of environmental morale on environmental time preferences. The present 
analysis seeks therefore to further explore whether temporal discounting is valence 
and/or domain specific and to assess whether environmental morale influences 
differences in discount rates and intergenerational preferences. A survey 
investigation was employed to analyse these particular issues. 
 
The chapter is organized as follows. The next section describes the rationale and 
aims of the survey analysis. It is followed by a detailed description of the 
questionnaire in section 6.3. Section 6.4 reports the results obtained by exploring the 
relationship between environmental morale and discounting, whereas a brief 
description of the results derived analysing the linkage between environmental 
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morale and intergenerational preferences is presented in section 6.5. Section 6.6 
provides concluding remarks.  
 
6.2 RATIONALE AND AIMS OF THE STUDY  
 
In general, regardless of valence, similar goods should be discounted the same168. 
However, an increasing number of studies in the literature (see e.g. Thaler, 1981, 
Loewenstein, 1987, and Hardisty and Weber, 2009) find discounting to differ among 
gains and losses. This leads to one of the major anomalies in intertemporal 
preferences – i.e., the gain-loss asymmetry (or sign effect), whereby losses are 
generally discounted at a lower rate than gains. Along the same lines, when domain 
matters (see e.g. Goodin, 1982), significant differences should be found in the way 
people discount e.g. monetary, environmental and health outcomes. Given that these 
arguments are not mutually excludible, in the current study the first hypothesis to be 
tested is: 
 
Hyphothesis 1:  Discounting is valence and/or domain dependent.  
 
 As stated in previous chapters, the psychological literature suggests that 
environmentally-friendly behaviours are driven by environmental morale as the 
intrinsic motivation to contribute to a better environment. However, to the best of the 
author’s knowledge, there are no empirical analyses in the literature that attempt to 
explain the connection between high/low environmental morale and discounting 
environmental outcomes. More specifically, holding environmental morale constant 
(i.e., high vs. low), do people exhibit different time preferences towards the 
environment? Does environmental morale affect discounting? This leads to the 
following hypotheses to be tested: 
 
Hyphothesis 2: Individual time preferences over the environment differ with 
different levels of environmental morale. 
 
                                                 
168 Put in another way, the amount of money an individual is willing to accept to delay an undesirable 
outcome should be equivalent to that he/she would pay to postpone an undesirable outcome of the 
same nature.  
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Hypothesis 3: Environmental morale (i.e., ethical considerations) influences 
differences in discount rates. 
 
However, what determines the extent to which environmental morale might 
influence discounting? According to the literature, there are two different neural 
systems that influence the way people form expectations on future outcomes (see 
Loewenstein and O’ Donoghue, 2007): a deliberative system that assesses options in 
a cognitive fashion (e.g. based on an evaluation of likely consequences), and an 
affective (or emotional) system that influences behaviour through emotional states 
(e.g. hunger, anger, and fear). The former, cares about both the short and long-term 
payoffs. The latter is driven mostly by short-term payoffs. How can environmental 
morale interact with these systems? Figure 6.1 provides a schematic representation of 
possible predictions169. As shown in Figure 6.1, environmental morale can influence 
individuals’ responsiveness to environmental stimuli in two different ways.  
 
First, in line with Frederick (2003), ethical considerations can activate the 
deliberative system via e.g. social justice and responsibility ascriptions towards 
future generations, which will induce people with high environmental morale to 
discount environmental costs and benefits at a lower rate (if any) relative to people 
with low environmental morale. In this case, discounting is not normatively justified 
and environmental outcomes should receive equal weight regardless of their 
occurrence and valence. Alternatively, it might be argued that environmentally-
friendly individuals might exhibit negative discount rates (i.e., they can inflate future 
benefits and costs), meaning that they will prefer to experience gains later than now, 
and losses now rather than later. The deliberative system assumes therefore a far-
sighted perspective.  
 
Secondly, ethical considerations can exacerbate the desire and/or visceral 
enjoyment of having a better environment, which ultimately translates into affect-
                                                 
169 The model is adapted from Loewenstein and O’Donoghue (2007) who provide a formal 
representation of a dual-system preference model by describing its implications for intertemporal 
choices. This model is also referred in the literature as the delta-beta preference model (see e.g. 
Hardisty and Weber, 2009, and Tsukayama and Duckworth, 2010).   
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based preferences for immediate outcomes (i.e., present bias or impatience)170, or in 
Loewenstein’s and O’ Donoghue (2007, p. 1) words “the heat of the moment”. It 
turns out that the affective system can lead to more myopic behaviours. According to 
previous analyses (see e.g. Tsukayama and Duckworth, 2010), therefore it might be 
expected that, when facing decisions involving immediate versus future payoffs,  
compared to those with low environmental morale, individuals with high 
environmental morale will have steeper discount rates for environmental gains (i.e., 
they will be impatient). In the same fashion, rather than showing equal discount rates 













The considerations above lead to the conclusion that human’s behaviour is 
determined by the interplay171 of these conflicting responses to a situation. Given the 
lack of empirical analysis in this area of research, it is difficult to make predictions 
about which of the two systems will dominate. In general, it might be expected that, 
if ethical concerns matter, those with high environmental morale will exhibit a lower 
discount rate compared to those with low environmental morale. As suggested by 
Hendrickx and Nicolaij (2004) who analyse the reasons for discounting, or not, 
                                                 
170 Present bias or impatience is referred in the literature as an ‘irrational’ disutility of waiting. For 
gains this translates into the desire of enjoying them immediately (i.e., higher discount rate), whereas 
for losses this translates into the desire of getting them out of the way immediately (i.e., lower 
discount rate). According to the Loewenstein’s (1987) model of savouring and dread, people obtain, 
in fact, a positive utility from anticipating gains and a negative utility from anticipating losses and for 
this reason they tend to postpone them.  
171 Emotional inputs can help the deliberative system to assess the value of future consequences. In the 
same vein, the deliberative system can mitigate emotional inputs. For a discussion see Loewestein et 











environmental outcomes, ethical considerations, in fact, seem to play a major role 
when comparing environmental risks to other (more personal) types of risks. 
Therefore, it can be expected that environmentally-friendly people will be more 
concerned about responsibility ascriptions towards future generations, especially 
when the consequences of the event can be attributed to anthropogenic rather than 
natural causation (see Böhm and Pfister, 2005). However, according to previous 
studies in different areas of research (Tsukayama and Duckworth, 2010), it might 
also be the case that environmentally-friendly people will be more impatient for (or 
tempted by)172 environmental outcomes compared to e.g. monetary and health 
outcomes.   
 
The present study differs from those of Hardisty and Weber (2009) and Böhm 
and Pfister (2005) since the former do not control for ethical considerations and the 
latter manipulate time perspective in a between-subjects design, so that it is not 
possible to infer any conclusion about individuals’ discount rates. Furthermore, this 
analysis accounts for differences in discounting when considering different 
generations, an issue that has been neglected in this area of research. 
 




In order to investigate possible differences in time preferences in different domains, 
the present study compares discounting for hypothetical monetary gains and losses 
with discounting of hypothetical environmental and health gains and losses. The 
empirical analysis is based on data from a survey investigation conducted in Bath 
(United Kingdom) which was carried out in November – December 2012. 
Respondents were chosen among the student population. The questionnaires were 
collected from first, second, and third year Economics lectures in the University of 
                                                 
172 Tsukayama and Duckworth (2010, p. 72) define temptation as “the visceral attraction to and 
enjoyment of a reward, regardless of the associated harm”. 
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Bath173. As with the survey described in chapter 3, before proceeding with the 
collection of the questionnaires, two pilot analyses174 were carried out. After 
introducing the necessary changes a final version of the questionnaire was built 
according to respondents’ suggestions and field-experts’ opinions. The survey was 
administered by the author according to the following procedure. After a brief 
introduction to the study, participants received a printed version of the questionnaire. 
The following preamble was read out: 
 
‘The purpose of this questionnaire is to gather information on individuals’ time 
preferences. The questionnaire is divided into three different sections. In ‘SECTION 
1’ and ‘SECTION 2’ you are requested to answer questions about hypothetical 
scenarios regarding time preferences in different contexts. In ‘SECTION 3’ you are 
asked to provide general information about yourself and to state your opinion on 
particular issues. 
 
In the questionnaire you will find questions with the following format: 
 
For each pair of values, please select the answer that best reflects your personal 
preferences. 
 
A. ☐ 50 apples or ☐ 45 apples 
B. ☐ 50 apples or ☐ 50 apples 
C. ☐ 50 apples or ☐ 55 apples 
D. ☐ 50 apples or ☐ 60 apples 
E. ☐ 50 apples or ☐ 65 apples 






                                                 
173 Note that, likewise the survey described and analysed in chapters 3 and 4, also in this case not all 
the students taking the Economics lectures were enrolled in the Economics degree programme (e.g., 
for first year students roughly two-thirds were formally registered in the Economics Department at the 
University of Bath). However, in line with Cipriani et al. (2009) the objective here is to investigate 
whether behaviour is consistent with the hypothesis that different levels of indoctrination into 
economics may have an impact on discounting. These issues will be further discussed below.   
174 The first pilot analysis involved a sample of 46 respondents interviewed among the student/adult 
population of the University of Bath. The second one included approximately 20 students recruited 
among the student population of the University of Bath.   
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For these questions you are supposed to tick only ONE box for each pair of values, 
i.e.,: 
 
A.  50 apples Or ☐ 45 apples 
B.  50 apples Or ☐ 50 apples 
C. ☐ 50 apples Or  55 apples 
D. ☐ 50 apples Or  60 apples 
E. ☐ 50 apples or  65 apples 
F. ☐ 50 apples or  70 apples 
 
 
To answer all the other questions, please tick ONE of the boxes next to the 
answer(s); or, when appropriate, write your answer in the space provided. 
 
I would be very grateful for your contribution to this study. All responses will remain 
anonymous. Thank you for your help.’ 
 
Participants were then asked to complete the questionnaire on their own and 
without consulting their colleagues. The time taken to hand out the questionnaires; to 
complete and collect them again was approximately 20 minutes. In all, 450 
questionnaires were collected. Data from 8 participants were excluded. Among them, 
3 did not complete the study, 2 switched to the titration items back and forth more 
than once, and following the Hardisty-Weber response criteria, the other three 
questionnaires were dropped if respondents preferred more losses or fewer gains – 
i.e., preferring £10000 immediately to £18000 ten years from now yet also finding it 
equally attractive to receive £15000 ten years from now to £10000 immediately. The 
sample was 39% female and 61% male. About 60% of respondents were first year 
economic students, 18% were second year students and the remaining 22% were 
third year students. 
 
6.3.2 Description of the questionnaire 
 
For comparisons with previous analyses, ‘SECTION 1’ of the questionnaire was 
inspired by a recent paper of Hardisty and Weber (2009) who carried out a survey 
investigation to analyse whether or not discounting is domain dependent. All 
participants responded to six scenarios: two monetary scenarios, two environmental 
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scenarios, and two health scenarios. Each domain (i.e., monetary, environmental and 
health) included one gain and one loss scenarios.  
 
As in previous analyses (see for example Hardisty and Weber, 2009, and 
Frederick, 2003), choices were made comparing an immediate option versus another 
one with a 10 years-time delay. In the monetary scenarios (one gain, one loss), 
respondents were asked to imagine to win/have taken a lottery/loan of £10000. They 
had either the option of receiving/paying the amount of money immediately or with 
10 years-time delay. Using a titration procedure, they then answered 10 binary 
choice questions, where they had to express their preferences over receiving/paying 
£10,000 immediately or ‘X’ pounds at a 10-year delay. For this and all other titration 
procedures the scale used for the binary alternatives ranged from 1.8 to 0.9 of the 
present value (e.g. £18,000 to £9,000)175, and was presented in an ascending order 
(i.e., from the smallest to the largest alternative).  
 
Discount rates were obtained using single indifference points where respondents 
switched from preferring the future option to preferring the present one. In case the 
titration procedure failed to account for a switching point, single indifference points 
where derived from a free-response question (that followed the titration procedure), 
where they were asked to fill in the number that would have made two different 
options (e.g. receiving £10,000 immediately vs. receiving £_____ 10 years from 
now) equally attractive to them.   
 
In the environmental scenarios (one gain, one loss) participants were asked to 
imagine their country’s government was planning to implement a programme to 
reduce (increase) urban deforestation176. The government was considering whether to 
implement the programme immediately with a gain (loss) of 100 trees or in 10 years-
time with a different gain (loss) of ‘X’ trees. Following these questions, in addition 
to titration and free-response items, respondents received a question where they were 
asked to state their preferences over the choice of getting (paying) £10,000 or saving 
                                                 
175 This scale is slightly different from that used in Hardisty and Weber (2009) that ranges roughly 
from 1.6 to 0.9. However, in order to prevent confusion among respondents, integer numbers 
changing by steps of £1,000 (100 for environmental and health scenarios) were preferred to a scale 
changing by steps of £100 (or 10).     
176 The increase of urban deforestation here is caused by an improvement of public transport.  
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(losing) 100 trees immediately. As suggested by Hardisty and Weber (2009), this 
helped to gather additional information on how individuals valued trees relative to 
money.  
 
Respondents were finally presented with hypothetical health scenarios (one gain, 
one loss). Here participants were asked to imagine their country’s government was 
planning to implement a programme to prevent (favour) life mortality177. The 
government was considering whether to implement the programme immediately with 
a gain (loss) of 100 lives or in 10 years-time with a different gain (loss) of ‘X’ lives. 
Also in this case titration and free-response items were provided. Subsequently 
respondents chose between receiving (paying) £10,000 immediately and saving 
(losing) 100 lives with 10 years-time delay.  
 
For all scenarios presented in ‘SECTION 1’ of the questionnaire, the timescale 
considered was longer than that usually taken into account in similar analyses (which 
ranges from few weeks to a year). This allows considering a more realistic timescale 
where environmental outcomes might affect individuals’ utility function. As 
suggested by Hardisty and Weber (2009), environmental benefits and costs are in 
fact not realized for many years and this might influence individuals’ time 
preferences. Furthermore, in terms of the time span, this enables a viable comparison 
with the second part of the questionnaire (i.e., ‘SECTION 2’), where respondents 
were required to allocate (i.e., match task) the same amount of money, trees and lives 
across their generation, their children’s generation, their grandchildren’ generation 
and their great grandchildren’s generation. Differently from previous analyses 
attempting to measure intergenerational time preferences (see e.g. Cropper et al. 
1994, Johanneson and Johansson, 1997, and Frederick, 2003), this study did not 
force respondents to choose between equitable/inequitable programs, but allowed 
them to design the program that better reflected their own preferences. As shown by 
Frederick (2003), different elicitation methods can yield different results. Therefore 
this part of the questionnaire was considered as a robust test for results obtained in 
the previous part of the questionnaire. Even in the presence of other relevant factors 
(such as uncertainty), and irrespective of the framing of the question at hand, in both 
                                                 
177 Life mortality here increases due to an expansion of manufacturing industries. 
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sections of the questionnaire respondents were expected to exert similar time 
preferences regarding their own generation178.  
 
In order to make sure that respondents completed the questionnaire, it was 
decided to split ‘SECTION 2’ in a way that gains and losses were randomly assigned 
to participants using two different questionnaires (i.e., Questionnaire A, and 
Questionnaire B) in a between subject design. By contrast, ‘SECTION 3’ of each 
questionnaire was common to all individuals. Here general information about 
respondents (i.e., gender, and year of degree programme), as well as their level of 
environmental morale, were collected. To this end, the same set of questions used in 
the survey described in chapter 3, were employed. The questionnaires are reproduced 
in Appendix 6A. Results are discussed separately for each section of the 
questionnaire in the following two paragraphs.    
 




The titration methodology and free-response measures used in ‘SECTION 1’ of the 
questionnaire served to compute a single indifference point for each scenario 
considered into the analysis. For comparisons with previous analyses (see Hardisty 
and Weber, 2009), mean discount parameters were obtained rearranging the 











 ,                                                                                                    (6.1) 
 
where PV represents the present value of future outcomes (FV), r  is the discount rate 
and D the delay (in unit of time/years). Given its simplicity this model is generally 
supported in the literature and it has been commonly used in similar analyses (see 
e.g. Hardisty and Weber, 2009).  
 
                                                 
178 The time horizon for a generation is generally considered 25 years (see e.g. Frederick, 2003). 
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In order to compare mean discount rates across experimental conditions (e.g. 
valence, domain, and environmental morale) paired-samples t-tests (for within-
subjects design) and independent-samples t-tests (for between-subjects design) were 
employed. These tests are based on the idea that if the experimental condition had no 
effect (i.e., 0H  is true), the average discount rate would not change from condition to 
condition – i.e., 0210  H , where 21,   represent the mean discount rates in 
conditions 1 and 2179. Moreover, depending on the context, within-subjects 
(repeated-measures), and mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA) were also used to 
test the source of variability in these sets of measurements.  
 
Likewise t-tests, analysis of variance deals with differences between and among 
sample means. However, no restrictions are imposed on the number of group means 
compared and more than one independent variable can be considered into the 
analysis. Overall, this reduces the chance of a Type I error180, thus resulting in one of 
the main advantages of using ANOVA designs. In general, the analysis of variance is 
built on an underlying model, where the dependent variable scores represent the data, 
the experimental conditions build up the model and the source of variability not 
accounted in the model is captured by a random error term. The main objective of the 
analysis of variance is to explore whether the mean dependent variable scores 
obtained by the manipulation of the experimental conditions differ significantly. This 
is achieved by establishing how much variation in the dependent variable scores is 
associated to differences in the scores of the experimental conditions and comparing 
this variation with the random error term, which provides a measure of the deviation 
of the dependent variable scores from the mean of each experimental condition181. 
 
Given the differences in assumptions and hypotheses testing used in repeated 
measure and mixed ANOVA designs, each model will be discussed in details in 
Appendix 6B. However, it is relevant to note here that one of the main assumptions 
of ANOVA and t-tests is that the dependent variable scores are normally distributed. 
In this study, a detailed analysis of the data revealed that the distributions of discount 
                                                 
179 For a detailed discussion of these methodologies see Blalock (1979), and Howell (2013). 
180 Type I errors occur when rejecting a true null hypothesis.  




rates were positively skewed (absolute values ≥ 1.91) and leptokurtic (absolute 
values ≥ 2.11). Unfortunately, data transformations using the square or cube182 of the 
observed data did not reduce departures from normality. Despite these 
considerations, given the large sample sizes (> 30 for each group considered into the 
analysis), it was decided to use parametric rather than non-parametric analyses on the 




6.4.2.1 Is discounting domain and/or valence dependent? 
 
Mean discount parameters for each of the six scenarios in ‘SECTION 1’ of the 
questionnaires184 are presented in Figure 6.2 below. In general, respondents 
discounted gains more than losses (see also Table 6.1), and discounted environmental 
gains and losses more than monetary and health gains and losses.  In particular, as 
shown in Tables 6.1 and 6.2, participants discounted monetary gains 
 22.0,14.0  SDr more than losses  09.0,04.0  SDr , a significant difference 
  001.0,8.9441  pt , corresponding to a moderate effect size  64.0d .185 Thus, 
participants indicated that getting £10,000 now was equivalent to getting £24,000 in 
10 years, whereas losing £10,000 now was roughly equivalent to losing £14,000 in 
10 years.  
 
In the same line, participants discounted tree gains  29.0,18.0  SDr more 
than losses  19.0,05.0  SDr ,   001.0,9.8441  pt , and they discounted 
human life gains  28.0,13.0  SDr more than losses  18.0,05.0  SDr , 
  001.0,0.7441  pt . Specifically, respondents stated that they would prefer to 
save 277 trees in 10 years’ time to 100 trees today, but would prefer to lose only 154 
trees in 10 years’ time to an immediate loss of 100 trees. Similarly, they revealed that 
saving 231 lives in 10 years’ time was preferable to saving 100 lives today, though 
                                                 
182 Natural log, inverse and square root transformations were not possible with this set of data. 
183 When using large samples sizes ANOVAs, t-tests and Pearson correlations are generally robust to 
the violation of the assumption of normality (see Martin and Bateson, 1986, Myers and Well, 1995, 
and Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007). 
184 Data here is pooled as the first part of the questionnaire was common to both questionnaires. 
185 Cohen’s d  is generally recommended in the literature to measure effect sizes. The index quantifies 
the magnitude of the difference between the means of two groups. For a discussion see Howell (2013).  
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only a loss of 148 lives in 10 years’ time was preferable to an immediate loss of 100 
lives. Also in this case the differences in discounting associated with a change of 
valence were modest (with effect sizes respectively of 52.0d  for environmental 
gains and losses, and 36.0d  for the health gains and losses), but smaller than that 
in the monetary scenario.186  
 
Figure 6.2: Mean discount parameters ( r ) for monetary, environmental, and health gains (plus signs) 





  N Minimum Maximum Mean SD 
Monetary gains 442 0.00 1.90 0.145 0.225 
Monetary losses 442 -0.10 0.90 0.043 0.092 
Environmental gains 442 -0.10 1.00 0.177 0.285 
Environmental losses 442 -0.10 0.90 0.054 0.186 
Health gains 442 -0.10 1.90 0.131 0.275 
Health losses 442 -0.10 1.90 0.047 0.184 
Notes: The table reports the total number of observations (N), the mean value (Mean), the standard 
deviation (SD), and the minimum/maximum value of the discount rates. 
 
 
                                                 
186 In other words, the number of times the discount rates overlapped was higher in the environmental 
and health scenarios, as the percentage of discount rates’ nonoverlap was on average 30%, against the 





Paired-samples t-tests within domains (across valence) 
t-tests, effect size (d) Monetary (gains/losses) Environment (gains/losses) Health (gains/losses) 
t-test 9.87 8.95 7.01 
p-value       0.000***       0.000***       0.000*** 
d 0.64 0.52 0.36 
Notes: ***significant at 1% level. 
 
Table 6.3 reports paired-samples t-test for differences within valence (across 
domains). As shown from the table, most of the pairwise comparisons for gains and 
losses across domains are insignificant. However, there is a significant difference in 
the way respondents discounted environmental gains versus monetary/health gains. 
Although not predicted, tree gains were discounted significantly more than monetary 
and human life gains; though the strength of the difference is relatively small in size 
(i.e., effect sizes range respectively from 1.0d  to 0.2).  
 
Table 6.3 
















  gains losses gains losses gains losses 
t-test 2.11 1.24 0.94     0.53 3.02 0.67 
p-value     0.035**   0.216   0.346   0.596       0.003*** 0.498 
d  0.12 0.08 0.06 0.03 0.16 0.03 
Notes: *** Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level 
 
 
A 2 (valence: gains vs. losses)   3 (domain: monetary vs. environmental vs. 
health) repeated-measures analysis of variance – two-way within-subjects ANOVA 
design – (see Appendix 6B) was used to test the hypotheses that (i.e., Hypothesis 1):  
 
1. Individuals’ time preferences were not influenced by valence differences. 
This is equivalent to the assumption that all valence means (across domain) 
have equal impact on the population mean; 
2. Individuals’ time preferences were not influenced by domain differences. 




3. The two factors were independent. 
 
As shown in Table 6.4, (mean) discount rates differ statistically significantly 
across valence and domain (   26.0,001.0,1.155441,1 2  ppF  , and 
  01.0,05.0,9.3882,2 2  ppF  , respectively). According to Hardisty and Weber 
(2009) the effect of valence is stronger than that of domain. The partial eta squared, 
2
p , indicates that about 26% of the variation in (mean) discounting is due to the 
effect of valence, against 0.9% explained by domain differences187. However, results 
show that there is also a statistically significant interaction (although substantially 
small) between valence and domain, thus suggesting that the differences in valence 
depend upon the differences in domain,   01.0,05.0,3.3882,2 2  ppF  .  
 
Table 6.4 
Two-way within-subjects ANOVA results 
Effect SSa df MS F p-valueb Partial(η2)c 
Valence 7.031 1 7.031 155.158 0.000 0.260 
Error (Valence) 19.984 441 0.045 
   Domain 0.346 2 0.173 3.995 0.019 0.009 
Error (Domain) 38.196 882 0.043 
   Valence × Domain 0.174 2 0.087 3.378 0.034 0.008 
Error (Valence × Domain) 22.719 882 0.026 
   
 
Mauchly's Test of Spericityd 
Valence   .,10
2  p  
Domain   763.0,541.02
2  p  
Valence × Domain   713.0,677.02
2  p  
a Type III sum of squares. 
b Results are evaluated at the 5% significance level. 
c Partial eta squared, 
2
p , is used to assess the effect size of each factor (i.e., the % of variance 
attributable to each factor). 
d The Mauchly’s Test of Sphericity is testing the null hypothesis of homogeneity of variance. A p-
value > 0.05 provides support for the null hypothesis. 
Notes: SPSS output. Within-subjects design (intercept): valence + domain + valence*domain. 
 
Figure 6.3 below provides a vivid representation of the effects of each factor and 
their interaction. In general, respondents discounted gains more than losses across all 
                                                 
187 In analysis of variance, the partial eta squared, 
2
p , is used to assess the effect size of each 
experimental condition and represents the % of variation in the dependent variable attributable to each 
factor. For a detailed discussion about partial eta square in different ANOVA designs see Cortina and 
Nouri (2000).    
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domains. However, for environmental outcomes these differences seem to be more 
pronounced, especially when comparing discounting across gain scenarios188. To 
better understand this interaction, Table 6.5 reports simple-effects tests for the data, 
where the effect of valence is tested at each level of domain individually, as well as 
the effect of domain is tested at each level of valence individually. On the one hand, 
the pairwise comparisons189 between domain means at each level of valence confirm 
that there is a statistically significant difference in the way respondents evaluate 
gains and losses in all domains ( 001.0p  for each pair comparison). On the other 
hand, the pairwise comparisons between valence means at each level of domain 
reveal a slight increase in discounting environmental gains relative to monetary and 
health gains, which is statistically significant ( 05.0p  for each pairwise 
comparison) and stronger when comparing the differences between environmental 
and health gains.  
 
Figure 6.3: Estimated marginal means across valence and domain 
 
                                                 
188 In particular, the effect of positive valence (gain scenarios) was to increase respondents’ discount 
rates by 0.06 (i.e., 095.0151.011   ), while the effect of negative valence (loss scenarios), 
was to decrease the discount rates by 0.05 (i.e., 095.0048.022   ). 
189 Pairwise comparisons were estimated with no adjustments as, according to Cardinal and Aitken 
(2006), corrections are not needed when groups are ≤ 3 and the overall F-test from the ANOVA is 






Simple-effects tests (pairwise comparisons)  
Domain (I) valence (J) valence 
Mean 
Difference (I-J) 
Std. Error Sig.b 
£ 
Gains Losses 0.102* 0.010 0.000 
Losses Gains -0.102* 0.010 0.000 
Trees 
Gains Losses 0.123* 0.014 0.000 
Losses Gains -0.123* 0.014 0.000 
Human Lives 
Gains Losses 0.083* 0.012 0.000 
Losses Gains -0.083* 0.012 0.000 
Valence (I) domain (J) domain 
Mean 
Difference (I-J) 
Std. Error Sig.b 
Gains 
£ 
Trees -0.032* 0.015 0.035 
Human Lives 0.014 0.015 0.346 
Trees 
£ 0.032* 0.015 0.035 
Human Lives 0.046* 0.015 0.003 
Human Lives 
£ -0.014 0.015 0.346 
Trees -0.046* 0.015 0.003 
Losses 
£ 
Trees -0.011 0.009 0.216 
Human Lives -0.005 0.009 0.596 
Trees 
£ 0.011 0.009 0.216 
Human Lives 0.006 0.009 0.498 
Human Lives 
£ 0.005 0.009 0.596 
Trees -0.006 0.009 0.498 
* Mean differences are evaluated at the 5% significance level.      
b Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Least Significant Difference (equivalent to no adjustments). 
Notes: SPSS output. Tests for simple effects are based on estimated marginal means.   
 
Although a similar trend can be observed across discount rates for loss scenarios, 
this is never statistically significant ( 05.0p  for each pair comparison). Thus, in 
contrast with previous analyses (e.g. Gattig and Hendrickx, 2007), results from this 
survey show that environmental outcomes are discounted more relative to monetary 
and health outcomes, though these differences are not statistically significant for loss 
scenarios. 
 
The proportion of zero and negative discounting in each domain was also 
computed. As in Hardisty and Weber (2009), this was done for comparisons with 
previous analyses that reported high rates of non-discounting for environmental 
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scenarios (e.g. Gattig and Hendrickx, 2007). Results show that (see proportion in 
parentheses) in general only few individuals exhibited zero or negative discounting 
for monetary (0.02), environmental (0.06), and health (0.09) gains. However, a large 
proportion of individuals displayed such kind of preferences for monetary (0.25), 
environmental (0.51), and health (0.59) losses. A similar pattern of preferences is 
reported in Hardisty and Weber (2009). Nevertheless, when looking at the magnitude 
of the calculated proportions, results from this survey indicate stronger differences 
between the environmental/health scenarios and the monetary scenario. In contrast 
with Hardisty and Weber (2009), in fact, the difference between proportions190 is not 
only highly significant within valence (across domains, 001.0ps ), but also within 
domains (across valence, 05.0ps  or better)191. Thus, while a small proportion of 
respondents was indifferent to receiving a reward immediately or in 10 years’ time, 
or preferred to receive it later rather than now, a large number of participants were 
indifferent to date of receipt of losses or preferred to receive them immediately rather 
than later. However, these preferences were more pronounced for environmental and 
health scenarios. Therefore, despite results provide evidence in support of the sign 
effect, in line with previous analyses (see for example Chapman, 1996b, Chapman et 
al. 1999, and Tsukayama and Duckworth, 2010) discounting seem to be also domain 
dependent.  
 
To further investigate this issue, Table 6.6 reports the correlation within domain 
(across valence) and within valence (across domain). As shown in the table, Pearson 
correlations reveal significant correlations within valence and domain supporting the 
conclusion that, both at the individual subject level and averaged across subjects, 
discounting is influenced not only by the valence of outcomes, but also by domain 
differences. However, as shown in the table, within-domain correlations are stronger 
in the monetary and health scenarios. Therefore, knowing how much an individual 
discounted monetary and health gains tell us more about how much that respondent 
                                                 
190 The difference between proportions is tested using a z-score statistics, which is defined as the 
difference between the (relative) proportions divided by the pooled standard deviation of the sampling 
distribution. For a discussion, see e.g. Blalock (1979).   
191 Zero and negative discounting occurred more often in response to the environmental and health 
outcomes than the monetary outcomes  01.0p , and occurred more often for health outcomes than 
for environmental outcomes  05.0p . However, differences between proportions were less 
(significantly) marked for environmental and health outcomes. 
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valued monetary and health losses compared to how much respondents valued 
environmental gains and losses.  
 
It is interesting to note that when removing zero and negative discount rates from 
the analysis (see Table 6.7), the sign effect remain highly significant
  15.0,001.0,9.1693,1 2  ppF  , the domain effect approaches significance
  03.0,053.0,9.2186,2 2  ppF  , while the interaction becomes insignificant
  05.0,8.0186,2  pF . In particular, the effect of excluding respondents with 
zero or negative discounting from the analysis was to reduce the difference between 
discounting environmental and health outcomes (see Figure 6.4), which becomes 
statistically insignificant  05.0p , while maintaining significant the difference in 
discounting environmental and monetary outcomes  05.0p 192. 
 
These findings seem to suggest that differences in discounting between domains 
are driven by ethical concerns about future generations, which are considerably 
stronger for environmental and health scenarios. A far-sighted perspective assumes 
in fact a low (or zero) or negative rate of discounting. However, comparing Figures 
6.3 and 6.4, far-sighted discounting seems to play a major role for discounting health 
gains rather than environmental gains. Even when including zero and negative 
discounting in the environmental scenario, the estimated (marginal) mean discount 
rate for gains remains, in fact, relatively high compared to the situation depicted in 
Figure 6.4. This suggests that there might be other emotional factors (such as 
impatience) that affect discounting environmental gains thus explaining the 
discrepancy in the results. In particular, it might be the case that individuals’ 
evaluation of future outcomes was influenced by different levels of environmental 
morale and that environmental morale generated more of an affective reaction to 
environmentally-friendly respondents.  
 
                                                 
192 Estimated marginal means within domains were 0.12  015.0SD , 0.19  026.0SD , and 0.18
 031.0SD , respectively for the monetary, environmental and health scenarios. Pairwise 
comparisons were estimated using Least Significant Difference (equivalent to no adjustments). 





Pearson correlations of discount parameters 
Outcome £+ £- Trees+ Trees- Human Lives+ Human Lives- 
£+ - 
     
£- 0.28*** - 
    
Trees+ 0.25*** 0.11** - 
   
Trees-   0.08 0.22*** 0.31*** - 
  
Human Lives+ 0.21*** 0.19** 0.35*** 0.28*** - 
 
Human Lives- 0.20*** 0.22*** 0.18*** 0.43*** 0.47*** - 
Notes: *** significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level. 
 
Table 6.7 
Two-way within-subjects ANOVA results (no zero and negative discounting, N=94) 
Effect SSa df MS F p-valueb Partial(η2)c 
Valence 0.534 1 0.534 16.89 0.000 0.154 
Error (Valence) 2.939 93 0.032    
Domain 0.432 2 0.216 2.982 0.053 0.031 
Error (Domain) 13.458 186 0.072    
Valence × Domain 0.036 2 0.018 0.859 0.425 0.009 
Error (Valence × Domain) 3.88 186 0.021    
 
Mauchly's Test of Spericityd 
Valence   .,10
2  p  
Domain   287.0,498.22
2  p  
Valence × Domain   24.0,856.22
2  p  
a,b,c,d As in Table 6.4.  
Notes: As in Table 6.4.  
 
6.4.2.2 Individuals’ time preferences towards the environment among different 
levels of environmental morale  
 
In order to investigate these issues (i.e., Hypothesis 2) and given the focus of this 
analysis on the role of environmental morale on discounting environmental 
outcomes, it was decided to split the sample between respondents with high 
environmental morale and low environmental morale and to run separate 2 (valence) 
  3 (domain) ANOVAs for each group. As in chapter 3, the index of environmental 
morale (Cronbach’s     0.6)193 was grouped in three different categories, one for 
low environmental morale (index score < 12), one for medium environmental morale 
(index score = 12), and one for high environmental morale. About 11% of 
                                                 
193 As in chapter 3, the index appeared to have a moderate internal consistency 598.0 . All items 
appeared to be worth of retention except for the item used to express the willingness to buy e green 
product rather than a conventional one. Removal of this item increased alpha only by 0.04. However, 
the lower correlation of this item with the others suggested removing this item from the index 
measurement – i.e., the ‘Corrected Item-Total Correlation’ provided a Pearson correlation of 0.227. 
 182 
 
respondents (i.e., 48) exhibited low environmental morale, 6% showed medium 
environmental morale (i.e., 27), while the majority of participants, 83% (i.e., 367), 
displayed high environmental morale. Given the small sample size of respondents 
with medium environmental morale, it was decided to group their responses with 
those reported by respondents with high environmental morale and to compare them 
with those obtained from respondents with low environmental morale. This not only 
allows us to control for problems related to departure from normality (thus providing 
more robust results); but also to make a clear cut point between low environmental 
morale (i.e., those who stated they never or rarely undertook pro-environmental 
behaviour for environmental reasons), and medium/high environmental morale (i.e., 
those who stated they sometimes, often or always undertook environmentally-
friendly behaviours for environmental reasons).  
 





As predicted, results show that when accounting for different levels of 
environmental morale, there is a substantial difference in the way individuals 
discount environmental outcomes with respect to other domains. Considering the 
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sub-set of individuals with medium/high environmental morale, Table 6.8 shows that 
(mean) discount parameters differ statistically significantly across valence 
  26.0,001.0,4.141393,1 2  ppF  , and domain  
  01.0,05.0,3.3786,2 2  ppF  . In addition, there is a significant interaction 
between valence and domain   01.0,001.0,1.5786,2 2  ppF  .  
 
Table 6.8 
Two-way within-subjects ANOVA results (sub-set: medium/high environmental morale) 
Effect SSa df MS F p-valueb Partial(η2)c 
Valence 6.152 1 6.152 141.492 0.000 0.265 
Error (Valence) 17.088 393 0.043 
   Domain 0.268 2 0.134 3.360 0.035 0.008 
Error (Domain) 31.391 786 0.040 
   Valence × Domain 0.253 2 0.126 5.134 0.006 0.013 
Error (Valence × Domain) 19.349 786 0.025 
   
 
Mauchly's Test of Spericityd 
Valence   .,10
2  p  
Domain   767.0,530.02
2  p  
Valence × Domain   450.0,597.12
2  p  
a,b,c,d  As in Table 6.4.  
Notes: As in Table 6.4. 
 
 
Likewise the pooled sample, graphical analysis (see Figure 6.5a) and post hoc 
pairwise comparisons (see Table 6.9) reveal that respondents discounted gains more 
than losses in all domains ( 001.0p  for each pair comparison of valence across 
domains). Again, environmental gains were discounted significantly more than 
monetary and health gains, with a stronger effect resulting from the comparison 
between environmental and health gains. By contrast, although monetary losses were 
discounted slightly less than environmental and health losses, there are no significant 





                                                 
194 These results remain robust even when restricting the analysis to the sub-set of individuals with 





Figure 6.5: Estimated marginal means across valence and domain. 
 
Notes: Part (a) of the figure reports data from the sub-set of individuals with medium/high 
environmental morale; part (b) represents that of low environmental morale. 
 
 
A different pattern of preferences is found among those who exhibited low 
environmental morale. In this context, valence (see Table 6.10 
) had the stronger effect on discounting,   23.0,001.0,3.1447,1 2  ppF  , relative 
to domains,   05.0,6.094,2  pF , and their interaction,   05.0,4.094,2  pF . 
Figure 6.5 (b) and post hoc comparisons (see Table 6.11) indicate, in fact, that 
participants generally discounted monetary, environmental (not statistically 
significant) and health gains more than losses. Furthermore, it is interesting to note 
that, although low environmental morale led individuals to discount environmental 
losses more than monetary and health losses, differences within domain (across 














Simple-effects tests (pairwise comparisons – sub-set: medium/high environmental morale)  
domain (I) valence (J) valence 
Mean 
Difference (I-J) 
Std. Error Sig.b 
£ 
Gains Losses 0.101* 0.011 0.000 
Losses Gains -0.101* 0.011 0.000 
Trees 
Gains Losses 0.128* 0.014 0.000 
Losses Gains -0.128* 0.014 0.000 
Human Lives 
Gains Losses 0.077* 0.012 0.000 
Losses Gains -0.077* 0.012 0.000 
valence (I) domain (J) domain 
Mean 
Difference (I-J) 
Std. Error Sig.b 
Gains 
£ 
Trees -0.033* 0.016 0.047 
Human Lives 0.018 0.015 0.246 
Trees 
£ 0.033* 0.016 0.047 
Human Lives 0.050* 0.016 0.001 
Human Lives 
£ -0.018 0.015 0.246 
Trees -0.050* 0.016 0.001 
Losses 
£ 
Trees -0.006 0.008 0.511 
Human Lives -0.006 0.009 0.520 
Trees 
£ 0.006 0.008 0.511 
Human Lives 0.000 0.009 0.971 
Human Lives 
£ 0.006 0.009 0.520 
Trees -0.000 0.009 0.971 
*,b As in Table 6.5.  





Two-way within-subjects ANOVA results (sub-set: low environmental morale) 
Effect SSa df MS F p-valueb Partial(η2)c 
Valence 0.884 1 0.884 14.368 0.000 0.234 
Error (Valence) 2.891 47 0.062 
   Domain 0.099 2 0.050 0.688 0.505 0.014 
Error (Domain) 6.783 94 0.072 
   Valence × Domain 0.030 2 0.015 0.437 0.647 0.009 
Error (Valence × Domain) 3.261 94 0.035 
   
 
Mauchly's Test of Spericityd 
Valence   .,10
2  p  
Domain   254.0,742.22
2  p  
Valence × Domain   105.0,503.42
2  p  
a,b,c,d As in Table 6.4.  






Simple-effects tests (pairwise comparisons – sub-set: low environmental morale)  
Domain (I) valence (J) valence 
Mean 
Difference (I-J) 
Std. Error Sig.b 
£ 
Gains Losses 0.115* 0.040 0.006 
Losses Gains -0.115* 0.040 0.006 
Trees 
Gains Losses 0.084 0.044 0.061 
Losses Gains -0.084 0.044 0.061 
Human Lives 
Gains Losses 0.134* 0.044 0.004 
Losses Gains -0.134* 0.044 0.004 
valence (I) domain (J) domain 
Mean 
Difference (I-J) 
Std. Error Sig.b 
Gains 
£ 
Trees -0.026 0.036 0.471 
Human Lives -0.014 0.062 0.823 
Trees 
£ 0.026 0.036 0.471 
Human Lives 0.012 0.059 0.840 
Human Lives 
£ 0.014 0.062 0.823 
Trees -0.012 0.059 0.840 
Losses 
£ 
Trees -0.057 0.045 0.214 
Human Lives 0.005 0.034 0.890 
Trees 
£ 0.057 0.045 0.214 
Human Lives 0.062 0.040 0.127 
Human Lives 
£ -0.005 0.034 0.890 
Trees -0.062 0.040 0.127 
*,b As in Table 6.5.   
Notes: As in Tables 6.5.        
 
The main lesson to be drawn from the discussion above outlined is provided by 
Table 6.12. The table summarizes the level of impatience experienced by 
respondents within domains (across valence) – i.e., the vertical distance of (marginal) 
mean discount parameters derived – within  domain (across valence) –from the full 
and split models above analysed (see also Figures 6.3 and 6.5)195. This provides a 
measure of the ‘irrational’ disutility of waiting to get something immediately. The 
figures reported in Table 6.12 suggest that, being less environmentally-friendly 
translates into heavily discounting (i.e., short-sighted preferences) environmental 
outcomes (i.e., impatience = 0.08), compared to other outcomes (i.e., money and 
                                                 
195 Differences in the sub-set of respondents with high environmental morale do not differ much from 
the full sample as the majority of respondents in the full model exhibited high environmental morale. 
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health). By contrast, high environmental morale led respondents to be more impatient 
for environmental outcomes (i.e., impatience = 0.13).  
 
Therefore, rather than a rational, reasoned discounting process which would 
predict a uniform (lower) discount rate for gains and losses, high environmental 
morale enhanced more of an affective response in participants. Present bias 
translates, in fact, into a higher discount rate for gains, and lower discount rate for 
losses. However, results show also that, compared to those with low environmental 
morale, in general environmentally-friendly respondents discounted gains and losses 
at a lower rate, meaning that they were less willing than them to receive gains 
immediately and to postpone losses to future generations. Recall that with hyperbolic 
discounting, positive time preferences means that the decision maker prefers to 
receive gains immediately rather than later and prefer to experience losses later 
rather than immediately. A possible explanation for this pattern of preferences can be 
that for environmentally-friendly respondents the desire to get gains now and losses 
out of the way immediately was offset by ethical concerns about future generations, 
thus resulting in a lower discount rate. In other words, in both the gain and loss 
scenarios the deliberative system might have mitigated emotional inputs towards the 
environment.   
 
Table 12 
Impatience across domains 
Domain/Model Full High EM Low EM 
Money 0.10 0.10 0.12 
Environment 0.12 0.13 0.08 
Health 0.08 0.08 0.13 
Notes: Full = full sample of respondents, High EM = sub-sample of individuals with medium/high 
environmental morale, Low EM = sub-sample of individuals with low environmental morale.  
 
6.4.2.3 The connection between environmental morale and discounting 
 
To further investigate the linkage between environmental morale and discounting in 
the environmental domain, a two-way mixed196 factorial ANOVA design (see 
Appendix 6B) was also run, whereby different levels of environmental morale were 
used as a between-subjects factor and discount rates across valence as a within-
                                                 
196 This model is also referred in the literature as a split plot design (see Maxwell and Delaney, 1990). 
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subjects factor. As it was previously done, responses from participants with medium 
and high environmental morale were grouped and compared to those obtained by 
respondents with low environmental morale. The mixed factorial design was 
employed to test the hypotheses (i.e., Hypothesis 3) that: 
 
1. Individuals’ time preferences were not influenced by different levels of 
environmental morale; 
2. Individuals’ time preferences were not influenced by valence differences; 
3. The two factors were independent. 
 
However, having established the relevance of valence for environmental 
outcomes (as well as for other domains), the analysis here focused on assessing 
whether environmentally-friendly respondents discounted (on average) significantly 
less than those with lower environmental morale, and whether different levels of 
environmental morale affected individuals’ discounting among gains and losses. 
 
Results reported in Table 6.13 confirm a significant main effect of valence, 
  05.0,001.0,9.22440,1 2  ppF  . However, the effect of environmental 
morale is not statistically significant,    01.0,4.4440,1  pF 197, and different 
levels of environmental morale seem not to affect statistically significantly the 
different way in which people discounted environmental gains and losses,  
  05.0,9.0440,1  pF  198. 
 
Nevertheless, data shows (see Figure 6.6) that generally respondents with low 
environmental morale discounted environmental outcomes more than those with high 
environmental morale. 
 
                                                 
197 The Levene’s test of equality of error variance suggested unequal variances across groups of 
individuals with different environmental morale in the loss scenario  001.0p . Therefore two 
additional tests, i.e., the Welch and Brown-Forsythe tests, were conducted to check the robustness of 
this violation. Although both tests approached significance,   054.0,8.351,1  pF , in order to err 
in the side of caution, it was decided to be more conservative and to reject inequality of means across 
different levels of environmental morale.   
198 Similar conclusions were reached even when considering the three groups (i.e., low, medium, and 




Two-way mixed factorial ANOVA results 
Effect SSa df MS F p-valueb Partial(η2)c 
Between-subjects (S):             
Environmental morale 0.325 1 0.325 4.384 0.037 0.01 
Error (S/Environmental morale) 32.65 440 0.074 
   
Within-subjects: 
      
Valence 0.959 1 0.959 22.933 0.000 0.05 
Valence × Environmental morale 0.042 1 0.042 0.995 0.319 0.002 
Error (Valence × S/Environmental 
morale) 
18.403 440 0.042    
 
Mauchly's Test of Spericityd 
Valence   .,102  p  
 
Levene’s Test of Equality of Error Variancee 
Environmental Gains   124.0,381.2440,1  pF  
Environmental Losses   000.0,838.26440,1  pF  
a Type III sum of squares. 
b Results are evaluated at the 5% significance level. 
c Partial eta squared, η2, is used to assess the effect size of each factor (i.e., the % of variance 
attributable to each factor). 
d The Mauchly’s Test of Sphericity is testing the null hypothesis of homogeneity of variance. A p-
value > 0.05 provides support for the null hypothesis. 
e The Levene’s Test of Equality of Error Variances tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of 
the dependent variable is equal across groups of different environmental morale. A p-value > 0.05 
provides support for the null hypothesis. 
Notes: SPSS output. Design: intercept + environmental morale. Within-subjects Design: valence 
 
Again, a possible explanation for this might be that ethical considerations such as 
social justice and equity were stronger among those with high environmental morale, 
which translates into higher discount rates for those with low environmental morale 
as they might care less about future generations. The figure provides also further 
evidence that affective responses were stronger among those with high 
environmental morale. Indeed, the difference between discount rates within valence 
is significantly more marked among those who exhibited high environmental morale 
  57.0,001.0,8.8366  dpt  than those with low environmental morale 




                                                 
199 The Pearson’s correlation coefficient between discount rates within valence is respectively 0.50 








Therefore, it is possible to conclude that, although affective responses were 
stronger among environmentally-friendly respondents200, overall they discounted 
environmental outcomes at a lower rate compared to less environmentally 
respondents. Unfortunately, the heavily unbalanced nature of the sample sizes 
prevents us to provide enough support for this conclusion. Indeed, increasing the 
number of individuals with low environmental morale might help reducing the 
                                                 
200 If compared with those with low environmental morale, people with high environmental morale are 




variability of discounting in the loss scenario, thus leading to more robust 
conclusions.  But this remains a matter of future research201. 
 
6.4.2.4 Money versus environmental and health outcomes  
 
As in Hardisty and Weber (2009), to see how individuals valued environmental and 
health outcomes relative to money, their preferences over the choice of gaining 
(losing) £10,000 or saving (losing) 100 trees/lives immediately was also analysed. 
Only 6% of respondents said they would prefer saving the trees immediately over 
receiving £10,000, while 8% said they would rather pay £10,000 immediately than 
losing 100 trees. Despite these respondents represented only a small proportion of the 
total sample size202, it is interesting to note that these preferences were expressed 
only by individuals with high environmental morale203. Therefore, nonmonetary 
outcomes of the environmental scenarios were valued more than monetary outcomes 
of the financial scenarios (the gain or payment of £10,000) only by environmentally-
friendly respondents.  
 
Regarding the health outcomes, just as 86% of respondents preferred to save 100 
lives immediately rather than receiving £10,000, so too 83% preferred paying 
£10,000 immediately over losing 100 lives. The differences between these 
proportions seem to suggest that loss aversion (i.e., the idea that a loss hurts more 
                                                 
201 In order to circumvent this problem, it was also decided to dichotomize the environmental morale 
scores at the median (i.e., 15). However, the problem of heterogeneity of variance was not solved even 
when using a different cut point. Furthermore, given that part of the information about respondents 
were lost (i.e., part of the respondents who stated they undertook pro-environmental behaviours at a 
medium or higher level were bunched into the group of those who were never or rarely contributing to 
pro-environmental activities), results discussed in this section remained robust only for the sub-sample 
of respondents with medium/high environmental morale. Indeed, though the patter of preferences of 
those with low environmental morale were similar to that above discussed, impatience was slightly 
stronger for environmental goods even when considering the sub-sample of individuals with low 
environmental morale. Therefore, according to previous analyses (see e.g. Tsukayama and 
Duckworth, 2010), it was decided to maintain the splitting point at the midpoint of the scale (i.e., 12) 
as, from a theoretical point of view, this represents the middle response (i.e., the sum of the mid-point 
category - 3 = sometimes - of each single item forming the EM index).  
202 These proportions are considerably different in magnitude from those reported by Hardisty and 
Weber (2009). However, the small proportions reported in this survey can be attributed to other 
potential confounding factors that are not controlled in this analysis, e.g. the magnitude of the 
monetary loss, which is significantly smaller in the Hardisty-Weber study (i.e., $ 250).  
203 93% of the individuals that stated they would prefer saving the trees immediately over the choice 
of receiving £10,000 exhibited high environmental morale. Similarly, 89% of those who stated they 
would prefer losing £10,000 immediately rather than losing 100 trees, had high environmental morale. 
The percentages are calculated including individuals with medium environmental morale. 
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than a gain of the same magnitude)204 is stronger for the environmental scenario than 
for the health scenario. However, the percentage of respondents willing to give up 
money to gain nonmonetary goods is greater in the health scenario than in the 
environmental scenario. This result seems to be at odds with affective-preferences 
for environmental outcomes among respondents with high environmental morale. It 
was expected, in fact, that those who exhibited high environmental morale would 
have been more willing to sacrifice their money to get a better environment. 
However, this result can be due either to the idiosyncratic nature of the hypothetical 
scenarios, which makes the environmental outcomes less hurtful compared to the 
health ones, or to the fact that, although respondents were environmentally-friendly, 
the relative weights (i.e., prices) they assigned to trees were lower compared to those 
assigned to lives. As a consequence, when answering this question, health outcomes 
might have generated a more visceral reaction to respondents. Unfortunately, the 
present analysis cannot disentangle these aspects, thus leaving this question to further 
research.   
 
6.4.2.5 The effect of gender and year of degree on discounting 
 
Entering gender as a between-subjects factor into the two-way repeated measures 
ANOVA designs (i.e., full sample of respondents and split samples according to 
individuals’ level of environmental morale)205 does not significantly change the 
pattern of preferences above discussed (see Tables 6C.1-6C.3 and Figure 6C.1 in 
Appendix 6C). However, although gender had no significant effect on discounting, 
an unexpected Valence × Gender interaction was found significant both in the full 
sample,   01.0,05.0,7.5440,1 2  ppF  , and in the sub-sample of individuals with 
low environmental morale,   12.0,05.0,2.646,1 2  ppF  , showing that, 
irrespective of gender characteristics,  respondents discounted gains more than 
losses, though the effect is stronger for females. Furthermore, pairwise comparisons 
show that, in the sub-sample of people with low environmental morale, males 
                                                 
204 See Tversky and Kahneman (1992). 
205 The model represents a one between-subjects factor/two within-subjects factors ANOVA design. 
In principle, this is a modified version of the one between-subjects and one within-subjects ANOVA 
design above described. For a detailed description of the model, see e.g. Maxwell and Delaney (1990), 
and Cardinal and Aitken (2006).  
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discounted losses at a significant higher rate than females  05.0p 206. This can be 
related not only to gender differences towards risk aversion, but also to differences in 
individuals’ level of environmental morale. According to results obtained in chapter 
4, females seem to exhibit higher environmental morale. If this is the case, it is 
possible to expect a significant interaction between gender differences and different 
levels of environmental morale. In order to test this hypothesis, gender was entered 
as an additional between-subjects factor in the two-way mixed factorial ANOVA 
design above discussed207. Again, results described earlier remain robust when 
entering gender into the analysis. Although, the main effects of gender, 
environmental morale and their interaction had no impact on discounting (see Table 
6C.4 and Figure 6C.2 in Appendix 6C), results confirm a significant interaction 
between valence and gender,   02.0,001.0,2.9438,1 2  pF  (with males 
discounting in general losses more than females, 05.0p )208, and, according to 
expectations, a Valence × Gender × Environmental Morale interaction 
  01.0,05.0,9.3438,1 2  pF  was also found significant. For the latter, 
pairwise comparisons suggest that: males with low environmental morale discounted 
losses at a significant higher rate than that of females with the same characteristics 
 05.0p 209; irrespective of the level of environmental morale females discounted 
gains significantly more than losses  01.0p 210, whereas only males with high 
environmental morale discounted gains significantly more than losses  001.0p 211; 
and finally, males with low environmental morale reported on average a significant 
                                                 
206 In the sub-sample of individuals with low environmental morale, estimated marginal means for 
loss discount rates of males and females were respectively 0.115  026.0SD , and 0.03
 047.0SD . These and the following pairwise comparisons were computed using Least Significant 
Difference (equivalent to no adjustments). Results were evaluated at the 5% significance level. 
207 The model represents a two between-subjects factor/one within-subjects factors ANOVA design. 
Again, the model can be viewed as a modified version of the one between-subjects and one within-
subjects ANOVA design. For a detailed description of the model, see e.g. Maxwell and Delaney 
(1990), and Cardinal and Aitken (2006).  
208 Estimated marginal means for loss discount rates of males and females were respectively 0.110
 016.0SD , and 0.018  029.0SD .  
209 Estimated marginal means for loss discount rates of males and females with low environmental 
morale were respectively 0.167  030.0SD , and 0.001  056.0SD .  
210 However, the effect was stronger among those with low environmental morale. Estimated marginal 
means for gains and losses for those with low environmental morale were respectively 0.284
 086.0SD  and 0.001  056.0SD , vs. 0.195  023.0SD  and 0.035  015.0SD  of those 
with high environmental morale.  
211 Estimated marginal means for gains and losses among those with high environmental morale were 
respectively 0.158  019.0SD  and 0.052  012.0SD . 
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higher discount rate compared to those with high environmental morale  001.0p
212. 
 
In summary, although gender differences had no direct impact on discounting, 
results from this survey suggest that individuals’ attitudes towards discounting seem 
also to be driven by gender differences and, in particular, by the interaction between 
environmental morale and gender. This supports the conclusion that people have 
different sensitiveness towards the environment, and, in line with other areas of 
research, results strengthen the argument that, irrespective of their level of 
environmental morale, males behave more in their self-interest than females as they 
appear to be less environmentally-friendly.  
 
By contrast, entering year of degree as a between-subjects factor into the 
ANOVA designs discussed earlier had neither significant effect on discounting, nor a 
statistically significant interaction with all other factors (see Appendix 6D). 
Therefore, differences in discounting cannot be related to different levels of 
indoctrination into economics. It is worth emphasizing here that, despite respondents 
were trained in net present value computations (at least second and third year 
students), their preferences were long way away from the ‘right’ option of 
discounting monetary gains more than other outcomes. This not only contradicts 
previous results obtained using a similar sample of students (see Guyse et al., 2002), 
but confutes also the idea that, in this context, ‘this population may not be 
representative of the general public’ (see Hardisty and Weber, 2009, p. 330). 
Individuals’ differences on discounting, in fact, seem to be driven more by 
differences in their level of environmental morale than by other possible relevant 





                                                 
212 Estimated marginal means of loss discount rates for males with low and high environmental morale 
were respectively 0.167  030.0SD  and 0.052  012.0SD . 
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As far as intergenerational distribution of preferences is concerned; individuals’ 
preferences were initially converted into proportions of welfare (i.e., proportion of 
money, trees, and lives) assigned to each generation for analysis of variance. 
Unfortunately, data was not only not-normally distributed, but problems arose also 
due to the violation of the homogeneity of variance assumption. The latter, in some 
cases, affected the significance level of the between-subjects factors included into the 
analyses, thus leading to misleading results. Unfortunately, none of the possible 
transformations (i.e. square and cube transformations) helped reducing these 
problems. Therefore, it was decided to analyse data using cross-tabulation as the best 
alternative solution.  
 
Looking at the framing of the questions, respondents were allowed to choose 
among four different options: they could either decide to allocate all outcomes to 
their own generation/great grandchildren’s generation (coded respectively 1 and 4 for 
contingency analysis), or to evenly/unevenly spread the outcomes among different 
generations (coded respectively 2 and 3 for the analysis). These options were 
aggregated into a scale that served as the dependent variable (= Choice) for 




The proportion of responses is reported in Table 6.14. In general the table shows 
significant differences in the distribution of intergenerational preferences within 
valence (across domains). The Pearson chi-square  2  tests on the mutual 
independence of choices between domains is highly significant both in the gain 
scenarios (   000.0,42.4762  p ) and in the loss scenarios (




In the gain scenarios, 54.8% of respondents chose to spread money across 
generations, whereas a substantial proportion of them preferred to allocate 
environmental and health outcomes to their own generation (47% and 52.9% of 
respondents, respectively). In general, equity concerns were stronger in the health 
domain compared to the other two domains. About 21% of respondents chose, in 
fact, to evenly allocate the 100 lives to be saved across generations, against 10.9% 
and 3.6% of respondents who respectively did so in the environmental and health 
domains213. Data reveals that only a small proportion of respondents chose to allocate 
all gains to their great grandchildren’s generation (none in the monetary domain, 
0.5% in the health domain, and 2.3% in the environmental domain), whereas a 
substantial part of individuals chose to spread gains across generations (54.8% vs. 
39.8% vs. 25.3% in the monetary, environmental, and health domains respectively).  
 
Table 6.14 
Cross-tabulation: Valence × Choice × Domain 
 Domain 
Valence Choice Money Environment Health Total 
Gains FG 1 1.60% 47.10% 52.90% 47.20% 
 
ESG 3.60% 7.70% 16.70% 9.40% 
 
SG 54.80% 43.00% 29.90% 42.50% 
 
GGG 0.00% 2.30% 0.50% 0.90% 
 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
Pearson chi-square   000.0,42.4762  p a 
 Choice Money Environment Health Total 
Losses FG 56.60% 15.80% 15.40% 29.30% 
 
ESG 0.90% 29.40% 34.40% 21.60% 
 
SG 37.10% 37.60% 29.90% 34.80% 
 
GGG 5.40% 17.20% 20.40% 14.30% 
 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
Pearson chi-square   000.0,79.17262  p b 
 
Total Pearson chi-square   000.0,82.13862  p c 
a 3 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.00. 
b 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 31.67. 
c 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 33.67. 
Notes: FG = All allocated to first generation, ESG = Evenly spread across generations, SG = Spread 
across generations, GGG = All allocated to great grandchildren’s generation.  
 
                                                 
213 Note that in contrast with Benartzi and Thaler (2001), respondents here were not naïve in the 
allocation of goods among generations. In fact, there is no presence of ‘1/n heuristic’, which would 




In the loss scenarios (see Table 6.14), 56.6% of respondents preferred to incur 
monetary losses in their own generation, whereas a substantial proportion of them 
preferred to unevenly/evenly spread environmental/health losses across generations 
(i.e. 37.6% and 34.4%, respectively). In general, looking at the distribution of 
preferences, major differences can be observed between monetary and 
environmental/health losses, whereas differences are less pronounced between the 
environmental and health domains.  
 
When controlling for the effect of valence as an additional layer in the cross-
tabulation analysis, the overall Pearson chi-square test is also significant, 
  000.0,82.13862  p , thus suggesting a possible interaction between the three 
variables. However, given the presence of sampling zeros214 and small observed 
count in some cells of the gain scenarios, in order to check the robustness of these 
results, a multi-way frequency analysis (MFA) was also applied. Sampling zeros and 
small observed count generate, in fact, small expected frequencies that might bias 
upwards the Pearson chi-square test (thus inflating Type I error rates).  
 
MFA is a nonparametric test that allows exploring interactions between discrete 
variables. Multi-way frequency analysis represents a simplified version of log-linear 
analysis215, whereby a modelling procedure is used to check for associations within 
variables and to come up with a model that best predicts the observed cell 
frequencies using the smallest number of association to do so. MFA and log-linear 
analysis have the advantage of allowing for a conservative correction on zero (and 
nonzero) frequencies by adding a value of 0.5 to every cell in the body of the table, 
thus providing empirical estimates of the population frequencies even in the absence 
of empirical instances.  
 
MFA is based on likelihood ratio tests. As with the Pearson chi-square  2  tests, 
likelihood ratio tests analyse the mutual independence of discrete variables using a 
comparison between observed and expected frequencies. Interactions are generally 
                                                 
214 Sampling zeros represent zero entries in cross-tabulated tables.  
215 Log-linear analysis has a direct parallel with ANOVA. However, the two methodologies differ on 
several grounds. For a detailed description of log-linear analysis, its advantages and limitations see 
Knoke and Burke (1980), Bishop et al. (1995), Howell (2002), and Howell (2013). 
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tested by looking at the goodness of fit of a model that contains only the lower order 
effects.  A ‘bad fit’ of the model results in a significant likelihood ratio (
2LR ) test 
and/or Pearson chi-square, thus suggesting that the interaction must be included into 
the model to fit the data.   
 
Therefore, in order to test whether or not there was an interaction between 
valence, domain and the choices of respondents, a likelihood ratio test was 
performed on a model that included all two-way interactions and the corresponding 
main factor effects. Results confirm that there is a significant interaction between the 
three variables,   000.0,45.7062  pLR 216, meaning that the effect of domain on 
the choice of a specific distribution significantly depends on valence and vice 
versa217.  
 
Having established the relationship between these variables, data was further 
disaggregated across different levels of environmental morale to explore whether or 
not environmental morale had an impact on respondents’ distribution of 
intergenerational preferences. Following previous sections, respondents were 
grouped into those who exhibited medium/high environmental morale (index score ≥ 
12) and those with low environmental morale (index score < 12)218. In general, 
results (see Table 6.15) show that respondents revealed different preferences within 
valence (across different levels of environmental morale) and within different levels 
of environmental morale (across valence). Within valence (across different levels of 
environmental morale), relative frequencies show that, compared to those with high 
environmental morale (38.40% and 51.20%, respectively), in the gain scenarios, 
respondents with low environmental morale were more likely to allocate monetary 
and health gains to their own generation (77.8% and 72.2%, respectively). By 
contrast, 47.8% of respondents with high environmental morale preferred to allocate 
                                                 
216 Results are reported for the four options considered in the analysis. However, they remain robust 
even when excluding category 4 (= All allocated to great grandchildren generation). 
217 A similar result was also obtained using a hierarchical log-linear analysis with backward 
elimination. Both tests are computed assuming that the choice count is conditional on the total sample 
size resulting in a Multinomial distribution.  
218 In the gain scenarios 8% of respondents had low environmental morale, while 92% of them 
exhibited medium/high environmental morale. In the loss scenarios 13% of respondents had low 




trees to their own generation, against 38.9% of respondents who did so among those 
with low environmental morale. Minor differences can be observed in the loss 
scenarios, where, irrespective of their level of environmental morale, respondents 
preferred to face monetary losses immediately, while postponing tree and life losses 
to future generations.      
 
Table 6.15 
Cross-tabulation: Valence × Environmental Morale (EM) × Choice × Domain 
      Domain 
Valence EM Choice Money Environment Health Total 
Gains Low EM FG 77.80% 38.90% 72.20% 63.00% 
  
 
ESG 0.00% 11.10% 16.70% 9.30% 
  
 
SG 22.20% 33.30% 11.10% 22.20% 
    GGG 0.00% 16.70% 0.00% 5.60% 
    Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 
    Pearson chi-square   038.0,32.136
2  p a,e 
    Choice Money Environment Health Total 
  High EM FG 38.40% 47.80% 51.20% 45.80% 
  
 
ESG 3.90% 7.40% 16.70% 9.40% 
  
 
SG 57.60% 43.80% 31.50% 44.30% 
    GGG 0.00% 1.00% 0.50% 0.50% 
    Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 
    Pearson chi-square    000.0,56.406
2  p b 
    Choice Money Environment Health Total 
Losses Low EM FG 60.00% 16.70% 0.00% 25.60% 
  
 
ESG 0.00% 13.30% 33.30% 38.90% 
  
 
SG 33.30% 50.00% 33.30% 38.90% 
    GGG 6.70% 20.00% 33.30% 20.00% 
    Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 
    Pearson chi-square   000.0,14.406
2  p c 
    Choice Money Environment Health Total 
  High EM FG 56.00% 15.70% 17.80% 29.80% 
  
 
ESG 1.00% 31.90% 34.60% 22.50% 
  
 
SG 37.70% 35.60% 29.30% 34.20% 
    GGG 5.20% 16.80% 18.30% 13.40% 
    Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 
    Pearson chi-square   000.0,50.1416
2  p d 
a 9 cells (75.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.00.  
b 3 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.00.  
c 3 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 4.67. 
d 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 25.67.  
e The Pearson chi-square tests for total sub-set of observations are not reported as they are 
equal to those reported in Table 6.14.  




Within different levels of environmental morale (across valence), respondents 
with high environmental morale (see Table 6.15) were more likely to save trees and 
lives (47.8% and 51.2%, respectively) than getting all money (38.4%) in their own 
generation.  
 
By contrast, in the loss scenarios the situation is almost reversed as the majority 
of respondents were more willing to repay a loan (56%) immediately than incurring 
environmental and health losses (15.7% and 17.8%, respectively). Minor differences 
can be observed for those with low environmental morale, where, irrespective of 
valence, respondents preferred to face monetary gains and losses in their own 
generation compared to the other two outcomes. 
 
As shown in Table 6.15 all Pearson chi-square tests are significant at the 5% level 
(or better). However, results here need to be treated with caution. Indeed, in cross-
tabulation analysis, the inevitable drawback of further disaggregating data among 
variables is to increase the number of sampling zeros and small observed (and 
expected) frequencies. This problem is also exacerbated here by the small sample 
size of respondents with low environmental (across valence)219. As stated above, this 
reduces the power of the Pearson chi-square tests thus leading to misleading 
conclusions. However, a possible alternative to test whether or not the observed cell 
frequencies of the variable ‘Choice’ were due to the interaction between 
environmental morale, valence and domain, was to collapse choices into a small 
number of categories. 
  
The distribution of preferences above summarized suggests, in fact, that major 
differences occurred over the choice of allocating all outcomes to the first generation 
versus all other options. Therefore, in order to simplify the analysis, two types of 
choice were considered: one accounting for the option ‘All allocated to the first 
generation’ and the second one considering all other alternatives (i.e., 
evenly/unevenly distribution of outcomes across generations, and all allocated to 
great grandchildren generation). Both the (overall) Pearson chi-square test 
                                                 
219 A possible solution to the problem, which is left to future research, is to increase the sample size 
sufficiently to remove all zero cells.  
 201 
 
  000.0,79.3322  p 220, and the likelihood ratio test 
  004.0,07.1122  pLR  were significant, thus suggesting a statistical 
significant interaction between the four variables.  
 
However, the fact that this relationship was statistically significant did not help 
much explaining the size of the effect of environmental morale. Odds ratios were 
therefore computed to compare the odds of choosing to allocate the outcomes to the 
first generation within valence (across different levels of environmental morale) and 
within different strata of environmental morale (across valence). Odds ratios 











 ,                                                                                           (6.2) 
 
where n  represents the number of observations falling into each cell of the table, and 
subscripts are used to distinguish different conditions over several strata221. In 
general odds can be interpreted as follows. The closer the odds value is to 1, the 
more balanced the relative odds are. Values below 1 and close to 0, are also referred 
as odds-against or less likely to occur. Finally, odds above the unity are more likely 
(than not) to occur. 
 
Unfortunately, even when collapsing choice categories into a small number of 
categories, one cell in the health domain displayed a sampling zero. Therefore, it was 
not possible to compute the odds ratio for that particular scenario. As shown in the 
table, compared to those with low environmental morale, in the gain scenarios people 
with high environmental morale were more impatient for environmental goods. 
Indeed, the odds of choosing to allocate all trees to the first generation (FG) were 
stronger than those for the other two goods (i.e., 1.44). By contrast, differences in 
preferences across different levels of environmental morale were less pronounced in 
                                                 
220 The overall Pearson chi-square and those related to each sub-sample of frequencies were computed 
with zero cells having expected frequencies less than 5.  
221 To give an example, relative to those with low environmental morale, the odds ratio of choosing to 
allocate all money to the first generation if having high environmental morale (i.e., 0.18) is given by 
the ratio of the odds of choosing FG if individuals exhibited high environmental morale (i.e., 78/125 = 
0.624), and the odds of doing so if they exhibited low environmental morale (i.e., 14/4 = 3.5).  
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the loss scenarios as the computed odds ratios are generally close to one, meaning 
that, the odds of choosing to allocate all outcomes to the first generation were similar 
across different levels of environmental morale, especially for the environmental 
scenario. Similarly, among those with high environmental morale, the odds of 
choosing FG in the gain scenarios were about five times of what they were in the loss 
scenarios. Although a similar pattern of preferences can be observed among those 
with low environmental morale, the effect is generally stronger among 
environmentally-friendly respondents.   
 
Table 6.16 
Distribution of choices across domains and levels of environmental morale (EM) 
Gains 
Domain High EM Low EM Total Odds ratio 
 
FG OO FG OO  
  Money 78 125 14 4 221 0.18 
Environment 97 106 7 11 221 1.44 
Health 104 99 13 5 221 0.40 
Total 279 330 34 20 663   
Losses 
Domain High EM Low EM Total Odds ratio 
  FG OO  FG OO     
Money 107 84 18 12 221 0.85 
Environment 30 161 5 25 221 0.93 
Health 34 157 0 30 221 - 
Total 171 402 23 67 663   
High EM 
Domain Gains Losses Total Odds ratio 
 
FG OO  FG OO 
  Money 78 125 107 84 394 0.49 
Environment 97 106 30 161 394 4.91 
Health 104 99 34 157 394 4.85 
Total 279 330 171 402 1182 
 Low EM 
Domain Gains Losses Total Odds ratio 
 
FG OO  FG OO  
  Money 14 4 18 12 48 2.33 
Environment 7 11 5 25 48 3.18 
Health 13 5 0 30 48 - 
Total 34 20 23 67 144 




A vivid representation of the discussion above outlined as well as of the results 
reported in Table 6.15 is provided in Figure 6.7. As shown in the figure, relative to 
monetary outcomes, environmentally-friendly respondents were more impatient to 
experience environmental and health gains than monetary gains, and less patient to 
experience monetary losses immediately compared to environmental and health 
losses. A different pattern of preferences occurred among people who exhibited low 
environmental morale, indicating that the variable matters. For the low 
environmental morale category impatience was stronger for monetary gains and 
losses, and patience prevailed among environmental and health outcomes.  
 





Environment Health Money 
Gains Now Now Spread 
 
Impatient Patient 
Losses Spread Spread Now 
 
Patient Impatient 




Environment Health Money 
Gains Spread Spread Now 
 
Patient Impatient 




Notes: The table summarises respondents’ preferences over the allocation of different goods (i.e., 
monetary, environmental and health outcomes) among generations. In the table, ‘Now’ represents 
respondents’ disposition to allocate the good to their own generation, whereas ‘Spread’ indicates their 
tendency to share the good with other generations. These preferences are accordingly regarded as 
impatient (=now) and patient (=spread) behaviours among participants. 
 
These findings suggest that valence as well as domain had a significant effect on 
the distribution of intergenerational preferences. Furthermore, depending on the 
context, according to their level of environmental morale, individuals exhibited 
different sensitiveness towards different goods. However, as shown in Figure 6.7, 
differences were less pronounced among intangibles222. What was different about 
                                                 
222 This result seems to be in line with neuroeconomics research (see Baddeley, 2013), which, in 
contrast to neoclassical economics, suggests that money can be viewed as an end in itself (i.e., money 
has its own utility) and not just as a means to an end (i.e., goods and services).   
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intangibles? In line with what suggested by Shogren et al. (1994) resolving 
differences in willingness to accept (WTA) and willingness to pay (WTP), possible 
explanation for this relies on the imperfect substitutability of intangible and tangible 
goods. Environmental and health outcomes cannot be perfectly exchanged for 
money, markets for these goods are incomplete and benefits and/or damages are 
irreversible. Therefore although people can make choices about them, they are 
generally not fully compensated for losses. This not only might create a discrepancy 
in evaluating nontradable and tradable goods, but can also lead individuals to exhibit 
a higher willingness to accept gains in their own generation, while postponing losses 
ahead. According with Shogren at al. (ibid) the lower the degree of substitutability 
with money, the higher the WTA-WTP discrepancy is. 
 
Apart from this, in general, more similarities can be found between health and 
environmental outcomes than between environmental and monetary outcomes. As 
suggested by Hardisty and Weber (2009), though difficult to quantify, for example, 
environmental changes always impact health. As stated in the questionnaire, in 
addition to abating air and water pollution; trees absorb carbon dioxide, which 
contributes to climate change and therefore to human lives.   
 
As far as discounting is concerned; the distribution of choice preferences 
provides further evidence into the argument that, environmentally-friendly people 
seem to discount environmental gains and losses more than monetary gains and 
losses (see also Figure 6.5 above).  
 
A recent reconceptualization of the fixed-cost present bias theory (see Hardisty et 
al., 2012), might help explaining these results. According to Hardisty et. al. (ibid), 
time preferences can be explained by the interaction between the psychological 
desire to resolve gains and losses soon (i.e., present bias motive), the desire to avoid 
feelings of deprivation/dread while waiting (see e.g. Hoch and Loewenstein, 1991) 
and many other factors (such as uncertainty, resource slack, opportunity cost, social 
norms and ideals). In line with their predictions, positive and high discount rates for 
environmental gains can be explained, for example, by the interaction between the 
desire of avoiding feelings of deprivation (of trees), uncertainty over the occurrence 
of future gains, and the present bias motive. All these motives follow the same 
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direction and reinforce each other and might explain why, in general, respondents 
preferred above all to save trees in their own generation. By contrast, for 
environmental losses the willingness to resolve things as soon as possible might be 
offset by the negative utility derived from anticipating losses (as environmentally-
friendly people like the environment), and, for example, by the fact that, if losses are 
postponed, respondents may never have to deal with them (or delayed losses may 
never be realized). This ultimately results in a lower (but positive) discount rate for 
environmental losses (i.e. higher willingness to spread losses among generations in 
comparison with monetary losses). What was different about monetary outcomes? 
The psychological desire to satisfy impatience for monetary outcomes might be 
relatively unimportant not only compared with other factors (such as social norms 
and ideals)223, but also compared with that experienced by environmentally-friendly 
people for the environment, thus discounting monetary gains and losses less than 
environmental gains and losses.  
 
Regarding the apparent discrepancy between discounting and intergenerational 
preferences of health versus monetary outcomes, this might be due to the large 
number of zero discounting reported in the first part of the questionnaire attributable 
to that part of respondents who did not complete the second section of the 
questionnaire for the gain scenarios (see also Figure 6.4 above)224. Similar arguments 
may apply when comparing intergenerational preferences and discounting for those 
who exhibited low environmental morale.  
   
6.6 CONCLUSIONS 
 
Given the scarce empirical research directly exploring differences in discounting for 
different goods, this chapter analyses discounting of (and intergenerational 
preferences for) monetary, environmental and health outcomes. The major objectives 
                                                 
223 Social norms and ideals (see Hardisty et al., 2012) can lead individuals to delay gratification (e.g. 
feelings of altruism towards other generations) and to attend losses immediately (e.g. people might 
feel irresponsible to ignore fiscal obligations that will be faced by future generations). These motives 
can explain why respondents preferred above all to spread monetary gains and experience monetary 
losses immediately (i.e. negative discounting). 
224 Recall that only a proportion of respondents who participated to the first part of the survey 




of the analysis were to investigate whether intangibles like environmental outcomes 
may be discounted differently from other outcomes and whether environmental 
morale might play a role in evaluating environmental costs and benefits, an area that 
has been neglected in the literature. To this end, a survey investigation was 
conducted at the University of Bath (UK) among first, second and third year students 
exposed to economics training. Discount rates and intergenerational preferences were 
obtained using respectively a titration procedure and a match task where respondents 
were allowed to allocate the goods across generations.  
 
Contrary to Hardisty and Weber (2009), results from this survey suggest that 
discounting is valence and domain dependent (Hypothesis 1), meaning that 
differences in discounting within valence depend upon domain differences. Although 
the effect of valence appeared to be stronger than that of domain, the effect of 
domain and their interaction also played a role in explaining differences in 
individuals’ discounting. Therefore, the present research not only corroborates 
previous findings that temporal discounting is domain dependent (see e.g. Chapman, 
1996b, and Tsukayama and Duckworth, 2010), but also provides a possible 
explanation for these results. In particular, the empirical analysis suggest that 
different sensitiveness towards the environment (i.e., different levels of 
environmental morale) partially explains differences in discounting within domain 
(across valence) and within valence (across domains) – i.e., Hypothesis 3. Thus, an 
individual can be more impatient for environmental outcomes (i.e., he/she has a high 
discount rate for environmental gains, but a low discount rate for losses), and can 
discount environmental gains more than monetary and health gains, in part, because 
they are environmentally-friendly (i.e., they act in a more eco-conscious way) – i.e. 
Hypothesis 2. This motivates them to evaluate environmental goods differently from 
other types of goods and to discount them accordingly. However, differences were in 
general less pronounced among intangibles. The incompleteness of markets (i.e., 
lack of substitutability with money) and the mutual interdependency between health 
and the environment might have created a more visceral reaction in respondents, who 




These findings remained generally robust even when changing the framing of the 
questions (i.e., in the match task), whereby results confirmed the presence of the sign 
and domain effects and impatience for environmental outcomes was stronger among 
individuals with high environmental morale.  
 
This said, it is also important to acknowledge that in contrast to other studies (see 
e.g. Hardisty and Weber, 2009), this analysis does not control for potential 
confounding factors (e.g. the order of the questions, the scale of the titration 
procedure, inclusion of adults into the sample population, and the use of different 
scenarios) which might affect the robustness of the results. Furthermore, in some 
cases, the unbalanced nature of the sample sizes to an extent undermined the strength 
of the conclusions. All these aspects remain matters of future research.  
 
Despite these considerations, results from this survey may offer guidance to 
policy makers hoping to encourage future-oriented environmental sustainability. As 
suggested by the present analysis, irrespective of valence, environmental outcomes 
are evaluated differently from other tradable and non-tradable goods, though 
differences are less pronounced among intangibles (i.e., environmental and health 
goods). The fact that people exhibited different rates of pure time preference for 
different goods (significantly different for gains, insignificantly different for losses) 
seems to suggest the adoption of different discount rates when dealing with 
consumption goods and when handling with environmental goods.  
 
These findings are in line with some of the arguments in support of the dual 
discounting approach (see Sáez and Requena, 2007, and Almansa and Martínez-Paz, 
2011). According to Almansa and Martínez-Paz (2011, p. 688) one of the theoretical 
reason for applying the dual-rate discounting it that ‘since environmental goods are 
not market goods, individuals have different mindsets and act differently when 
dealing with ‘merchandise’ and when dealing with ‘environmental goods’.’  
 
However, in contrast with other studies (see e.g., Luckert and Admowicz, 1993, 
Tylor et al., 2003, and Gatting and Hendrickx, 2007), even among environmentally-
friendly respondents, revealed preferences in the current research did not provide 
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evidence for lower rates of time preference for environmental goods, thus suggesting 
departures from the dual rate discounting. This leads to the following questions: first, 
what are the implications of relying on such preferences? Are these preferences 
feasible with the objective of maximizing environmental sustainability and social 
welfare? If so, what specific value should the discount rate take on? If not, is there 
any alternative solution?     
 
If governments were to accept individuals’ preferences as described above, the 
consequences for CBA will be twofold. First, the pure rate of time preference should 
be higher than those suggested in the literature for   (i.e., the Stern Review 
considers %0 , while the Green Book assumes %5.0 ), thus intimating a 
higher discount rate than that used in the financial market for cost benefit analysis. 
However, as discussed in chapter 5, this might preclude many desirable projects 
being undertaken even if their impacts are evaluated in the short run (i.e., 0-30 
years). Kula and Evans (2011), for example, in an afforestation project appraisal in 
County Tyrone (Northern Ireland), show that even using a discount rate of 3.5% (as 
suggested by the HM Treasury, 2003), can lead to a negative net present value over a 
time span of 30 years.  
 
These considerations fit into the well-known debate about whether the discount 
rate, and  , should be determined according to a descriptive approach (i.e., it should 
be derived from the sum of individual or government preferences) or a prescriptive 
approach (i.e., it should be normatively agreed with the society’s objective of 
sustainability). Without going into details, the main argument underpinning the 
debate behind the two schools of thought is that the sum of individuals’ preferences 
might differ from collective preferences (see e.g. Klassen and Opschoor, 1991, and 
Bürgenmeier, 1994). Indeed, according to Kula (1981, 1987) society cannot be 
considered as a mortal individual as it has much longer life expectancy than that of 
individuals. This calls for specific evaluations of project impacts to future 
generations. Considering a descriptive approach, a higher discount rate than that used 
in the financial market, will turn out into greater discrimination against future 
generations (see Pearce et al., 1989), thus introducing problems of intergenerational 
equity and justice. However, contrary to Stern (2007), the current research suggests 
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departures from a zero rate of pure time preference, according to which a gain/loss of 
100 trees 10 years from now should be given the same value as today. This not only 
can realistically capture individuals’ behaviour, but might also balance the welfare 
trade-off between the current and future generation(s) thus preventing the so called 
‘tyranny of the future generations’ (see Harrison, 2010).   
 
Second, irrespective of individuals’ level of environmental morale, participants 
showed that compensation for delaying (or the willingness to pay to get) a desirable 
outcome (i.e., gain 100 trees) was a long way away from the premium they were 
willing to accept to put such an event off (i.e., lose 100 trees). Just as prospect theory 
(see e.g. Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) relates differences in risk attitudes towards 
gains and losses to a behavioural anomaly (i.e., endowment effect, which is the 
tendency to value goods that are owned by individuals more than those not held in 
their endowment), the discounting literature attaches this disposition to impatience 
for consumption now rather than later and the reverse for costs. Rational expectations 
would predict that, regardless of valence, two identical situations (i.e., goods) should 
be discounted similarly. However, observed discount rates in survey analyses and 
experiments (see Thaler, 1981, Frederick et al., 2002, and Hardisty et al., 2012) 
typically show that losses are discounted less than gains. A possible explanation for 
this anomaly is that individuals might not be alive to enjoy/deal with it tomorrow. 
The fact that risk and uncertainty over the future influence present bias preferences is 
well acknowledged in the literature – i.e., when considering trade-offs between two 
options in two future moments, stronger relative weights are assigned to the closer 
event in time. It turns out that individuals tend to anticipate (postpone) gains (losses) 
immediately rather than having them hanging over their head (see Loewenstein, 
1987).  
 
In the context of this research, impatience was unexpectedly higher among 
environmentally-friendly respondents. This would suggest myopic behaviour even in 
the presence of ethical considerations. Thus, one may conclude that, if impatience 
matters, economic assessment of loss will be seriously underestimated if they are 
evaluated in terms of gains (see also Knetsch, 1990). Too many projects will pass 
CBA and compensation will fail to fully indemnify adverse environmental changes 
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(see Cullis and Jones, 2009). However, as discussed in the empirical section, rather 
than a more rational discounting process which would predict a uniform (lower) rate 
of time preference, the irreversible nature of natural capital might have stimulated 
more of an affective reaction in environmentally-friendly respondents, thus 
exacerbating the discrepancy between discounting environmental gains and losses. 
Therefore, a paradox of hyperopia seems to be located in this data: people that have 
a long-sighted view discount environmental gains more than losses, but, compared to 
less environmentally-friendly individuals, they are less willing to postpone losses to 
(near and far distant) future generations. Taking these preferences, the benefits of 
doing something now can also be experienced by future generations, but for costs 
this will result in a less discriminatory practice towards future generations.  
Therefore, in this context, present bias preferences will be appreciated by our long-
run selves as this translates into ‘benevolence of the present’ rather than the ‘tyranny 
of the present’ (see Koundouri, 2009).  
 
Keeping in mind the challenging goal of environmental sustainability, the above 
discussion seems to suggest that government intervention is needed not only to 
sensitize individuals towards more eco-conscious behaviour, but also to guarantee 
increasing investments to ameliorate the environment as a ‘grant to future 
generations’. While further empirical research is needed to strengthen this 
conclusion, the results from this analysis envision a more paternalistic role of the 
government, not only to deal with environmental sustainability but also to face a 






APPENDIX 6A: QUESTIONNAIRES 
 
6A.1 QUESTIONNAIRE A 
 
University of Bath 






The purpose of this questionnaire is to gather information on individuals’ time 
preferences. The questionnaire is divided into three different sections. In ‘SECTION 1’ 
and ‘SECTION 2’ you are requested to answer questions about hypothetical scenarios 
regarding time preferences in different contexts. In ‘SECTION 3’ you are asked to 
provide general information about yourself and to state your opinion on particular 
issues.  
 
In the questionnaire you will find questions with the following format: 
 
For each pair of values, please select the answer that best reflects your personal 
preferences. 
 
A. ☐ 50 apples Or ☐ 45 apples 
B. ☐ 50 apples Or ☐ 50 apples 
C. ☐ 50 apples Or ☐ 55 apples 
D. ☐ 50 apples Or ☐ 60 apples 
E. ☐ 50 apples Or ☐ 65 apples 
F. ☐ 50 apples Or ☐ 70 apples 
 
For these questions you are supposed to tick only ONE box for each pair of values, i.e.: 
  
A.  50 apples or ☐ 45 apples 
B.  50 apples or ☐ 50 apples 
C. ☐ 50 apples or  55 apples 
D. ☐ 50 apples or  60 apples 
E. ☐ 50 apples or  65 apples 
F. ☐ 50 apples or  70 apples 
 
 
To answer all the other questions, please tick ONE of the boxes next to the answer(s); 
or, when appropriate, write your answer in the space provided. 
 
I would be very grateful for your contribution to this study. All responses will remain 











Q1) Imagine you won a lottery, worth £10,000. You have the option of either receiving 
the amount of money immediately or receiving a different amount of money “X” 10 
years from now. Would you prefer to receive £10,000 immediately or “X” pounds 10 
years from now? 
 
For each pair of values, please select the answer that best reflects your personal 
preferences. 
 
A. ☐ £10,000 immediately or ☐  £9,000 10 years from now 
B. ☐ £10,000 immediately or ☐ £10,000 10 years from now 
C. ☐ £10,000 immediately or ☐ £11,000 10 years from now 
D. ☐ £10,000 immediately or ☐ £12,000 10 years from now 
E. ☐ £10,000 immediately or ☐ £13,000 10 years from now 
F. ☐ £10,000 immediately or ☐ £14,000 10 years from now 
G. ☐ £10,000 immediately or ☐ £15,000 10 years from now 
H. ☐ £10,000 immediately or ☐ £16,000 10 years from now 
I. ☐ £10,000 immediately or ☐ £17,000 10 years from now 
J. ☐ £10,000 immediately or ☐ £18,000 10 years from now 
 
Please fill in the number that would make the following two options equally attractive 
to you: 
 
A. Receiving £10,000 immediately. 
B. Receiving £________ 10 years from now. 
 
Q2) Imagine you have taken a loan of £10,000. You have the option of either repaying 
the amount of money immediately or delaying your payment by returning a different 
amount of money “X” 10 years from now. Would you prefer to pay £10,000 
immediately or “X” pounds 10 years from now? 
 
For each pair of values, please select the answer that best reflects your personal 
preferences. 
 
A. ☐ £10,000 immediately or ☐  £9,000 10 years from now 
B. ☐ £10,000 immediately or ☐ £10,000 10 years from now 
C. ☐ £10,000 immediately or ☐ £11,000 10 years from now 
D. ☐ £10,000 immediately or ☐ £12,000 10 years from now 
E. ☐ £10,000 immediately or ☐ £13,000 10 years from now 
F. ☐ £10,000 immediately or ☐ £14,000 10 years from now 
G. ☐ £10,000 immediately or ☐ £15,000 10 years from now 
H. ☐ £10,000 immediately or ☐ £16,000 10 years from now 
I. ☐ £10,000 immediately or ☐ £17,000 10 years from now 
J. ☐ £10,000 immediately or ☐ £18,000 10 years from now 
 
Please fill in the number that would make the following two options equally attractive 
to you: 
 
A. Paying £10,000 immediately. 
B. Paying £________ 10 years from now. 
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Q3) Imagine your country’s government is planning to implement a programme to 
reduce urban deforestation. In addition to abating air and water pollution; trees absorb 
carbon dioxide, which contributes to climate change. The government is considering 
whether to implement the programme immediately to save 100 trees, or 10 years from 
now to save a different number “X” of trees. Would you prefer to save 100 trees 
immediately or “X” trees 10 years in the future? 
 
For each pair of values, please select the answer that best reflects your personal 
preferences. 
 
A. ☐ 100 trees immediately or ☐   90 trees 10 years from now 
B. ☐ 100 trees immediately or ☐ 100 trees 10 years from now 
C. ☐ 100 trees immediately or ☐ 110 trees 10 years from now 
D. ☐ 100 trees immediately or ☐ 120 trees 10 years from now 
E. ☐ 100 trees immediately or ☐ 130 trees 10 years from now 
F. ☐ 100 trees immediately or ☐ 140 trees 10 years from now 
G. ☐ 100 trees immediately or ☐ 150 trees 10 years from now 
H. ☐ 100 trees immediately or ☐ 160 trees 10 years from now 
I. ☐ 100 trees immediately or ☐ 170 trees 10 years from now 
J. ☐ 100 trees immediately or ☐ 180 trees 10 years from now 
 
Please fill in the number that would make the following two options equally attractive 
to you: 
 
A. Saving 100 trees immediately. 
B. Saving ________ trees 10 years from now. 
 
Would you prefer to gain £10,000 or to save 100 trees immediately? 
 
A. I would prefer to gain £10,000 immediately                            ☐ 
B. I would prefer to save 100 trees immediately                            ☐ 
 
Q4) Imagine your country’s government wants to ameliorate public transport by 
implementing the construction of new railways, highways and subways. This will 
certainly favour connections but will also contribute to an increase of urban 
deforestation. The government is considering whether to implement the programme 
immediately with a loss of 100 trees or 10 years from now for a different loss of “X” 
trees. Would you prefer to lose 100 trees immediately, or “X” trees 10 years in the 
future? 
 
For each pair of values, please select the answer that best reflects your personal 
preferences. 
 
A. ☐ 100 trees immediately or ☐   90 trees 10 years from now 
B. ☐ 100 trees immediately or ☐ 100 trees 10 years from now 
C. ☐ 100 trees immediately or ☐ 110 trees 10 years from now 
D. ☐ 100 trees immediately or ☐ 120 trees 10 years from now 
E. ☐ 100 trees immediately or ☐ 130 trees 10 years from now 
F. ☐ 100 trees immediately or ☐ 140 trees 10 years from now 
G. ☐ 100 trees immediately or ☐ 150 trees 10 years from now 
H. ☐ 100 trees immediately or ☐ 160 trees 10 years from now 
I. ☐ 100 trees immediately or ☐ 170 trees 10 years from now 
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J. ☐ 100 trees immediately or ☐ 180 trees 10 years from now 
 
Please fill in the number that would make the following two options equally 
unattractive to you: 
 
A. Losing 100 trees immediately.  
B. Losing ________ trees 10 years from now. 
 
Would you prefer to lose £10,000 or to lose 100 trees immediately?  
 
A. I would prefer to lose £10,000 immediately                            ☐ 
B. I would prefer to lose 100 trees immediately                            ☐ 
 
Q5) Imagine your country’s government is planning to implement a programme to 
reduce population’s mortality by providing high quality health care and promoting 
healthy lifestyles. The government is considering whether to implement the programme 
immediately to save 100 lives or 10 years from now to save a different number “X” of 
lives. Would you prefer to save a certain 100 lives immediately or a certain “X” lives 10 
years in the future? 
 
For each pair of values, please select the answer that best reflects your personal 
preferences. 
 
A. ☐ 100 lives immediately or ☐   90 lives 10 years from now 
B. ☐ 100 lives immediately or ☐ 100 lives 10 years from now 
C. ☐ 100 lives immediately or ☐ 110 lives 10 years from now 
D. ☐ 100 lives immediately or ☐ 120 lives 10 years from now 
E. ☐ 100 lives immediately or ☐ 130 lives 10 years from now 
F. ☐ 100 lives immediately or ☐ 140 lives 10 years from now 
G. ☐ 100 lives immediately or ☐ 150 lives 10 years from now 
H. ☐ 100 lives immediately or ☐ 160 lives 10 years from now 
I. ☐ 100 lives immediately or ☐ 170 lives 10 years from now 
J. ☐ 100 lives immediately or ☐ 180 lives 10 years from now 
 
Please fill in the number that would make the following two options equally attractive 
to you: 
 
A. Saving 100 lives immediately. 
B. Saving ________lives 10 years from now. 
 
Would you prefer to gain £10,000 or to save 100 lives immediately?  
 
A. I would prefer to gain £10,000 immediately                            ☐ 
B. I would prefer to save 100 lives immediately                            ☐ 
 
Q6) Imagine your country’s government is planning to expand manufacturing 
industries. This will encourage economic growth but will also increase the population’s 
exposure to pollution and the risk of cancer deaths. The government is considering 
whether to implement the programme immediately with a loss of 100 lives or 10 years 
from now for a different loss of “X” lives. Would you prefer to lose a certain 100 lives 




For each pair of values, please select the answer that best reflects your personal 
preferences. 
 
A. ☐ 100 lives immediately or ☐   90 lives 10 years from now 
B. ☐ 100 lives immediately or ☐ 100 lives 10 years from now 
C. ☐ 100 lives immediately or ☐ 110 lives 10 years from now 
D. ☐ 100 lives immediately or ☐ 120 lives 10 years from now 
E. ☐ 100 lives immediately or ☐ 130 lives 10 years from now 
F. ☐ 100 lives immediately or ☐ 140 lives 10 years from now 
G. ☐ 100 lives immediately or ☐ 150 lives 10 years from now 
H. ☐ 100 lives immediately or ☐ 160 lives 10 years from now 
I. ☐ 100 lives immediately or ☐ 170 lives 10 years from now 
J. ☐ 100 lives immediately or ☐ 180 lives 10 years from now 
 
Please fill in the number that would make the following two options equally attractive 
to you: 
 
A. Losing 100 lives immediately. 
B. Losing ________lives 10 years from now. 
 
Would you prefer to lose £10,000 or to lose 100 lives immediately?  
 
A. I would prefer to lose £10,000 immediately                            ☐ 




Q7) Imagine you won a lottery, worth £10,000. You are given the opportunity of 
receiving the £10,000 in your generation or to allocate the £10,000 across generations.  
 
Please fill in the blank the number that best reflects your personal preferences.    
 
I would prefer to receive £________ in my generation, to leave £________ to my children’s 
generation, to leave £________ to my grandchildren’s generation, and to leave £________to 
my great grandchildren’s generation. 
 
Q8) Imagine the government has implemented a programme to stop urban 
deforestation. The programme will save 100 trees. How would you allocate the 100 trees 
to be saved across generations? 
 
Please fill in the number that best reflects your personal preferences. 
 
I would prefer to save ________ trees in my generation, ________ trees in my children’s 
generation, ________ trees in my grandchildren’s generation, and ________ trees in my 
great grandchildren’s generation. 
 
Q9) Imagine the government has implemented a life saving programme. The 
programme will save 100 lives. How would you allocate the 100 lives to be saved across 
generations? 
 
Please fill in the number that best reflects your personal preferences. 
 
I would prefer to save ________ lives in my generation, ________ lives in my children’s 
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generation, ________ lives in my grandchildren’s generation, and ________ lives in my 






Male                                                                                            ☐ 
Female                                                                                            ☐ 
 
Q11) Year of Degree Programme: 
 
First                                                                                            ☐ 
Second                                                                                            ☐ 
Third                                                                                            ☐ 
 
Q12) Imagine you have two identical ‘supermarket’ type goods: one is environmentally 
-friendly, the other one is a conventional product. Compared to the price of the 
conventional good, what price would you be willing to pay to buy the environmentally-
friendly item? The difference in price helps to protect the environment. 
 
Only the same price as the conventional good                            ☐ 
10 % more than the price of the conventional good                       ☐ 
20 % more than the price of the conventional good                           ☐ 
30 % more than the price of the conventional good                ☐ 
More than 30% than the price of the conventional good                ☐ 
 
Q13) Please indicate how often you take each action for environmental reasons: 
 
a) Save water when taking a shower or brushing your teeth: 
 
Never                                                                                            ☐ 
Rarely                                                                                            ☐ 
Sometimes                                                                                    ☐ 
Often                                                                                            ☐ 




Never                                                                                            ☐ 
Rarely                                                                                            ☐ 
Sometimes                                                                                    ☐ 
Often                                                                                            ☐ 
Always                                                                                            ☐ 
 
c) Turn off lights you are not using: 
 
Never                                                                                            ☐ 
Rarely                                                                                            ☐ 
Sometimes                                                                                    ☐ 
Often                                                                                            ☐ 
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Always                                                                                            ☐ 
 
d) Walk, cycle or take public transport: 
 
Never                                                                                            ☐ 
Rarely                                                                                            ☐ 
Sometimes                                                                                    ☐ 
Often                                                                                            ☐ 
Always                                                                                            ☐ 
 
Thank for taking the time to complete this questionnaire! 
 
6A.2 QUESTIONNAIRE B 





Q7) Imagine you have taken a loan of £10,000. You are given the opportunity of 
repaying the £10,000 in your generation or to allocate the payment of £10,000 across 
generations.   
 
Please fill in the blank the number that best reflects your personal preferences.    
 
I would prefer to pay £________ in my generation, to leave £________ to my children’s 
generation, to leave £________ to my grandchildren’s generation, and to leave £________to 
my great grandchildren’s generation. 
 
Q8) Imagine the government has implemented a programme to favour public 
transport. The programme will cause a loss of 100 trees. How would you allocate the 
loss of 100 trees across generations? 
 
Please fill in the number that best reflects your personal preferences. 
 
I would prefer to lose ________ trees in my generation, ________ trees in my children’s 
generation, ________ trees in my grandchildren’s generation, and ________ trees in my 
great grandchildren’s generation. 
 
Q9) Imagine the government has implemented a programme to favour manufacturing 
industries. The programme will cause a loss of 100 lives due to additional pollution. 
How would you allocate the loss of 100 lives across generations? 
 
Please fill in the number that best reflects your personal preferences. 
 
I would prefer to lose ________ lives in my generation, ________ lives in my children’s 
generation, ________ lives in my grandchildren’s generation, and ________ lives in my 




APPENDIX 6B: ANOVA DESIGNS 
 
6B. 1 TWO-WAY GENERAL LINEAR MODEL (GLM) ANOVA 
DESIGN 
 
In a two-way ANOVA design, the structural model can be formally summarized by 
the following equation (see e.g. Maxwell and Delaney, 1990, and Cardinal and 
Aitken, 2006)225: 
 
        ijkijkjkikijkjiijkY   ,                        (6B.1)                                                                                            
 
where ijkY  is the dependent variable score for subject i  at the jth level of Factor A 
(e.g., valence ) and the kth level of Factor B (e.g., domain),   is the dependent 
variable score free of any influence of the experimental conditions (i.e., the grand 
mean)226, ji  , , and k  are respectively the random contributions of subject i , and 
that of the jth  and kth level of Factors A and B227,  ij and  ik are the 
interactions between subject i  and each level of the two factors,   jk is the 
interaction effect of the jth  level of Factor A and the kth  of Factor B,  ijk
represents the contribution of the interaction of subject i  with each level of the two 
                                                 
225 Equation (6B.1) represents a fully related (non-additive) factorial design GLM. Among other 
things, this model seems to be a more realistic representation of the data. In contrast with additive 
models, in fact, it allows subjects to interact with all variables – i.e., it assumes that different 
treatments may affect different subject in different way and therefore it accommodates score variance 
attributable to different subjects. For an explanation of the differences between additive and non-
additive models, see e.g. Girden (1992), Rutherford (2001), and Cardinal and Aitken (2006).    
226 The grand mean can be defined as the sum of the means of each separate factor, divided by the 









/ , where 
jk denotes the separate experimental 
condition means, and qp,  are respectively the number of levels in Factors A and B. 
227 That is, these terms represent the degree to which the marginal mean of conditions ,, ji and k
deviates from the overall mean, where the marginal mean for each level of the factors is defined as the 
performance estimates under the levels of one factor, averaged over the influence of the other factor. 
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factors228, and ijk  is the amount by which the score of person i  in conditions j  and 
k  of Factors A and B deviates from the scores predicted by the two factors GLM 
(i.e., a random error)229. 
 
Equation (6B.1) summaries a system of equations, where each equation 
represents a single dependent variable score. ANOVA assumes that the scores of 
each condition are independent and normally distributed, and have the same variance 
(i.e., homogeneity of variance). Therefore they can only differ in their means. In 
order to measure the mean variation across conditions, ANOVA calculations rely on 
sum of squares (SS) estimations230, from which expected mean squares (MS) and F-
test statistics can be computed to assess the impact of a specific factor231.  
 
According to the model, there are seven effects to be estimated: three main factor 
effects, three two-way interactions (A × B, A × S, B × S) – where S stays for 
Subjects –, and one three way interaction (A × B × S). However, the main objective 
of the model is to analyse the main effects of Factors A and B as well as their 
interaction. Thus, the null hypotheses to be tested are that all means (across levels 
and factors) are equal to each other and equal to the grand mean (i.e., all treatment 
effects are zero), and that there is no interaction between the two factors.  
 
In a balanced two-way within-subject ANOVA the sum of squares of a particular 
effect can be computed from the full model described in equation (6B.1), where it is 
                                                 
228 Although in ANOVA GLMs the interaction term between each factor and subjects is generally 
captured by the F-test used to assess the main effects of Factors A and B, the term representing the 
interaction between subjects and the other two factors (i.e., 
ijk  ) is commonly omitted (i.e., the 
interaction is equal to zero) as the presence of only one score per subject per experimental condition 
prevents its computation (see Rutherford, 2001). Therefore, it is assumed that the interaction is 
confounded with the error term 
ijk , which can be written more accurately as   ijkijk   .  
229Specifically, the error term can be defined as follows: 
        ijkjkikijkjiijkijkijkijk YYY   ˆ , where ijkYˆ  represents the 
predicted scores per subject and in each experimental condition. 
230 The least-squares criterion is used here to minimize the errors of the predicted values of the 
dependent variables. 
231 These statistics vary across different ANOVA designs. For a comprehensive description of them 
see, for example, Maxwell and Delaney (1990). In this context, the sum of squares of a particular 
treatment can be defined as the summed squared deviations of the treatment marginal mean from the 
grand mean, multiplied by the total number of observations per treatment and the number of levels of 
the other factor. 
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assumed that Factors A and B are fixed factors, while S is a random factor. However, 
in contrast with a between-subjects design, in this case, the choice of the error term 
for a specific effect is dictated by the expected mean squares ( EMS )232 of the effects 
in the model, rather than by the mean square error term (which is an estimation of the 
population variance). This is particularly relevant for the computation of the F-test 
statistics, which compares the variance of the expected mean squares of each 







F  ,                                                                                          (6B.2) 
 
As a general rule of thumb, the error term of an effect is chosen in a way that it 
differs from the expected mean square of the effect itself only from an additional 
term over the denominator of the F-test. In the model described by equation (6B.1), 
the interaction terms between a specific factor and subjects (and between all factors 
and subjects) can be used as an appropriate error term to test the main effects of the 
factors (and that of their interaction). This is because the expected mean square of a 
specific factor is given by the sum of the population variance, the variance 
attributable to the interaction between the factor and the subjects, and the variance 
generated by the main effect of the factor. By contrast, the expected mean square of 
the interaction of that particular factor with subjects differs from the expected mean 
square of the effect itself only in that the former does not include the variation of the 
main effect of the factor. Therefore, the interaction between the factor and subjects 
can be used as an error term for testing the factor main effect. The same 
considerations can also be applied to the interaction between factors (and factors and 
subjects). 
 
It is worth emphasizing that, when the null hypothesis is true, the variance 
attributable to the main effect of the factor (or that of their interaction) is equal to 
zero, and    errortreatment EMSEMS  . However, if the null hypothesis is false, the F-test 
statistics becomes significant the more it departs from one – i.e., when 
                                                 
232 The expected mean squares for each effect is given by the ratio between the sum of square 
attributable to an effect and the degrees of freedom used to calculate the relative sum of squares. 
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   errortreatment EMSEMS  .    Table 6B.1 provides a summary of the ANOVA output as 
well as a description of the main statistics used to explain the results.  
 
Table 6B.1 
Two-way within-subjects ANOVA table 
Effect SS df MSa F 
Factor A SSA (p-1) MSA MSA/MSA × S 
Error (Factor A × S) SSA × S (p-1)(n-1) MSA × S   
Factor B SSB (q-1) MSB MSB/MSB × S 
Error (Factor B × S) SSB × S (q-1)(n-1) MSB × S   
Factor A × B SSA × B (p-1)(q-1) MSA × B MSA × B/MSA × B × S 
Error (Factor A × B × S) SSA × B × S (p-1)(q-1)(n-1) MSA × B × S   
a MS  can be also obtained by dividing the respective SS of the effect under consideration by its 
degrees of freedom.   
Notes: p and q are the levels of Factors A and B, respectively. n is the number of subjects. SS 
represents sum of squares for specific factor effects and interactions. df represents the degrees of 
freedom used to compute SS. MS refers to expected mean squares for specific factor effects and 
interactions. F is the F-test statistic obtained using expected mean squares. 
 
6B.2 TWO-WAY MIXED GENERAL LINEAR MODEL (GLM) 
ANOVA DESIGN 
 
A two-way mixed ANOVA design can be formally written as follows (see e.g. 
Maxwell and Delaney, 1990, and Cardinal and Aitken, 2006): 
 
        ijkjkjkijikjijkY   ,                                               (6B.3) 
 
where ijkY is the dependent variable score for subject i  at the jth  level of Factor A 
(e.g., environmental morale) and the kth  level of Factor B (e.g., valence),   is the 
dependent variable score free of any influence of the experimental conditions (i.e., 
the grand mean), j  and k  are respectively the random contributions of the jth  
and kth level of Factors A and B,  ji  is the contribution of subject i  to the jth  
level of Factor A,     jki  is the effect of the interaction between the kth  level of 
Factor B and the ithsubject in the jth  level of Factor A,   jk is the interaction 
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effect of the jth  level of Factor A and the kth  level of Factor B, and ijk  is a 
random error term associated with measuring person i  (that always experiences 
treatment A) in condition Bk . 
 
This model is similar to that described in equation (6B.1). However, there is a 
substantial difference in the way subjects and their effects are represented into the 
models. Specifically, in the model described by equation (6B.3) subjects are nested 
under Factor A as each subject appears in only one level of A233. Therefore, 
differently from a two-way within-subjects design, in a mixed design it is impossible 
to verify whether the effect of Factor A differs across subjects. This nested effect 
substitutes therefore the main effect of S and its interaction with Factor A in equation 
(6B.1), but it does not affect Factor B234. A natural consequence of this is that rather 
than seven effects, there are now five effects to be analysed in the model.  
 
The general principles described earlier for repeated measures ANOVA designs 
are also valid here to analyse the mean variation across conditions. The only 
difference occurs in the source of variability used to compute the denominator of the 
F-test235, which is employed to assess the significance of each factor main effect and 
their interaction. In this case, the F-test needs to take into account that subject 
variation cannot be analysed separately from Factor A. Table 6B.2 reports a 
summary of the ANOVA output as well as the main statistics used to obtain the 
results. As shown in Table 6B.2, the between-subjects variability is attributed not 
only to the effect of Factor A (A), but also to differences between subjects in the 
same group (S/A). Similarly, the within-subjects variability is attributed to either the 
effect of Factor B (B), or an interaction between the two factors (B × A), or an 
interaction between Factor B and the subject-to-subject variability (e.g., an effect of 
                                                 
233 This is indicated by the  ji  notation in equation (6B.3). 
234 The interaction between S and Factor B,   jki , still holds as each subject has a score at each 
and every level of Factor B (= valence).  
235 Compared to the model described in equation (6B.1), the specific expressions for sum of squares 
are identical for the main effects of A, B, and A × B in a two-way within-subjects design. The only 
differences occur in the error terms, which are chosen following the same principles above described 




valence that differs for each subject), which can only be measured, for example, 
within an environmental morale group (B × S/A).  
 
Table 6B.2 
One within-subjects factor and one between-subjects factor design ANOVA table 
Effect SS df MSa F 
Between-subjects (S):     
Factor A SSA (a-1) MSA MSA/MSS/A 
Error (Factor S/A) SS S/A a(n-1) MS S/A 
 
Within-subjects:     
Factor B SSB (b-1) MSB MSB/MSS/A 
Factor B × A SSB × A (a-1)(b-1) MSB × A MSB × A/MSB × S/A 
Error (Factor B × S/A) SSB × S/A a(b-1)(n-1) MSB × S/A 
 
a MS  can be also obtained by dividing the respective SS of the effect under consideration by its 
degrees of freedom.   
Notes: a and b are the levels of Factors A and B respectively. n is the number of subjects per group 
(per level of A). SS represents sum of squares for specific factor effects and interactions. df represents 
the degrees of freedom used to compute SS. MS refers to expected mean squares for specific factor 
effects and interactions. F is the F-test statistic obtained using expected mean squares. 
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Two within-subjects factors and one between-subjects factor design ANOVA table (full model) 
Effect SSa Df MS F p-valueb Partial(η2)c 
Between-subjects (S):             
Genderd 0.059 1 0.059 0.574 0.449 0.001 
Error (S/Gender) 45.179 440 0.103 
   
Within-subjects: 
      
Valence 7.280 1 7.28 162.401 0.000 0.270 
Valence × Gender 0.260 1 0.26 5.793 0.016 0.013 
Error (Valence × S/Gender) 19.724 440 0.045    
Domain 0.289 2 0.144 3.331 0.036 0.008 
Domain × Gender 0.032 2 0.016 0.364 0.695 0.001 
Error (Domain × S/Gender) 38.164 880 0.043    
Valence × Domain 0.226 2 0.113 4.392 0.013 0.010 
Valence × Domain × Gender 0.094 2 0.047 1.834 0.160 0.004 
Error (Valence × Domain × 
S/Gender) 
22.624 880 0.026    
 
Mauchly's Test of Spericitye 
Valence   .,102  p  
Domain   773.0,515.022  p  
Valence × Domain   759.0,552.022  p  
 
Levene’s Test of Equality of Error Variancef236 
Monetary Gains   001.0,286.11440,1  pF  
Monetary Losses   455.0,560.0440,1  pF  
Environmental Gains   004.0,584.8440,1  pF  
Environmental Losses   001.0,218.11440,1  pF  
Health Gains   144.0,144.2440,1  pF  
Health Losses   073.0,237.3440,1  pF  
a Type III sum of squares. 
b Results are evaluated at the 5% significance level. 
c Partial eta squared, η2, is used to assess the effect size of each factor (i.e. the % of variance 
attributable to each factor). 
d Gender: 271 males, and 171 females. 
e The Mauchly’s Test of Sphericity is testing the null hypothesis of homogeneity of variance. A p-
value > 0.05 provides support for the null hypothesis. 
f The Levene’s Test of Equality of Error Variances tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of 
the dependent variable is equal across males and females for different outcomes. A p-value > 0.05 
provides support for the null hypothesis. 
 
                                                 
236 All tables reported in this Appendix show that the Levene’s test of equality of variance is 
significant for some of the outcomes. Given the unbalanced nature of the between-subjects factors 
used in the analysis, this might create a distortion to Type I error rates (i.e., the incorrect conclusion 
that the between-subjects factor has a significant main effect on discounting). However, as shown in 
the tables, the between-subjects factors are always insignificant, thus suggesting that generally the 
violation of this assumption does not represent a problem (see Cardinal and Aitken, 2006, and 
Maxwell and Delaney, 1990).  
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Two within-subjects factors and one between-subjects factor design ANOVA table (sub-sample: 
medium/high environmental morale) 
Effect SSa df MS F p-valueb Partial(η2)c 
Between-subjects (S):             
Genderd 0.170 1 0.170 1.937 0.165 0.005 
Error (S/Gender) 34.368 392 0.088    
Within-subjects:       
Valence 6.276 1 6.276 145.126 0.000 0.27 
Valence × Gender 0.135 1 0.135 3.124 0.078 0.008 
Error (Valence × S/Gender) 16.953 392 0.043    
Domain 0.321 2 0.116 2.890 0.056 0.007 
Domain × Gender 0.036 2 0.018 0.451 0.637 0.001 
Error (Domain × S/Gender) 31.355 784 0.040    
Valence × Domain 0.286 2 0.143 5.816 0.003 0.015 
Valence × Domain × Gender 0.049 2 0.024 0.988 0.373 0.003 
Error (Valence × Domain × S/Gender) 19.3 784 0.025    
 
Mauchly's Test of Spericitye 
Valence   .,102  p  
Domain   765.0,535.022  p  
Valence × Domain   449.0,602.122  p  
 
Levene’s Test of Equality of Error Variancef 
Monetary Gains   001.0,692.11392,1  pF  
Monetary Losses   082.0,033.3392,1  pF  
Environmental Gains   005.0,088.8392,1  pF  
Environmental Losses   087.0,935.2392,1  pF  
Health Gains   026.0,965.4392,1  pF  
Health Losses   004.0,39.8392,1  pF  
a,b,c,e,f As in Table 6C.1. 
d Gender: 234 males, and 160 females. 

















Two within-subjects factors and one between-subjects factor design ANOVA table (sub-sample: low 
environmental morale) 
Effect SSa df MS F p-valueb Partial(η2)c 
Between-subjects (S):             
Genderd 0.043 1 0.043 0.196 0.660 0.004 
Error (S/Gender) 10.010 46 0.218    
Within-subjects:       
Valence 1.232 1 1.231 22.263 0.000 0.326 
Valence × Gender 0.347 1 0.347 6.284 0.016 0.12 
Error (Valence × S/Gender) 2.543 46 0.055    
Domain 0.059 2 0.029 0.398 0.672 0.009 
Domain × Gender 0.009 2 0.005 0.064 0.938 0.001 
Error (Domain × S/Gender) 6.773 92 0.074    
Valence × Domain 0.005 2 0.028 0.067 0.935 0.001 
Valence × Domain × Gender 0.055 2 0.028 0.794 0.455 0.017 
Error (Valence × Domain × S/Gender) 3.206 92 0.035    
 
Mauchly's Test of Spericitye 
Valence   .,102  p  
Domain   259.0,698.222  p  
Valence × Domain   092.0,552.022  p  
 
Levene’s Test of Equality of Error Variancef 
Monetary Gains   224.0,519.146,1  pF  
Monetary Losses   419.0,664.046,1  pF  
Environmental Gains   366.0,883.046,1  pF  
Environmental Losses   001.0,029.1246,1  pF  
Health Gains   892.0,019.046,1  pF  
Health Losses   050.0,061.446,1  pF  
a,b,c,e,f As in Table 6C.1. 
d Gender: 37 males, and 11 females. 




















Figure 6C.1: Gender differences - Estimated marginal means across valence and domain 
 
 
Notes: The figure is divided into three groups of graphs. The top of the figure shows estimated 
marginal means across valence and domain for males and females in the full model. Similar 
estimations for the sub-sample of respondents with medium/high environmental morale and low 














One within-subjects factor and two between-subjects factors design ANOVA table 
Effect SSa df MS F p-valueb Partial(η2)c 
Between-subjects (S):             
Genderd 0.011 1 0.011 0.153 0.696 0.000 
Environmental moraled 0.160 1 0.160 2.148 0.144 0.005 
Gender × Environmental morale 0.035 1 0.035 0.464 0.496 0.001 
Error (S/Gender and Environmental 
morale) 
32.608 438 0.074    
Within-subjects:       
Valence 1.28 1 1.28 31.193 0.000 0.066 
Valence × Gender 0.381 1 0.381 9.278 0.002 0.021 
Valence × Environmental morale 0.007 1 0.007 0.162 0.688 0.000 
Valence × Gender × Environmental 
morale 
0.161 1 0.161 3.92 0.048 0.009 
Error (Valence × S/Gender and 
Environmental morale) 
17.978 438 0.041    
 
Mauchly's Test of Spericitye 
Valence   .,102  p  
 
Levene’s Test of Equality of Error Variancef 
Environmental Gains   014.0,558.3438,1  pF  
Environmental Losses   000.0,782.14438,1  pF  
a,b,c,e As in Table 6C.1. 
d Gender: 271 males, and 171 females. Environmental morale: 394 respondents with medium/high 
environmental morale, and 48 respondents with low environmental morale. 
f The Levene’s Test of Equality of Error Variances tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of 
the dependent variable is equal across males and females with different levels of environmental 
morale. A p-value > 0.05 provides support for the null hypothesis. 
Notes: SPSS output. Design: intercept + gender + environmental morale + gender × environmental 





















Figure 6C.2: Gender differences - Estimated marginal means across valence levels of environmental 









































Two within-subjects factors and one between-subjects factor design ANOVA table (full model) 
Effect SSa Df MS F p-valueb Partial(η2)c 
Between-subjects (S):             
YDd 0.304 2 0.152 1.487 0.227 0.007 
Error (S/YD) 44.933 439 0.102    
Within-subjects:       
Valence 4.471 1 4.471 99.020 0.000 0.184 
Valence × YD 0.163 2 0.082 1.809 0.165 0.008 
Error (Valence × S/YD) 19.820 439 0.045    
Domain 0.214 2 0.107 2.469 0.085 0.006 
Domain × YD 0.057 4 0.014 .331 0.857 0.006 
Error (Domain × S/YD) 38.138 878 0.043    
Valence × Domain 0.105 2 0.053 2.043 0.130 0.005 
Valence × Domain × YD 0.070 4 0.017 0.675 0.609 0.003 
Error (Valence × Domain × 
S/YD) 
22.649 878 0.026    
 
Mauchly's Test of Spericitye 
Valence   .,102  p  
Domain   781.0,495.022  p  
Valence × Domain   708.0,692.022  p  
 
Levene’s Test of Equality of Error Variancef237 
Monetary Gains   699.0,358.0439,1  pF  
Monetary Losses   621.0,477.0439,1  pF  
Environmental Gains   219.0,525.1439,1  pF  
Environmental Losses   019.0,010.4439,1  pF  
Health Gains   788.0,238.0439,1  pF  
Health Losses   008.0,943.4439,1  pF  
a Type III sum of squares. 
b Results are evaluated at the 5% significance level. 
c Partial eta squared, η2, is used to assess the effect size of each factor (i.e. the % of variance 
attributable to each factor). 
d YD (Year of Degree): 268 first year students, 78 second year students, and 96 third year students. 
e The Mauchly’s Test of Sphericity is testing the null hypothesis of homogeneity of variance. A p-
value > 0.05 provides support for the null hypothesis. 
f The Levene’s Test of Equality of Error Variances tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of 
the dependent variable is equal across first, second and third year students for different outcomes. A p-
value > 0.05 provides support for the null hypothesis. 





                                                 




Two within-subjects factors and one between-subjects factor design ANOVA table (sub-sample: 
medium/high environmental morale) 
Effect SSa df MS F p-valueb Partial(η2)c 
Between-subjects (S):             
YDd 0.218 2 0.109 1.242 0.290 0.006 
Error (S/YD) 34.320 391 0.088    
Within-subjects:       
Valence 3.865 1 3.865 89.205 0.000 0.186 
Valence × YD 0.148 2 0.074 1.705 0.183 0.009 
Error (Valence × S/YD) 16.940 391 0.043    
Domain 0.163 2 0.082 2.037 0.131 0.005 
Domain × YD 0.065 4 0.016 0.404 0.806 0.002 
Error (Domain × S/YD) 31.327 782 0.040    
Valence × Domain 0.164 2 0.082 3.322 0.037 0.008 
Valence × Domain × YD 0.042 4 0.011 .0427 0.789 0.002 
Error (Valence × Domain × S/YD) 19.307 782 0.025    
 
Mauchly's Test of Spericitye 
Valence   .,102  p  
Domain   773.0,514.022  p  
Valence × Domain   470.0,511.122  p  
 
Levene’s Test of Equality of Error Variancef 
Monetary Gains   719.0,330.0391,1  pF  
Monetary Losses   193.0,652.1391,1  pF  
Environmental Gains   268.0,322.1391,1  pF  
Environmental Losses   020.0,948.3391,1  pF  
Health Gains   259.0,357.1391,1  pF  
Health Losses   003.0,914.5391,1  pF  
a,b,c,e,f As in Table 6D.1. 
d YD (Year of Degree): 239 first year students, 70 second year students, and 85 third year students. 





















Two within-subjects factors and one between-subjects factor design ANOVA table (sub-sample: low 
environmental morale) 
Effect SSa df MS F p-valueb Partial(η2)c 
Between-subjects (S):             
YDd 0.808 2 0.404 1.967 0.152 0.080 
Error (S/YD) 9.245 45 0.205    
Within-subjects:       
Valence 0.584 1 0.584 9.564 0.003 0.175 
Valence × YD 0.142 2 0.071 1.160 0.323 0.049 
Error (Valence × S/YD) 2.749 45 0.061    
Domain 0.074 2 0.037 0.493 0.612 0.011 
Domain × YD 0.009 4 0.002 0.029 0.998 0.001 
Error (Domain × S/YD) 6.774 90 0.075    
Valence × Domain 0.046 2 0.023 0.650 0.524 0.014 
Valence × Domain × YD 0.091 4 0.023 0.644 0.633 0.028 
Error (Valence × Domain × S/YD) 3.171 90 0.035    
 
Mauchly's Test of Spericitye 
Valence   .,102  p  
Domain   270.0,616.222  p  
Valence × Domain   11.0,409.422  p  
 
Levene’s Test of Equality of Error Variancef 
Monetary Gains   001.0,5.845,1  pF  
Monetary Losses   642.0,447.045,1  pF  
Environmental Gains   016.0,555.445,1  pF  
Environmental Losses   560.0,587.045,1  pF  
Health Gains   166.0,872.145,1  pF  
Health Losses   004.0,325.645,1  pF  
a,b,c,e,f As in Table 6D.1. 
d YD (Year of Degree): 29 first year students, 8 second year students, and 11 third year students. 






















One within-subjects factor and two between-subjects factors design ANOVA table 
Effect SSa df MS F p-valueb Partial(η2)c 
Between-subjects (S):             
YDd 0.255 2 0.127 1.715 0.181 0.008 
Environmental moraled 0.221 1 0.221 2.979 0.085 0.007 
YD × Environmental morale 0.164 2 0.082 1.105 0.332 0.005 
Error (S/YD and Environmental 
morale) 
32.366 436 0.074    
Within-subjects:       
Valence 0.506 1 0.506 12.124 0.001 0.027 
Valence × YD 0.117 2 0.059 1.406 0.246 0.006 
Valence × Environmental 
morale 
0.039 1 0.039 0.946 0.331 0.002 
Valence × YD × Environmental 
morale 
0.056 2 0.028 0.669 0.513 0.003 
Error (Valence × S/YD and 
Environmental morale) 
18.196 436 0.042    
 
Mauchly's Test of Spericitye 
Valence   .,102  p  
 
Levene’s Test of Equality of Error Variancef 
Environmental Gains   042.0,332.2436,1  pF  
Environmental Losses   000.0,518.7436,1  pF  
a,b,c,e As in Table 6D.1 
d YD (Year of Degree): 268 first year students, 78 second year students, and 96 third year students. 
Environmental morale: 394 respondents with medium/high environmental morale, and 48 respondents 
with low environmental morale. 
f The Levene’s Test of Equality of Error Variances tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of 
the dependent variable is equal across first, second, and third year students with different levels of 
environmental morale. A p-value > 0.05 provides support for the null hypothesis. 
Notes: SPSS output. Design: intercept + YD + environmental morale + YD × environmental morale. 



















The harmful impact of human activities on environmental conservation and non-
renewable resource exhaustion are becoming a matter of great concern with each 
passing year. Over the last four decades, environmental economics has been mainly 
focused on developing solutions for market failures. The idea that economic theory 
can correct market failures is based on the assumption of rational behaviour. Rational 
choice theory can only guide environmental policy if people make consistent and 
systematic choices. However, there are circumstances in which individuals’ 
behaviour departs from rational expectations. Since its advent, behavioural 
economics analyses, catalogues and explains systematic deviations from rational 
choices by introducing more psychology into economics. Despite the attention that 
behavioural economics has received in different fields of study (i.e., tax compliance, 
individual cooperation), environmental and resource economics includes little 
empirical evidence aimed at analysing behavioural failures into environmental 
contexts.  
 
This study makes a contribution to this area of research. The analysis makes: (i) a 
theoretical contribution via exploring the concept of environmental morale; (ii) an 
empirical contribution via analysing the linkage between environmental morale and 
recycling behaviour and intertemporal choices; and (iii) a policy contribution by 
discussing the relevant policy implications stemming from (i) and (ii).  
 
7.2 MAJOR FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
The importance of morale considerations (or social norms) in human life has been 
widely recognized in different fields of study such as tax and benefit compliance. 
However, to date there are only a few contributions (mostly theoretical) to the 
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literature that analyse the link between environmental morale and individuals’ 
behaviour. This motivated the current research. Theoretically the study provides a 
novel and broader definition of environmental morale, which is discussed in chapter 
2 along with its possible link with ‘other-regarding’ preferences, namely social 
norms, altruism, and reciprocal preferences. Specifically, environmental morale is 
viewed in this analysis not only as the act of doing an action for its intrinsic 
satisfaction, but also as a moral obligation that comes from individuals’ concern 
about the environment.  
 
Based on this definition, the study empirically investigates how environmental 
morale interplays with individuals’ behaviour within two different contexts: 
recycling participation under different policy schemes (i.e., a voluntary scheme, a 
facilitating nudge policy, and a mandatory scheme), and intertemporal choices 
among different domains (i.e., monetary, environmental and health outcomes) and 
valence (i.e., gains and losses). The rationale for separate analysis in each of these 
contexts is addressed respectively in chapters 3 and 6 of this thesis and is pertinent to 
what follows. Understanding the interaction between intrinsic and extrinsic 
motivations as well as studying the factors that affect discounting is crucial for 
successful policy implementation. On the one hand, intrinsic motivation in the form 
of environmental morale might render certain policy more effective (i.e., crowding-
in) and others less effective (crowding-out). On the other hand, ethical considerations 
might help at explaining how people form expectations about tangible (i.e., money) 
and intangible (i.e., environment and health) future outcomes. Original survey 
investigations were employed to analyse these issues. Results are reported and 
discussed in detail respectively in chapters 4 and 6 of this thesis.  
 
In general, in both contexts empirical results underline the relevance of 
environmental morale in determining individuals’ behaviour towards the 
environment. Not surprisingly, results indicate that environmentally-friendly 
individuals are more willing to contribute to environmental preservation (even when 
this is costly to them in terms of time and trouble costs) and feel the ‘urgency’ of 
doing something for the environment ‘now’, not eventually, and not when this fits 
well into a schedule. These findings support the idea that homo economicus 
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represents only a single explanation of how human beings act and what they value. 
Personal motivations and ‘other-regarding’ preferences seem also to play an 
important role to modelling ‘real life’ and individuals’ behaviour. Thus, ‘real 
humans’ – i.e., homo realitus – are certainly capable of rational decisions, but might 
also be ‘predictably irrational’ (see Ariely, 2009) as their actions and reactions are 
swayed by emotions and constrained by social norms and moral/ethical standards. In 
other words, they rely on bounded rationality (i.e., they have cognitive and 
information processing capabilities).  
  
Indeed, within the context of recycling, results suggest that individuals react to 
government policies not only according to their level of environmental morale, but 
also depending on the nature of the signals. As with other studies in different areas of 
research (see e.g. Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000b), responses to the follow-up 
questions and empirical results discussed in chapter 4 support the hypothesis that 
external regulations can be counterproductive – i.e., crowd-out intrinsic motivation. 
In particular, the survey revealed that individuals were generally willing to increase 
their contribution to recycling both with a policy improvement (a facilitating nudge 
policy measure) and the introduction of a fine (a mandatory scheme), with the latter 
having a stronger disciplining effect on respondents. However, the crowding-out 
effect of intrinsic motivation was predominant in the mandatory scheme, whereas the 
crowding-in effect was stronger in the facilitating nudge policy measure. Thus, 
according to results obtained from this analysis, a facilitating nudge policy (such as 
kerbside collection) seems to be more effective than a mandatory scheme in fostering 
recycling motivation and behaviour.  
  
Similarly, the survey investigation employed to analyse the relationship between 
environmental morale and individuals’ intertemporal choices provides further 
evidence of behavioural failures. As discussed in chapter 5, a large number of 
theoretical and empirical studies (see e.g. Sáez and Requena, 2007, Almansa and 
Martínez-Paz, 2011, and Stern, 2007) have recently advocated the employment of a 
lower discount rate than that used in the financial market ‘as a grant to future 
generations’. This is generally justified by ethical considerations regarding 
intergenerational issues and environmental sustainability. In line with the ongoing 
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debate, environmentally-friendly respondents were expected to be less likely to 
exhibit a rate of pure time preferences higher than zero. Indeed, according to the 
literature, ethical concerns are more likely to activate a deliberative (or cognitive) 
system, thus leading individuals to normatively disapprove of discounting as this is 
against social justice towards future generations. However, as discussed in chapter 6, 
results from this study move in an opposite direction and show that, compared to less 
environmentally-friendly individuals, those who cared more about the environment 
were also more impatient. As such, they discounted environmental gains more than 
losses with a rate of pure time preference (on average) a long way away from zero.  
 
The question is: how can these findings affect thinking about environmental 
policy? More importantly, how can they inform policy makers? As regards recycling 
participation, results seem to support a libertarian paternalism approach (see Thaler 
and Sunstein, 2008) – i.e., policies need to be designed to correct individual failures. 
As noted in chapter 1, libertarian paternalism – paternalistic as it claims government 
legitimacy to stop individuals making ‘wrong’ decisions, and libertarian as in 
principle ‘choice architects’ (i.e., policy makers) cannot impede individuals’ freedom 
of choice – is a response to systematic behavioural anomalies documented by 
behavioural economics. Libertarian paternalism is implemented by nudging 
individuals towards ‘desirable’ choices. Specifically, the nudge perspective diverges 
from the neoclassical perspective, in so far as the focus is not on the change in 
economic constraints individuals face, but on finding ways to influence the choice 
architecture in which individuals operate. Although in recent years a large consensus 
has been formed around this new form of intervention (see e.g. Shogren and Taylor, 
2008), it is also important to acknowledge that some scholars (see Sugden, 2008, 
2009) express their reservations about the adoption of such a form of paternalism. 
Major criticisms against Thaler and Sustein’s arguments in favour of nudge can be 
summarised as follows. First, there is lack of credibility of the idea that the 
libertarian component can be realistically consistent with paternalism. Indeed, if 
individuals make systematic mistakes any interventions that a paternalistic judges to 
be in the individuals’ well-being can potentially be justified. Secondly, Thaler and 
Sustein (2008, pp. 79-84) offer general guidance as to situations in which nudges can 
be beneficial to individuals – i.e., when there is lack of self-control, when decisions 
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are difficult and infrequent, when feedback to individuals is rare, when nudgers have 
more expertise than individuals, and finally, when tastes and needs of individuals can 
be easily identified. However, in their seminal book the definition of most of these 
criteria remains generally vague. Lack of precision is also present in most of the 
arguments supporting the statement that individuals want to be nudged, against the 
more realistic statement that they might want to be nudged (see Sugden, 2009). 
Finally, in contrast to neoclassical economics and in order to reduce complexity, 
nudge supports the idea that the number of choices that individuals face need to be 
restricted as this reduces the chances of losing the ‘optimal’ choice. However, a 
restriction on the choice ‘overload’ might benefit some groups more than others, 
which raises the problem of whose group preferences need to be assigned greater 
relevance. Thus, “…if it is possible to design policies to change behaviour, it is also 
important to be aware of all of the implications of policies that are designed to 
nudge” (see e.g. Weyman et al., 2013, p. 163).   
 
This said, drawing on results obtained from this analysis, the answer to the 
questions mentioned above depends on whom you ask and on what governments 
really need to achieve. A libertarian paternalist would favour a facilitating nudge 
policy measure over mandatory schemes as “ better governance requires less in the 
way of government coercion and constraint, and more in the way of freedom to 
choose” (see Thaler and Sunstein, 2008, p. 15). Moreover, if government aims at 
attaining a positive long-run effect, a facilitating nudge intervention might be more 
desirable as it seems to boost individuals’ intrinsic motivation towards recycling (see 
Rege, 2004). Thus, building upon the insights of Cognitive Evaluation Theory 
(CET), in this context external regulation will be more likely to be internalised into 
an autonomous regulation. By contrast, anti-libertarian paternalists would probably 
express reservations about a facilitating nudge policy as there is always a feasible 
alternative to paternalism, and this “is what it has always been – the market” (see 
Sugden, 2008, p. 247). Indeed, based upon the above evidence and with the objective 
of short-run effectiveness, mandatory schemes seem to be more attractive (i.e., they 




Moving to discounting, individuals’ preferences revealed the existence of a 
paradox of hyperopia. Thus, compared to less environmentally-friendly respondents, 
eco-friendly people not only discounted environmental gains more than losses, but 
they were also less willing to postpone losses to future generations. In its essentials, 
the argument can be explained as follows. Traditionally, the discounting literature 
has associated impatience with the tendency of acting in self-interest – i.e., people 
prefer consumption now rather than later and the reverse for costs. However, results 
from this analysis suggest that this tendency is more likely to be related to 
selflessness. As such, the benefits of taking actions on the environment ‘now’ can 
also spillover to the (near and far distant) future, whereas the lower disposition to 
postpone costs to future generations result in a less discriminatory practice towards 
future generations. The core premise is that the ‘urgency’ of doing something for the 
environment ‘now’ among environmentally-friendly individuals translates here into 
‘benevolence of the present’ rather than the ‘tyranny of the present’ (as suggested by 
Koundouri, 2009). With this in mind, empirical findings from this analysis seem to 
support again a more paternalistic role of the government. Government intervention 
is here advisable not only to sensitise individuals towards more eco-friendly 
behaviours (e.g. by raising individuals’ awareness about environmental damages 
through national and local information campaigns), but also to enhance 
environmental sustainability in the long-run.  
 
7.3 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
     
It is also important to acknowledge that both surveys are based on students’ 
responses and hypothetical scenarios. As discussed in chapter 4, a growing 
experimental literature relies on students’ responses – i.e., there is no reason, in fact, 
to think that undergraduate students have a different cognitive process from the adult 
non-student population (see Alm and Jacobson, 2007). However, there is now an 
increasing concern over the external validity of studies published in world’s top 
journals that claim to generalise to ‘humans’ or ‘people’ results obtained entirely by 
Western, Educated, Industrialised, Rich and Democratic (WEIRD) undergraduates 
(see Henrich et al., 2010). Major criticisms over the representativeness of WEIRD 
subjects concerns how: these people measure up to the relevant reference 
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populations, people from modern industrialised societies compare with small-scale 
societies (such as South Africa and New Guinea), people from Western societies 
compare with people from non-Western industrialised societies, and university 
students compare with the adult non-student population. Although it is important to 
recognize the relevance of these criticisms and to acknowledge that these WEIRD 
people may not reflect the full breadth of human diversity238, the peculiarity of the 
frameworks employed in this study offer insight. Ideally, in order to control for such 
diversities research programs should promote large-scale experiments extended to a 
broader sample of individuals, international research as well as collection of data 
over the full life-cycle of individuals using a wide-variety of experimental 
techniques. But the world is not ideal. As a future task it might be of interest to 
extend in further research the surveys to a broader sample of respondents, or to 
analyse these aspects in a field experiment. Confining the interpretation of results to 
the population from which individuals were sampled will help reducing problems of 
over-generalisation of findings.  
 
Regarding the hypothetical bias of stated preferences methods, it might be argued 
that this problem seems not to play a major role here. The purposes of both empirical 
analyses were neither to assess which was the best policy to adopt in order to 
increase individuals’ contribution to recycling among those mentioned in the 
hypothetical settings, nor to provide a specific measure of the discount rate to use in 
cost-benefit analysis. The surveys employed here were used to shed light on how 
individuals react (in terms of intrinsic motivation) to different policy schemes (i.e., 
signals), and to test whether or not people discount all goods in the same way.   
 
However, if in the case of recycling participation it might be argued that 
hypothetical scenarios served to reduce ‘socially acceptable’ responses bias (see 
Orviska and Hudson, 2003), this was not the case for intertemporal choices.  Further 
research is needed in this context to control for potential confounding factors (e.g., 
                                                 
238 This might explain for example why there was not very much variation in many of the socio-
demographic/economic indicators used in the survey described and analysed in chapters 3 and 4 (e.g., 
age, financial satisfaction, occupational and marital status), and why some other relevant variables 
(i.e., education) were not included into the analysis. 
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changing the order of the questions, and using less abstract scenarios) which might 
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